

THE AMERICAN NEPTUNE

MARITIME HISTORY & ARTS



VOLUME SIXTY-ONE, NUMBER THREE

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THE AMERICAN NEPTUNE

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF MARITIME HISTORY AND ARTS

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≈ ON THE COVER ≈

L'Astrolabe and *La Zélée* (French ships) stranded in Le Detroit de Torres, May–June 1840. Oil on canvas, ca. 1856. 36 x 67¼ in. Signed: Louis le Breton (1818–66). This painting by the official artist of the Dumont d'Urville expedition was exhibited at the Paris Salon. Gift of Museum Friends and Fellows, 1961 (M10920).

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF'S NOTE

A recent visit to Pearl Harbor, as part of the arrangements for the annual meeting of the North American Society for Oceanic History, allowed me to fulfill a lifelong dream: to visit the USS *Arizona* Memorial. The memorial itself grew out of a wartime desire to honor those who died in the attack. The present memorial was created in 1958 and dedicated in 1962. According to its architect, Alfred Preis, the design was to show structural sag in the center but strength and vigor at its extremities: the initial defeat represented by the sag is flanked by the ultimate victory and remembrance of the ends. The overall effect, as intended, is one of great serenity.

In a larger sense, the memorial, the final resting place for many of the ship's 1,177 crewmen who lost their lives on 7 December, is also a commemoration of all military personnel killed in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

We all prepare ourselves as best we can to face the personal difficulties, shock, sadness, and horror when we go to memorials. My first experience of this was at Dieppe, France. The *Arizona* memorial was equally moving, lying as the wreck does in such a peaceful and secure setting. The total violence of the "day that will live in infamy" was hinted at when I viewed, as a sort of preview to visiting the site, a film about the battleship's last minute. I had never before seen the starboard-on movie footage of the 1,760-pound armor-piercing bomb that passed through her deck and ignited the forward ammunition magazine. At approximately 8:10 A.M., the ship exploded, and in less than nine minutes sank, a total loss. This finality, matched by

its suddenness, is hard to fathom, but that is exactly what happened.

The U.S. Navy and the National Park Service provide excellent interpretation and support for any persons wishing to visit this memorial, and in the course of this you will get a glimpse of the great USS *Missouri*, now secured to her berth, a living testimony to the longevity (thanks to protective air power and other means of self defense) of perhaps the greatest battleship class in history.

Incidentally, a recent notice in my newspaper reports the death at age eighty-six of Captain Herbert Houck, a naval aviator from USS *Yorktown*, who in his Hellcat led forty planes into attack. The target was the Imperial Japanese Navy's *Yamato*, which, with her sister, the *Musashi*, was by far the largest warship ever built. The bombs and especially torpedoes dropped by Houck and his fellow carrier aviators ended the age of battleships. Massive explosions were caused in the *Yamato*. She went down with a loss of 2,499 of a crew of 2,767. This was the last gasp of the battleship, and no other naval board of admiralty ever ordered another built—although they did go for some smaller, powerful versions. The dreadnought era had closed, but the revamped *Missouri*, along with the *Iowa*, *New Jersey*, and *Wisconsin*—all still afloat—remind us of the persistence of the mobile fire battery that only a battleship can deliver against land. They may have a return to favor in the future or be replaced by something of equal vitality and efficacy.

We must commend the organizers of the North American Society for Oceanic History for holding the meeting in Honolulu and at the Hawaiian

Maritime Center. It would have been so easy to cancel arrangements in the wake of 9 September, but in the end, the attendance was full, and the papers were most promising. The best may appear in future pages of this journal. Incidentally, next year's NASOH meeting is at the Maine Maritime Museum in Bath, Maine, 14 to 18 May, and that is another venue not to be missed. The program chair is Dr. Warren Reiss of the Darling Marine Center of the University of Maine in Walpole.

In this issue, we publish a truly strong collection of articles. We also print our usual rich array of book reviews and notices, trusting that our readers will approve of our efforts and labors and encourage others to take up subscriptions.

BARRY GOUGH
Editor in Chief

“WE ARE ARMED FOR THE DEFENSE
OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN”:
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION COMES TO AMERICA

by William R. Casto

On 29 July 1793, Jean-Baptiste François Bompard woke up and probably anticipated a leisurely morning. He had dedicated his life to service in the French navy, and the last seven months had been the most satisfying of his career. In January, he had been promoted to the rank of captain and was given the beautiful frigate *L'Embuscade*—a powerful cruiser almost identical in size to the USS *Constitution* (which had not yet been built). Since then, war had broken out between Great Britain and revolutionary France, and he had sailed his ship on an independent command to North America. In the middle of a successful maritime campaign against British

commerce, his ship was in New York Harbor for repairs. He could not possibly have anticipated that, in the next three days, a challenge to a duel would lead to a desperate frigate action at sea that would be discussed in President George Washington's cabinet meetings and be celebrated throughout America in toasts, poems, and songs.¹

The story of the next three days is emblematic of American politics and foreign relations in the earliest years of the republic under the Constitution. In 1793, the United States was a weak, agrarian country powerless to prevent European superpowers from operating at will along the eastern seaboard. The British minister to America bitterly complained that in dealing with foreign affairs issues the American government was “forced to recur to half measures and palliatives, that would disgrace the miserable republic of San Marino.”² In addition to an almost utter lack of power to implement foreign policy decisions, conflicting attitudes toward revolutionary France and Great Britain politically paralyzed the republic. A minority of Americans—led by the merchant class—was pro-British, but most Americans supported France, which had lent crucial assistance during the Revolutionary War. For pro-French Americans, *L'Embuscade* and Bompard, her gallant commander,

William R. Casto is the Allison Professor of Law at Texas Tech University and has always harbored a love for maritime history. He is the author of the award-winning book *The Supreme Court in the Early Republic* and is particularly interested in foreign affairs in late eighteenth-century America. The present article will appear as a chapter in his forthcoming book *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution in the Age of Fighting Sail*.

embodied the republican ideals of the American and French Revolutions.

Regardless of the American government's weakness, a man has to eat. After dressing, Bompard sent word that he was ready for breakfast, and the response almost certainly was, "Oui, Citizen Bompard." It was not as captain or sir, but as citizen, that he was addressed. This democratic title neatly summarized his entire career. He had first gone to sea twenty years earlier as a fifteen-year-old volunteer on a two-year voyage to India. During the American Revolution, he had seen extensive combat and served with distinction with the French naval forces that assisted the rebelling colonies along the East Coast and that operated in the West Indies. Nevertheless, he had found promotion in the navy of Louis XVI almost impossible.³

Bompard's problem was quite simple. He lacked influence. For most of the eighteenth century, sea-officers of the French navy were divided into a class system that greatly hampered effective operations. There were two officer corps. All commands of significant ships were reserved for the Grand Corps, which consisted of *officiers rouges* who were exclusively of noble birth. In addition, there was a Petit Corps of auxiliary officers, who were drawn primarily from the merchant marine and the navy's petty officers. Most of the auxiliary officers were non-noble *officiers bleus*. The Petit Corps officers were allowed to stand watch but never to command an important ship. Although Bompard styled himself as de Bompard when he first entered the navy, his father was in the French counterpart of the British East India Company, the Compagnie des Indes, and his pretension to nobility was dubious. Bompard was a member of the Petit Corps—a *bleu* officer.⁴

By 1787, after fifteen years at sea, Bompard was a penniless, thirty-year-old auxiliary officer reduced to pleading for promotion to the lowest commissioned rank of Vessel Second Lieutenant. Marshal de Castries, an army officer who recently had been appointed minister of marine, had instituted naval reforms designed to open the Grand Corps to non-

nobles. With this encouragement, Bompard humbly petitioned de Castries for a commission. Bompard reviewed his extensive service record and noted "the flattering service reviews from all his chiefs." He even invoked his mother, "who has exhausted her fortune." Although Marshal de Castries decided to grant the petition, he did not necessarily base his decision on merit. The petition's margin bears this note: "Recommended by Madame the Marquise de la Rivière and given by Madame the Marshal de Castries."⁵

Bompard served as a second lieutenant for the next five years without promotion, but the French Revolution changed everything. Suddenly, there were no more *rouge* officers. In 1789, the *officiers rouges* began leaving the navy, and by 1792, most of the noble officers were gone. The Revolution turned the navy's officer corps upside down and swept away the stultifying system of promotion for *bleu* officers. Bompard enthusiastically embraced the ideals of the Revolution and detested the aristocrats who had left. In 1793, the French consul in New York, who was himself an aristocrat, recorded in his private journal that "Bompard has only one way to judge the aristocracy: every person he hates is irrevocably an aristocrat." The elimination of the navy's aristocratic class system made 1792 a great year for Bompard. In January, the new navy promoted him to Vessel First Lieutenant, and later that year he took the civic oath decreed by the National Assembly. Then, after only a year in grade as a full lieutenant, he leapt to the rank of captain and took command of *L'Embuscade*. He had been to sea for fifteen years before receiving a commission, but with the Revolution, he needed only a year to become a captain.⁶

So the simple phrase "citizen" undoubtedly had real meaning for Bompard. It represented a rejection of the royalist regime and an affirmation of France's new revolutionary ideals. The leaders of the Revolution had recognized his merit and entrusted him with an important independent command. As Bompard ate breakfast, he may have thought about his recent campaign along the east-

ern seaboard that had vindicated the Revolution's trust in him.

In early April, he had taken France's new minister to the United States to Charleston, South Carolina, but he did not tarry to be feted by wealthy Francophile planters. Bompard believed in decisive action. As soon as he had replenished *L'Embuscade's* supplies of food and water, he rampaged northward taking British ships willy-nilly.

Americans were bowled over by Bompard's maritime onslaught. In Philadelphia, which was then the nation's capital, the mere appearance of two British ships taken by *L'Embuscade* sparked a sensation. The arrival of the two prizes elated Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson. He gleefully wrote his friends that masses of yeomen flocked to

the wharves and "shewed prodigious joy when . . . they saw the British colours reversed and the French flying above them." The yeomen "burst into peals of exultation."⁷

The entry of *L'Embuscade*, herself, into port caused no less a stir. As the frigate glided into Philadelphia Harbor, almost every vessel in port flew their colors to honor her arrival. Although Bompard was above all else a man of action, he understood that his ship represented the Revolution's spirit and martial prowess. He ordered a fifteen-gun salute, which was returned by cannons at Market Street Wharf. When the smoke cleared, everyone saw that *L'Embuscade* was decorated from stem to stern with red caps of liberty, and she flew flags with specially inscribed messages from her



Contemporary engraving of *L'Embuscade* off the Battery of New York. She is flying the new Republic's ensign with a tricolor canton on a field of white. Courtesy of the New York Public Library.

masts. From the foremast came the warning "Enemies of equality, reform or tremble," from the mainmast, it read "Freemen, we are your friends and brothers," and from the mizzenmast, it proclaimed "We are armed for the defense of the rights of man."⁸

In addition to these stirring slogans, Bompard almost turned his frigate into a stage. On public occasions, he and his crew delighted in serenading spectators with fervent renditions of the new revolutionary song, the *Marseillaise*. *L'Embuscade's* "yards were manned, and every person on board joined with utmost enthusiasm." Even moderate Federalists who leaned toward Great Britain were impressed. Years later, Charles Biddle recalled *L'Embuscade's* serenade and insisted "there never was a more animating song composed."⁹

In Philadelphia and other ports, local leaders visited *L'Embuscade* and saw in Bompard the epitome of liberty, equality, and fraternity. He was a true republican who dressed simply in a sailor's jacket without badges of rank. Instead of the traditional cocked hat, he wore the red stocking cap of liberty. He was not elegant in manners. He spoke simply and directly. After entertaining visitors with dinner and numerous toasts, Bompard would have the frigate's boatswain give an "artless and energetic [speech] replete with feeling." Americans were bowled over by Citizen Bompard, who came "armed for the defense of the rights of man."¹⁰

L'Embuscade's cruise quickly assumed legendary status. Most of the newspapers in the country carried details of her exploits. Bompard took eleven prizes during the spring and summer of 1793, but speculation and rumor quickly inflated his impressive record to epic proportions to the public. Within less than a month after Bompard's arrival in the United States, an English merchant in far-off Nova Scotia confided to his diary that *L'Embuscade* had already "taken upwards of 20 sail of English Vessels." Others reported that Bompard "had captured or destroyed upwards of 60 british vessels." In New York, Edward Livingston gleefully wrote his brother, the governor, that the "unex-

pected arrival of the *Ambuscade* seems to have at once [revived the] spirit of seventy-six."¹¹

Bompard could not help but be proud of his ship's accomplishments, but reveries have to end. After breakfast, he may have turned with a frown to the bane of every captain's existence: paperwork. As he slowly plowed through the accumulated lists, returns, balances, tabulations, and reports, a small launch was seen rowing toward *L'Embuscade*. Eventually word reached Bompard that the launch bore an important message from Hauterive, the French consul. A British frigate, the *Boston*, was cruising outside New York off Sandy Hook and was masquerading as a French ship.

As soon as Bompard heard the message, he knew that he had been tricked. He had been informed over the weekend just a day or two before that a strange cruiser had appeared off the coast and that the stranger was the frigate *La Concorde* newly arrived from France via Cap Français in the West Indies. Bompard and Consul Hauterive had been delighted by this news of reinforcements and had sent a message out to "*La Concorde*" suggesting that she sail towards Rhode Island to catch a British pirate who was plundering Frenchmen without a letter of marque. Bompard had sent the message in a barge with one of his officers, Lieutenant Whittemore, and nine other members of *L'Embuscade's* crew. Undoubtedly, the *Boston* had snapped up the barge and crew, but the ruse hardly could have been a complete surprise. Ships in the eighteenth century frequently flew their enemy's flags in the hope of obtaining some advantage. Indeed, just three months earlier, *L'Embuscade* had flown the British flag before capturing the British merchantman *Grange*.¹²

However irritating the likely capture of Lieutenant Whittemore must have been, the most astonishing news from Consul Hauterive was that the *Boston's* captain had openly challenged Bompard to a ship-to-ship duel. By chance, the two captains actually knew each other. Some say that Bompard had been taken prisoner by the British captain during the American Revolution. It is more

likely, however, that the two met during peacetime when Bompard sailed on packets as an auxiliary officer or lowly lieutenant, and the Englishman, who was five years his junior, was already an august captain. The misery of those lean peacetime years surely rushed back coupled with an opportunity for revenge against an enemy who epitomized the system of influence that had kept Bompard down for so many years. He immediately resolved to accept the challenge.¹³

The English captain was George William Augustus Courtenay, a rising star in the Royal Navy, clearly destined for promotion to admiral at an early age. In 1781, at the age of twenty, Courtenay became a lieutenant and almost immediately received a plum assignment to an admiral's staff. Courtenay had what Bompard lacked; that is, influence. Although Courtenay technically was not a nobleman, his uncle was the second Earl of Bute, his first cousin had served as chief minister of Britain, and another cousin, who was also a dear friend, was in Parliament.¹⁴

For all this influence, Courtenay never viewed his office as a sinecure. He had entered the Royal Navy when he was fourteen years old, and in a number of battles, he had proved himself to be a capable and aggressive leader. Promotion to acting lieutenant came in 1780, and he almost immediately became Admiral Rodney's flag lieutenant in the West Indies. In 1782, he distinguished himself in Rodney's victory over the French at the Saintes. Courtenay's cousin later wrote these lines:

When Rodney's genius forc'd the gallic line,
In victory's van he saw you early shine;

Rodney was so impressed that, on the spot, he promoted Courtenay, then twenty-one, to the rank of captain and temporarily gave him the *Anson*, a ship of the line whose captain had been killed in the victory. Such early promotions were unusual, but they happened on occasion. Horatio Nelson was promoted to captain when he was twenty, and August Keppel was nineteen when he became a captain.¹⁵

Because Courtenay's utter lack of seniority did not warrant command of such a large ship, Rodney almost immediately transferred him to the command of the small, 24-gun frigate *Eurydice*. A few days later, Rodney sent Courtenay back to England with duplicate copies of the despatches announcing the great victory. Courtenay made the most of his new command. Shortly after returning to European waters, he fought a successful battle in which he took a French 14-gun brig. When peace came in 1783, his influence kept him from having to serve at half-pay without a ship. He sailed to the East Indies to convey the news that the Treaty of Paris had concluded the Revolutionary War. While in India, he married Frances Ogle, the daughter of a British general.¹⁶

Although influence can jump a twenty-one-year-old to the rank of captain, promotion to admiral was another matter altogether. Throughout the eighteenth century, promotion to flag rank in the Royal Navy was based solely upon seniority. In 1793, when war resumed with France and Citizen Bompard sailed *L'Embuscade* to the New World, Courtenay was not quite half way up the captain's list with 219 captains ahead of him. Nevertheless, he had reason to hope for a somewhat accelerated promotion to admiral. In the late 1780s, the Admiralty began obliquely recognizing merit by forcing unfit senior captains to retire, and in 1787, the new approach was, in effect, approved when Parliament rejected a challenge to the new system. In addition, with war being newly declared, England hungered for victories. Earlier in the summer, Captain Edward Pellew, who fought the first successful frigate action of the war, was knighted the day he set foot back in England. In 1793, Captain Courtenay was an aggressive thirty-year-old officer who knew that the newly declared war would offer similar opportunities to him.¹⁷

After ten years of peace, Courtenay was ready for action. As Bompard rampaged up the eastern seaboard, Britain's minister to the United States sent letters to the Royal Navy in Canada, detailing

to the Almshouse, Bridewell and Jail, in place of
Nicholas Romaine M.D. who has resigned.

FOR SANDY HOOK,

For the purpose of carrying Passengers.



The beautiful and fast sailing
Schooner **EXPERIMENT**,
Charles Buckley, Master.

Will sail as soon as the French
frigate *Ambuscade* gets under way. For passage
apply to the master on board. It is desired of
those who wish for a passage to call by 10 o'clock.
Said schooner lies at Jones's new Wharf.

July 30.

Sales by SIMON NATHAN,

This Day, 12 o'clock at the Coffee-house, for

A newspaper advertisement offering a ringside seat to the coming battle (*New York Daily Advertiser*, 30 July 1793).

L'Embuscade's exploits and providing a full description of her armament. Finally, the minister's cries for help reached the Newfoundland Station where, by lucky coincidence, Courtenay was the senior officer. His frigate, the *Boston*, was older and about two-thirds the strength of *L'Embuscade* in terms of size and number of crew, but the *Boston* was not undergunned. In addition to the standard thirty-two long guns of her class, she mounted six twelve-pound cannonades, which made the two frigates' broadsides virtually equal.¹⁸

Courtenay recognized a golden opportunity when he saw one. Like Captain Wentworth in Jane Austen's novel *Persuasion*, Courtenay hoped to have "the good luck . . . to fall in with the very French frigate I wanted." The capture of *L'Embuscade* would net Courtenay and his crew a tremendous amount of prize money—almost certainly over ten thousand pounds. In addition, a victory would distinguish Courtenay as one of the top English officers, one who clearly merited one of the navy's choicest assignments. Finally, given Courtenay's family connections, a victory undoubtedly would

have brought him a knighthood and probably even a baronetcy.¹⁹

The *Boston* immediately set sail. On the way south, Courtenay's last stop in Canada was Halifax, where he stopped to hire a pilot familiar with American waters and, probably, to replenish munitions. Halifax was a wealthy port with an immense stock of military stores. The inhabitants generally believed the port was "so ill protected that two vessels of war, and one thousand men . . . might destroy it all." In fact, just a few months earlier, false rumors of an approaching French frigate had thrown everyone into a panic. When the *Boston* arrived off the port's entrance, Courtenay "made a signal for a pilot with a gun" and "exercised [the] Great and small guns." The cannonade immediately sparked a panic in Halifax. People mistook the *Boston* for a French frigate—probably *L'Embuscade*. "Alarm guns . . . were fired, and a red flag displayed at the Citadel." Militiamen stumbled out of their houses, farms, and places of business.²⁰

There was considerable relief when word filtered through town that the menacing frigate was British. When Captain Courtenay announced his plan to sail south and take *L'Embuscade*, an impromptu ball was immediately scheduled. The governor and every prominent person attended, and at the conclusion of the ball, the ladies of the town announced that they would raise a substantial purse to reward the *Boston*'s crew when she returned from her mission.²¹

After the ball, Captain Courtenay set sail as soon as wind and tide would permit. On the way south, he did everything possible to prepare for battle. The gunners greased the trucks of the gun carriages and were set to making "swabs & points [and] Wads." Courtenay read and reread the "Articles of War" to his men, and as the *Boston* approached New York, the crew exercised the "Great Guns" each day.²²

On the way to New York, Courtenay received disturbing intelligence. A French squadron, including two 74-gun ships of the line and several frigates, was in transit from Cap Français in the West Indies

to the American coast. This news, however, did not cause Courtenay to change his plans, and as he continued sailing south, he hit upon a clever idea. If Halifax mistook the *Boston* for a Frenchman, perhaps others would too. He summoned his sailmaker and ordered the making of flags bearing the colors of the new French Republic. Others in the crew set to making tricolor cockades for the quarterdeck crew's hats, and the motto "Liberté et Égalité" was carefully painted on the frigate's stern. When the *Boston* finally arrived off the port of New York, she looked like a Frenchman, and Captain Courtenay had adjusted the duty roster so that all of his French-speaking officers and men were on deck.²³

The ruse worked to perfection. Passing ships immediately mistook the *Boston* for the French frigate *La Concorde*, known to be sailing from the West Indies. Like *La Concorde*, the *Boston* was a "black-sided ship," whose long row of gunports was not painted in a contrasting color. During the weekend of 27 and 28 July, word of the new "French" frigate filtered into New York, and newspapers actually reported that the newly arrived ship was *La Concorde*.²⁴

The next day, Captain Courtenay continued cruising well outside New York Harbor, and in the mid-afternoon, the barge steered by *L'Embuscade*'s Lieutenant Whittemore provided a little comic relief. The oarsmen had been rowing for about twelve hours. They proceeded first through a "rainy and dark" night and then entered into bright sunlight. As the crew continued pulling on their oars, Whittemore tried to catch a ride on passing ships out to "*La Concorde*," but no one would take him. At least two of the passing ships assured him, however, that a French frigate was at Sandy Hook. He later related that, when he finally reached the *Boston*, "they began to talk French to me, with vous aboarde monsieur." To which he replied, "Oui," and in the next instant, "they had got two guns pointed into me and ready to fire." As Bompard feared, the British took *L'Embuscade*'s barge and crew.²⁵

Almost immediately, Captain Courtenay turned his attention to a small schooner within cannon shot. After the *Boston* fired three progressively closer warning shots, the schooner hove to and, upon being boarded, proved to be an eight-gun privateer, the *Republican*. This vessel had sailed from Cap Français in a moderately successful cruise and had sent at least one prize into New York. For Captain Courtenay, the capture presented an opportunity to communicate with Sir John Temple, the British consul in New York. He placed his most junior lieutenant, George Hayes, who happened to be the consul's nephew, on the *Republican* as a prize master and sent him into port with a number of despatches for Temple.²⁶

Back in New York Harbor, Citizen Bompard knew that there was much work to be done before he could weigh anchor to meet the *Boston*. Moreover, he had only a skeleton crew on board, which complicated the task of preparing the ship for combat. Some time earlier, *L'Embuscade* had suffered damage to her masts in a storm, and he had put into New York for repairs. The crew had worked hard, and the day before Bompard received word of Courtenay's challenge, he had distributed some prize money and given shore leave to virtually the entire crew. The first order of the day, then, was to recall the crew.²⁷

As Bompard gave orders for the recall, he saw more boats pulling toward *L'Embuscade*. News of the coming engagement had already swept through town, and his men were returning of their own accord. Courtenay had sent his challenge into New York via Patrick Dennis, the commander of an American revenue cutter. Immediately after communicating the challenge to Consul Hauterive, Dennis went to the recently-built Tontine Coffee House, which was in the commercial center of New York. As soon as Dennis got to the Tontine, he told everyone about the challenge and posted a notice on the coffeehouse bulletin board.²⁸ The notice informed the public in this simple and unusually casual manner:

Last evening came up from Sandy-Hook, the Revenue Cutter, Capt. Dennis, who at 4 P.M. 2 leagues E. by S. from Sandy-Hook, spoke the British frigate *Boston*, Capt. Courtenay, who informed Capt. Dennis, he would be very happy to see the *Ambuscade*.

The above ship carries 32 guns.

The news flashed through the city.²⁹

When Bompard heard about the notice at the Tontine, he sent a messenger over to the coffeehouse to pin a card immediately below Courtenay's challenge. Bompard's reply was short and sweet:

Citizen BOMPARD will wait on Capt. COURTENEY tomorrow, agreeably to Invitation; he hopes to find him at the Hook.

The city was agog.³⁰

As *L'Embuscade's* crew turned to their work, New Yorkers gravitated toward the East River wharves and encouraged the crew "with yells of joy and clapping." While Bompard and his crew busily prepared the ship for action, Consul Hauterive started looking for a pilot to guide the frigate out to sea. The "most extravagant terms were offered" by Hauterive, but to no avail. No pilot wanted to sail on board a frigate that was going into combat. Nor were pilot boats available. One pilot explained that his usual boat "was already engaged to go down to the Hook on a fishing party with a number of merchants." The more probable explanation is that every boat in port was already chartered by sightseers who planned to see the impending battle. At least nine vessels were chartered for this purpose, and one enterprising captain even ran an ad in a local newspaper.³¹

In the late afternoon, Lieutenant Hayes, prize master of the *Republican*, sailed into the harbor with news of how Captain Courtenay's masquerade had tricked the French. Hayes was a junior officer who had been a lieutenant for only two months.³² After delivering despatches to his uncle, the British con-

sul, the new lieutenant stepped over to the Tontine for a drink. His intentions were probably innocent, but he became embroiled in a fracas that heightened the city's interest in the coming combat.

As soon as Lieutenant Hayes walked through the coffeehouse door in his new lieutenant's uniform, someone drew his attention to the posting of Captain Courtenay's challenge and Citizen Bompard's reply. Needless to say, he could not resist proclaiming that he was a King's officer on the *Boston* and that Captain Courtenay would certainly thrash the frog frigate. Hayes's boast delighted "some mercantile persons" who undoubtedly stood him a round of drinks. As the evening progressed, however, Lieutenant Hayes began "vociferating against the Americans as a nation [and] offered to bet a wager of 100 dollars, that the *Boston* would take the *Ambuscade* frigate." Perhaps someone inelegantly told him to put his money where his mouth was. In any event, Hayes, who was by then drunk on pride, spirits, or both, replied that "he would instantly stake the money, provided he was sure it would be safe in the country."³³

In response to this slur by Hayes, one Mr. Jessop stepped forward to defend the honor of America and France. Not being schooled in the finer elements of honor, Jessop knocked the tipsy lieutenant to the ground with a haymaker. Hayes struggled to his feet with his hand on his sword and started to say something, but Jessop was not interested in talk and swords. He stepped in close, and again the good lieutenant went to the ground. Bystanders "seized [Hayes] by the nape of the neck and the waistband of his breeches" and gave him the bum's rush out of the Tontine. They "tossed [him] from the gallery into the street," and when his "mercantile [friends] attempted to be insolent in his behalf, [the friends] were soon hushed by a saving glimpse of the Liberty Cap."³⁴

By Tuesday, brags and counter brags enveloped the city. Everyone eagerly anticipated the coming battle. Francophiles gloried in Mr. Jessop's premonitory pounding of Lieutenant Hayes. A local newspaper reported that "the great majority [sup-

port] our gallant Gallic friends [and] many bets are laid on the subject." Another paper reported that "business was almost at a stand." On board *L'Embuscade*, the crew had labored incessantly to prepare her for action, and Bompard was ready to sail. There was still no pilot, and some in town began to suggest that perhaps the French were not eager to engage the *Boston*. Bompard finally decided to leave without a pilot. He sailed *L'Embuscade* into the Upper Bay, dropped anchor, and waited for the tide. Contrary winds prevented a Tuesday departure, and the battle would simply have to await another day.³⁵

Finally, the contrary winds let up the next day, and *L'Embuscade* sailed through the Narrows and began searching for the *Boston*. At about the same time, Captain Courtenay encountered the French squadron from Cap Français and managed to elude it. He and Bompard continued searching for each other until they finally met in the early morning of 1 August, the next day. Both ships beat to quarters, but neither captain wished to close. Dawn had yet to arrive, and Bompard could not ignore the possibility that the dimly perceived phantom frigate was actually *La Concorde*. As for Courtenay, he knew that the French squadron that he had eluded earlier might be in the area and decided not to close until he could see how many enemy ships were about. Finally, dawn came at five o'clock, and the two ships began to approach each other.³⁶

In the coming engagement, Bompard had a real advantage. The wind was behind *L'Embuscade* and blowing in the *Boston's* general direction, which gave Bompard the weather gage. Therefore, the French would be assisted by the wind in any maneuvers taken toward the *Boston*, and the *Boston* would be hindered in its movements toward *L'Embuscade*. Captain Courtenay well understood his handicap and set his ship on a course parallel to and somewhat ahead of his adversary. His plan was to "reach" *L'Embuscade*. In effect, he sought to take the weather gage away by making a large U-turn around Bompard. To counter this tactic,

Bompard sailed his ship on the same course as the *Boston* and at a slight angle that would prevent Courtenay from "reaching" him but would cause the two frigates to converge.

Bompard's plan worked to perfection, and as the two frigates gradually converged, Courtenay had to think fast. If he let Bompard get too close on a parallel course and Bompard maneuvered his ship effectively, *L'Embuscade's* opening broadside could be devastating. The problem was inherent in the design of sailing ships. Cannons were mounted along the sides of a warship and could not fire directly forward or aft. If ships were close to each other and on a parallel course, they could slug it out and see whose gunnery was superior or luckier. If, on the other hand, a ship could manage a raking maneuver by crossing close ahead of or behind a target ship, the ship could fire an unopposed rolling broadside into the target ship. The comparative advantage of the weather gage greatly enhanced the probability that *L'Embuscade* would be able to rake the *Boston*, and Courtenay saw this well before the opportunity arose. He put the *Boston* about and turned inside *L'Embuscade's* course so that the two ships wound up sailing directly towards each other on parallel courses. Bompard still had the weather gage, but the closing speed between the ships was at such a rapid pace that a raking maneuver would be more difficult.

As the two frigates converged, Bompard made a private recognition signal to establish whether the *Boston* was a French vessel. Instead of replying with the proper signal, Courtenay struck his French colors, hoisted British colors, and fired the *Boston's* only cannon that could bear forward. Each crew now waited to give and receive broadsides, and finally the ships met at a distance of about a hundred yards. The *Boston* fired her broadside battery, but *L'Embuscade's* guns were silent.

During the long period of maneuvering after the ships first sighted each other at daylight, there was ample time to load each cannon with care and precision. Bompard wanted his first broadside to be a devastating raking fire against the enemy's stern.

As the two ships converged, he ordered his crew not to fire and instead prepared to put his ship about. His plan was to cross the *Boston's* stern as soon as she passed by, but all went for naught because *L'Embuscade* missed her stays. As a result, she floundered somewhat into the wind, backed her main and mizzen topsail, and wound up sailing on the same tack as before. Meanwhile, the *Boston* wore ship and came back parallel to *L'Embuscade*. The time for fancy maneuvers was over, and the two frigates settled into a pounding match.

For about an hour, the ships blasted away at each other, and each suffered grievous losses. On the *Boston*, the French broadsides struck down key members of the crew. Because Lieutenant Hayes was unable to rejoin the ship, Captain Courtenay had only two commissioned naval officers to assist in managing the battle: Lieutenant Edwards, his first lieutenant, stayed by his side on the quarter-deck, and Lieutenant Kerr supervised the cannons on the main deck. As the battle progressed, grapeshot struck Kerr in the shoulder, and splinters permanently blinded one eye and temporarily blinded the other. Splinters also got to Edwards, who suffered a concussion. At the same time, "a splinter which being driven in horizontal direction thro' the fleshy part of his nose, there lodged, remaining fixed something in the manner of a ship sprit sail yard." After the ship's first and second lieutenants went to the sick bay, Captain Courtenay and a lieutenant of marines were the only officers left on deck.³⁷

The loss of these key officers, however, did not diminish the *Boston's* murderous broadsides. As the cannon exchange progressed, the British gun crews proved to be more efficient than the French. According to a British report, the *Boston* managed to fire three shots for every two fired by the French, and one of *L'Embuscade's* officers later conceded that the French fire "was not quick." The hours of gunnery practice that had been imposed by Captain Courtenay paid off. In addition, the *Boston's* cannons had a new flintlock firing mechanism. After the battle, Lieutenant Edwards reported with some



J. B. F. BOMPARD,

Capitaine de Vaisseau, Chef de Division Commandant LE HOCHÉ, 21 Vend^{re} an 7 (12 Oct^{bre} 1798)

Citizen Bompard in action off the Irish coast in 1798. Courtesy of the Musée de la Marine, Paris.

satisfaction that the new locks proved to be “of great service, by not having one Gun misfire during the Action.”³⁸

On board *L'Embuscade*, Bompard did everything that he could to counter the *Boston's* superior rate of fire. To keep the crew's spirits up, he had a sailor sing the great revolutionary songs, and during sporadic moments of silence, the crew was urged on by the *Ça Ira*, the *Marseillaise*, and other Revolutionary songs. As the British continued their effective fire, Bompard knew he was at a disadvantage, and three times attempted to close on the *Boston* and board her. Captain Courtenay had com-

manded a king's frigate for over ten years and was an excellent sailor. Each time, he managed to maintain enough distance between the two ships to prevent boarding. After two unsuccessful attempts, Bompard finally got *L'Embuscade* almost close enough to board. A wag later wrote these lines:

Close as a lover to his mistress dear,
Close as a pillory to a rascal's ear,
Close as a miser to a bag of Joes—
So close hung *Ambuscade* to *Boston's* nose

Courtenay managed to keep a slight distance, and as the ships came close to touching, he pulled a card out of his sleeve.³⁹ Courtenay ordered his gunners to charge their cannons with pieces of "old iron, nails, broken knives, broken pots, and broken bottles." When *L'Embuscade* hung close to *Boston's* nose, the British fired at point-blank range. Bompard saw entire swaths of rigging and sails dissolve before his eyes. He still had the weather gage, but the *Boston's* devastating broadside virtually destroyed his ability to maneuver. A spectator reported that *L'Embuscade* "appeared to be in much confusion." Her fire slackened, and Bompard saw the specter of defeat.⁴⁰

Before Captain Courtenay could take advantage of his crippled opponent, chance and the French gun crews' stubborn determination reversed the tide of victory. Either at this point or perhaps earlier, Bompard threw tradition to the wind. He believed his presence on the quarterdeck had "more of a ceremonious parade in it, than real utility." He knew that all was lost if *L'Embuscade's* gunnery did not improve, and he left the quarterdeck to devote himself personally to "the management of his main deck great guns." Driven on by the words of *La Marseillaise* and the hands-on encouragement of their captain, the French gun crews redoubled their efforts and extracted a murderous dividend from their enemy. The French cannonade shot away the *Boston's* main topmast, and its huge sail fell to the deck and covered most of the guns on one side of the ship. Even worse, one of *L'Embuscade's* cannonballs struck the *Boston's* quarterdeck and found Captain Courtenay and his lieutenant of marines, and the two men died instantly.⁴¹ An anonymous poet later wrote this account:

One random shot from fate's sure bow,
Lays *Boston's* mighty monarch low

At about the same time, the wind shifted almost imperceptibly. *L'Embuscade* still had good steerage, and her sailing master briefly turned the

frigate slightly towards the wind, which caused the ship to slow down. The *Boston* moved ahead, and using the remaining steerage, *L'Embuscade* managed to creep across the *Boston's* stern.

The next minute would determine the battle. There was time for only one broadside, and every shot must count. Under Bompard's direct and personal supervision on the main deck, the gun crews prepared to fire. As the *Boston's* stern eased slowly into view at close range, the gunner of *L'Embuscade's* forwardmost cannon blew the slow match on his linstock and touched it to the gun's vent. The priming charge caught fire, and the gun carriage leapt backwards as the gun cast its twelve-pound ball or perhaps a wreath of scrap metal at the enemy.⁴² There were twelve more guns on the main deck, and *L'Embuscade* delivered a slow, rolling—almost rhythmic—broadside of destruction.

The battle was over. Bompard had won. The final broadside had wasted everything connected to the *Boston's* mizzenmast, and a sailing ship cannot effectively maneuver without the mizzenmast and sails in its rear. The broadside had "cut the spars, sails and rigging of the *Boston* in such a manner that they had very little command of their ship." The destruction was too much for the British sailors. They had seen every officer cut down, and without leadership, they briefly panicked. A number of gun crews fled their guns and huddled in the forward part of the ship, away from *L'Embuscade's* devastating fire. The *Boston* could not maneuver; a fallen sail and mast had disabled one whole side of her gundeck, her crew had abandoned their stations, and not a single commissioned officer remained on deck. All *L'Embuscade* had to do was limp alongside the *Boston* and board her.⁴³

The same wind that had been Bompard's ally all morning snatched away complete victory. The mangled sails and masts in the *Boston's* rear prevented her from doing anything but sail with the wind. In an instant, the breeze caught the undamaged sails on the *Boston's* foremast and without direction by any human hand spun her before the wind and wafted her gently along. Poor Bompard

watched in disbelief as the *Boston* sailed slowly but inexorably away. He immediately attempted to wear ship and give pursuit, but his rigging and sails would not allow it. The French crew leaped to the masts to jury rig the frigate, and *L'Embuscade* was off and running in about fifteen minutes. As both ships raced before the wind, Lieutenant Edwards staggered to the quarterdeck sporting the gruesome splinter through his nose and wearing a shirt with a dark brown mantle of dried blood. He later explained that he was "in so weak a state as to be obliged to support myself for some time by the breast work Barricade on the Qr Deck." Given the state of his ship and his knowledge that a French squadron was somewhere in the area, he concluded that flight was his only viable option.⁴⁴

Unfortunately for Bompard, the *Boston* had a head start and was able to crowd on more canvas. The British broadsides had shot through *L'Embuscade's* mainmast, impaired her foremast, and severed her mainstay, which supported and steadied the main mast. Nevertheless, Bompard persevered in the chase. He had been to sea since he was fifteen, and he knew that a mishap aboard the *Boston* might bring her once more under his guns. As the pursuit continued, axmen cut away the railing on *L'Embuscade's* bow, and gunners shifted cannons forward to serve as makeshift bow chasers in the hopes that a fortunate shot might disable the fleeing British frigate. Bompard continued the chase for two hours, but the pursuit was to no avail, and the *Boston* escaped. With regret, Bompard turned his ship back towards New York.⁴⁵

The arrival of the French squadron from Cap Français preceded *L'Embuscade's* return to New York. Two ships of the line and fourteen other vessels dropped anchor off the Battery, and thousands flocked to the tip of Manhattan. The squadron and the Battery fired salutes to each other and "three cheers [came] from the amazing concourse attending." Then word swept through town that *L'Embuscade* could be seen coming from the Narrows. The crowd swelled to "nearly ten thousand persons" according to one newspaper—to

four thousand according to a careful lawyer. Then the victorious frigate sailed gracefully into view, "under a full suit of canvass with a light breeze." The crowd of "people assembled were at a loss how to express their joy, having heard of the gallant behavior of Citizen Bompard . . . and his crew." As *L'Embuscade* came closer, she shattered the silence with a triumphant artillery salute. Immediately, everyone "answered as if each had the lungs of Stentor." Spontaneous cheers burst forth, and "continued shouts and huzzas were vociferated." As *L'Embuscade* sailed slowly by towards her anchorage in the East River, Bompard and his crew returned the enthusiastic cheers.⁴⁶

Word of the engagement quickly swept throughout the United States, and countless poems, songs, and toasts celebrated the victory. A few days after the battle, "a number of citizens met at the house of citizen Richardet [in Philadelphia] to celebrate the victory," and after dinner, the celebrants drank numerous toasts. The first was to "the patriotic band of heroes who composed the crew of the *L'Ambuscade*." The party concluded with a vow of Franco-American solidarity. Everyone raised his tankard and pledged "The republic of America & France: may their emulation only tend to a love of each other!" In far-off Charleston, South Carolina, the celebrations were much the same. A "large company of reputable citizens assembled" for an evening of "great festivity," and after dinner, the first of countless toasts was dedicated to "Citizen Bompard and his heroic crew: may liberty always have such gallant defenders." Immediately there followed "3 cheers."⁴⁷

The British implicitly agreed that *L'Embuscade* had won the day and tried to explain the outcome as turning upon a significant disparity in the raw size of the two frigates' crews. In addition, a week or so after the battle, word began to circulate that the powerful French squadron came upon the battling frigates and forced the *Boston* to retire. The disparity of crews might have been significant if *L'Embuscade* had managed to board the *Boston*, but she did not. The notion that the French squadron

forced the *Boston* to withdraw should be dismissed as a *post hoc* fabrication. Lieutenant Edwards's action report, Citizen Bompard's action report, the master's log of the *Boston*, and the other early eyewitness accounts of the battle do not mention an intervention by the French squadron.⁴⁸

Today, some two hundred years later, the elation of the pro-French Americans and the implicit concession of the British seems unwarranted. Two frigates of roughly comparable strength inflicted serious damage on each other. Neither ship was completely victorious, and after repairs, both ships returned to active duty. In strictly military terms, the engagement clearly was a draw. Yet, virtually all Americans, including those who leaned toward Britain, clearly regarded the battle as a French victory.

The reason for this disparity between the eighteenth- and twentieth-century views of the battle lies in the fundamental nature of *L'Embuscade's* mission to America. The political impact of Bompard's depredations was far more significant than his success as a commerce raider. As Edward Livingston explained, *L'Embuscade's* exploits revived the "spirit of seventy-six." Bompard took prizes and effectively fought off the *Boston*, but the main impact of his mission was to provide reassurance to the majority of Americans who wanted to support the cause of Revolutionary France.

In the United States, the battle was a major political victory for Revolutionary France, and the American reaction was quite unkind to Captain Courtenay. Although he had bravely given his life in service to his country, Americans who sought to bolster commercial relations with Great Britain were quick to revile the fallen captain. When word of the battle reached Thomas Jefferson, he was in a cabinet meeting and could not resist rubbing Secretary of War Henry Knox's and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton's pro-British noses in the French victory. With gloating satisfaction, Jefferson noted that "both shewed the most unequivocal mortification." Knox immediately

"broke out into the most unqualified abuse of Capt. Courtenay." For his part, Hamilton, admittedly "with less fury, but with deepest vexation, loaded [Courtenay] with censures."⁴⁹

Pro-French Americans were equally quick to launch unseemly *ad hominem* attacks. Newspaper articles variously attacked Captain Courtenay as "arrogant," a "Braggadocio," an "envenomed ruffian," and even a "gasconading poltroon." He was full of "British bombast," and a man given "to bluster and threaten." His conduct was "a striking example of the bullying, sanguinary disposition of the British nation" and was "an indelible stain upon their boasted national character." Citizen Bompard, however, refused to participate in this riot of invective. He gave "due credit to the valour and intrepidity of his antagonist [and spoke] only of the victory, as one obtained over a respectable foe."⁵⁰

The reason for the overblown American reaction to the battle lay in the belief that the Royal Navy was superior to any navy in the world and certainly superior to the navy of a country like France that was newly founded on republican principles. One newspaper noted the "old English prejudice, 'that an Englishman is a match for three Frenchmen,'" and Senator Pierce Butler of South Carolina wrote the same thing in a private letter. Another paper noted that some believed that "an English frigate was an over match for any frigate of more than equal force." In the wagering frenzy preceding the battle, those "who believed in the invincibility of the tars of Old England had given large odds that the *Ambuscade* would be taken." This assumption of British superiority galled Americans who saw France as following the trail blazed in the American Revolutionary War. The French—like the Americans—had rejected monarchy in favor of republicanism. Nevertheless, Americans could not help but believe that the British Royal Navy was superior to a republican navy in France.⁵¹

Citizen Bompard's steadfast conduct contradicted this lingering belief in the Royal Navy's superiority. As one newspaper noted, the victory

was “a compleat refutation of the old superstition” of English superiority. Bompard came to America “armed for the defense of the rights of man” and by force of arms proved that a crew of citizen-sailors could defeat a king’s ship of comparable strength. Americans delighted in this proof. Senator Butler saw Bompard’s triumph as a clear refutation of the myth of British superiority. A writer in New York, who relished the *Boston*’s flight from battle, explained, “the Frenchman won the Battle, the Briton won the Race.” Similarly, a poet in Philadelphia composed this verse:

The Gaul had the best of the fight, tis agreed
The Briton—the best of the race

In Philadelphia, citizens drank to *L’Embuscade*’s “patriotic band of heroes” and then lifted their glasses again to this toast: “May British bombast ever meet the fate of Capt. Courtney, when opposed to the sons of freedom.”⁵²

In retrospect, Bompard’s triumphant return to New York marked the high tide of pro-French sentiment in the United States. Throughout the course of *L’Embuscade*’s maritime exploits, Edmond Charles Genet, the new French minister that Bompard had brought to America in the spring, was impetuously sowing the seeds of a public relations catastrophe. Genet insisted that the Federal government adopt a loose neutrality that would help France, but instead the government chose a strict neutrality that was more favorable to Great Britain. The policy of strict neutrality so infuriated Genet that in private he began threatening to appeal the matter directly to the people. By the fall, skilled Federalist politicians managed to persuade the public that the French minister wanted the American people to choose between himself and President Washington.⁵³

A song written a few days after *L’Embuscade*’s victory unwittingly prophesied Genet’s public relations disaster. Most of the song’s twenty-five stanzas are devoted to “gallant BOMPARD” and his crew.

They fought “like lions . . . for freedom [and] in Equality’s Cause.” The song also called for a toast “to Citizen GENET” but urged Americans to raise their glasses only when Genet “treats with respect the MAN whom the PEOPLE adore.” Nothing was left to inference. The man whom Genet must respect was “GEORGE WASHINGTON . . . who saved Columbia’s brave Land.” If the people were to choose between the French minister and George Washington, the choice was inevitable. Genet’s mission ended in failure, and for a variety of reasons, Franco-American relations steadily deteriorated to the point that, a few years later, the United States found itself engaged in an undeclared naval war with France.⁵⁴

AFTERWARDS

After repairs, the *Boston* was on convoy duty to Newfoundland by early 1794. She spent the rest of her career in the backwaters of the Napoleonic Wars. She was already thirty-one years old in 1793, and her small size did not comport with the Royal Navy’s evolving preference for larger frigates. Finally, in 1811, she was broken up.

L’Embuscade continued in French service. In 1798, she sailed on an ill-fated expedition to Ireland where the British captured her and later renamed her the *Seine*. Consistent with the new frigate policy, the British enhanced her armament to forty-four guns. She saw considerable action, but only survived the *Boston* by two years. In 1813, she was broken up.

After the battle, the British government granted Courtenay’s widow and children individual pensions. Lieutenant Edwards, the *Boston*’s first lieutenant, attained the rank of commander two years later but was never promoted to captain. Although permanently blinded in one eye, Lieutenant Kerr had a distinguished career. He became a captain in 1806 and a Companion of the Bath in 1815. Lieutenant Hays survived his scuffle at the Tontine Coffee House and became a Companion of the Bath and Rear Admiral of the White.

Citizen Bompard remained a committed republican for the rest of his long life but never reached the rank of admiral. In 1798, he was taken prisoner after a heroic fight in which his ship of the line fought three British ships of the line for three and one-half hours. When he got back to France, Napoleon was in the process of converting the Republic to the Empire, which Bompard opposed.

He finally left the navy, never to serve again. He must have been appalled when the monarchy was restored after Napoleon's downfall. He publicly supported the overthrow of the ultra royalists in the July Revolution of 1830. Four years later, France finally recognized his service to the Republic and made him a Commander of the Legion of Honor. In 1841, Bompard died in his hometown of Bagnol.⁵⁵

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≈ NOTES ≈

1. "Summary of Service, Jean-Baptiste François Bompard," *Service historique de la marine*, Vincennes, France; Maude Howlett Woodfin, *Citizen Genet and His Mission* (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1928), appendix D; David Lyon, *The Sailing Navy List* (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1993), 246; K. Jack Bauer and Stephen S. Roberts, *Register of Ships of the U.S. Navy* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 8; George Hammond to Officer Commanding at Halifax, 27 April 1793, Public Record Office, Admiralty Archives; and *Etat exact des forces navales de la République française qui se trouvent actuellement dans les Etats unis*, 15 July 1793, Archives des affaires étrangères, *Correspondance politique, Etats unis*, 38:52. *L'Embuscade* was only three years old and was an early example of the tendency to build larger frigates. She was two feet longer than the USS *Constitution* and four inches narrower. *L'Embuscade* was undergunned. In April 1793, the commander of a

British packet carefully inspected *L'Embuscade* and reported that she mounted twenty-six twelve-pounders and twelve eight-pounders. French records indicate that she mounted only thirty-six cannons.

2. George Hammond to James Bland Burges, 12 October 1793, James Bland Burges Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford University.

3. "Summary of J. B. F. Bompard's Service," *Service historique de la marine*.

4. William S. Cormack, *Revolution and Political Conflict in the French Navy, 1789-1794* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 35-41; Ernest H. Jenkins, *A History of the French Navy* (London: Macdonald & Jane's, 1973), 109, 147, 200; "Bompard, Jean-Baptiste François," in M. Prévost & Roman d'Amat, *Dictionnaire de biographie française* (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1954). For an example of Bompard being called de Bompard, see *Les combattants français*

de la guerre américaine, 1778–1783 (Washington: Imprimerie Nationale, 1905), 118.

5. Cormack, *French Navy*, 43–45; and Bompard to Marshal de Castries, n.d. [ca. 1787], *Service historique de la marine*. For an earlier, unsuccessful petition, see Bompard to Marshal de Castries, n.d. [ca. 1784], *Service historique de la marine*.

6. Cormack, *French Navy*, chapters 5 and 6; “Summary of Bompard’s Service,” *Service historique de la marine*; Jenkins, *French Navy*, 204–6; Bompard’s Civic Oath, 14 March 1792, *Service historique de la marine*; and journal of Alexandre Maurice Hauterive, entry of 3 November 1793, New-York Historical Society.

7. Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 5 May 1793, and Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Randolph Jr., 6 May 1793, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. John Catanzariti (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 26:661, 668–69. For the specific identity of the prizes, see *The Counter Case of Great Britain as Laid before the Tribunal of Arbitration, Convened at Geneva* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1872), 610.

8. *Philadelphia National Gazette*, 4 May 1793.

9. Charles Biddle, *Autobiography of Charles Biddle* (Philadelphia: E. Claxton, 1883), 253 (a posthumous publication).

10. *Philadelphia Federal Gazette*, 9 August 1793; and *Carlisle Gazette*, 5 June 1793.

11. Bompard, record of prizes, n.d., *Service historique de la marine*; *Diary of Simeon Perkins, 1790–1796* (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1961), 3:226; William James, *The Naval History of Great Britain* (London: Harding, Lepard, 1826), 1:142 (60 vessels); and Edward Livingston to Robert Livingston, 15 May 1793, Robert Livingston Papers, New-York Historical Society.

12. Memorial from George Hammond, 2 May 1793, *Jefferson Papers*, 25:637–40; Jean-Baptiste François Bompard, “Report of the Combat that took place August 1, 1793,” *Service historique de la marine*; and Jacob Whittemore to the Convention of France, 18 October 1793, Archives des affaires étrangères, *Correspondance politique, Angleterre*, 587:271–73. For details of the British pirate, see Tobias Lear to Thomas Jefferson, 14 August 1793, *Thomas Jefferson Papers*, 26:666–67; and John Edwards to the Admiralty, August

1793, Adm 1/2863 (Lt. Edwards’s draft report).

13. Alexandre Maurice Hauterive to Jean-Baptiste François Bompard, 29 July 1793, *Service historique de la marine*; and [Providence, Rhode Island] *United States Chronicle*, 22 August 1793.

14. Egerton Brydges, *Collin’s Peerage of England* (London: Rivington Otridge & Son, 1812), 2:574–75; and George W. A. Courtenay’s Lieutenant’s Passing Certificate, Public Record Office, Adm 6/89. The cousin in Parliament was John Courtenay.

15. George W. A. Courtenay’s Lieutenant’s Passing Certificate, Public Record Office, Adm 6/89; *London Gentleman’s Magazine*, September 1793, at 862 (obituary); John Courtenay, *Elegy to the Memory of George W. A. Courtenay, Esq.* (1793; reprint, private second edition, London, post 1816); “Genealogy of the House of Courtenay from their first going over to Ireland [ca. 1816],” Courtenay Archives, Powderham Castle, England; Letter-Books and Order-Book of George, Lord Rodney (New York: New-York Historical Society, 1932), 2:666; and Daniel A. Baugh, “The Eighteenth-Century Navy as a National Institution, 1690–1815,” *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy*, ed. J. R. Hill (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 154.

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17. William Laird Clowes, *The Royal Navy* (London: Samson Low Marston, 1898), 3:343–47, 4:476–77; and Steel’s Original and Correct List of the Royal Navy (May 1793).

18. George Hammond to Officer Commanding at Halifax, 27 April 1793, and George Hammond to Officer Commanding at Halifax, 17 May 1793, Admiralty Archives, Public Record Office, London; and William James, *A Naval History of Great Britain* (London: Harding, Lepard, 1826), 1:145–46.

19. Richard Hill, *The Prizes of War* (United Kingdom: Sutton Publishing, 1998), ch. 17, quoting Jane Austen.

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United States of North America in the Summer of 1794 (London: G. & T. Wilkie, 1796), 24; master's log of the *Boston*, Public Record Office, Adm 52/2951; and *Halifax Gazette*, 23 July 1793.

21. *Philadelphia Federal Gazette*, 12 August 1793; and *Carlisle Gazette*, 21 August 1793.

22. Master's log of the *Boston*, Public Record Office, Adm 52/2951.

23. *Philadelphia Federal Gazette*, 9 August 1793; O. Troude, *Batailles navales de la France* (Paris: Challamel aîné, 1867), 2:304; *New York Diary; or, Loudon's Register*, 6 August 1793; *Salem Gazette*, 6 August 1793; and master's log of the *Boston*, Public Record Office, Adm 54/2951.

24. Jacob Whittemore to the Convention of France, 18 October 1793, Archives des affaires étrangères, *Correspondance politique, Angleterre*, 587:271-73; *Philadelphia Federal Gazette*, 30 July 1793; and Edmond Genet to French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2 August 1793, reprinted in "Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791-1797," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1903 (1904), 236-37.

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28. *New York Diary; or, Loudon's Register*, 6 August 1793; and *Salem Gazette*, 6 August 1793.

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30. Ibid.

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34. *Carlisle Gazette*, 7 August 1793; and Charles William Janson, *The Stranger in America* (London: J. Cundee, 1807), 430-31. A pro-British account of the incident states that Lt. Hayes "escaped further injury by jumping over the iron railing in front of the house." When Lt. Hayes reminisced about the battle years later, he made no mention of his Tontine adventure (John Marshall, *Royal Navy Biography* [London: Harding, Lepard, 1827], supp., pt 1: 35-39).

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37. Marshall, *Royal Navy Biography*, supp., pt. 1: 35, 37 (Lt. Kerr); and *New York Diary; or, Loudon's Register*, 12 August 1793 (Lt. Edwards).

38. *Philadelphia Federal Gazette*, 23 October 1793; *Philadelphia Federal Gazette*, 9 August 1793 ("not quick"); and John Edwards to the Admiralty, August 1793, Adm 1/2863 (draft report).

39. *Carlisle Gazette*, 21 August 1793 (poem and revolu-

tionary songs).

40. *Philadelphia Federal Gazette*, 9 August 1793 ("old iron," etc.); Edmond Genet to French minister of foreign affairs, 1 August 1793, Archives des affaires étrangères, *Correspondance politique, Etats unis*, 38:151–53; and *Philadelphia Federal Gazette*, 2 August 1793 ("confusion").

41. *Carlisle Gazette*, 21 August 1793 (Bompard's personal management of great guns); and *Hartford [Connecticut] Courant*, 6 January 1794 (anonymous poem).

42. *New York Diary; or, Loudon's Register*, 12 August 1793 ("A crow bar was found sticking to the *Boston's* side from the *Ambuscade*.")

43. *Philadelphia Federal Gazette*, 6 August 1793; Marshall, *Royal Naval Biography*, supp., pt 1:39 (referring to Lt. Edwards's unpublished official report); Clowes, *Royal Navy*, 4:478; and *London Gentleman's Magazine*, September 1793, at page 862.

44. John Edwards to the Admiralty, August 1793, Adm 1/2863 (draft report); and *Salem Gazette*, 20 August 1793.

45. *Philadelphia Federal Gazette*, 6 August 1793; and deposition of John Whitney, 4 August 1793, Public Record Office: FO 5/2.

46. *Philadelphia Federal Gazette*, 5 and 6 August 1793; James Kent to Moss Kent Jr., 3 August 1793, James Kent Papers, Library of Congress; and Walter Livingston to Henry Walter Livingston, August 1793, Robert Livingston Papers, New-York Historical Society.

47. *Philadelphia Federal Gazette*, 7 August 1793; and *Boston Gazette*, 7 October 1793.

48. William Windham to Captain Lukin, 22 March 1794, *The Windham Papers* (Boston: Small, Maynard; 1908), 1:210–12.

49. Thomas Jefferson, "Notes of a Cabinet Meeting," 3 August 1793, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 26:607–8.

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Carlisle Gazette, 14 and 21 August 1793. For Bompard, see [Providence, Rhode Island] *United States Chronicle*, 22 August 1793.

51. *Boston Gazette*, 7 October 1793; *Philadelphia Federal Gazette*, 5 August 1793; Pierce Butler to Edward Rutledge, 9 August 1793, Pierce Butler letterbook, 1:133–34, Pennsylvania Historical Society; Isaac Q. Leake, *Memoir of the Life and Times of General John Lamb* (Albany, N.Y.: J. Munsell, 1850), 342 ("large odds"); and "An excellent new PATRIOTIC SONG," a broadside (Boston, 1793).

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53. The story is well told in Harry Ammon, *The Genet Mission* (New York: Norton, 1973) and Alexander DeConde, *Entangling Alliance: Politics and Diplomacy under George Washington* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1958).

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THE USS *CONSTELLATION*'S CIVIL WAR

by John D. Barnard

Moored as a museum ship in the inner harbor of Baltimore, Maryland, is a large, three-masted, square-rigged wooden warship. She is the sloop-of-war, or corvette, the USS *Constellation*, the only former U.S. Navy ship still afloat that served in the American Civil War as a major first-line fighting ship.

The November 1860 election of Abraham Lincoln brought to a head issues dividing the country. Convinced now it could no longer expect reasonable treatment from the federal government, South Carolina left the Union in December. Six more like-minded states followed over the next few months and formed a new nation, the Confederate States of America. Tensions increased, and in early April 1861, South Carolina decided it could no longer tolerate a foreign military post, the United States Fort Sumter, at the entrance to Charleston Harbor. Accordingly, the fort was bombarded. Its

garrison soon surrendered and was evacuated. In response, President Lincoln issued a call for seventy-five thousand troops from loyal states to deal with the rebellion. This act prompted the states of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas to secede and join the Confederacy. War was now a certainty.

When the conflict began, the ships of the U.S. Navy were stationed around the world in small squadrons on various tasks. Forty-one vessels were in active commission in March 1861, engaged primarily in promoting and protecting American commercial and diplomatic interests abroad as well as protecting American citizens overseas. The thirteen ships of the Home Squadron operated off the U.S. East Coast and in the Caribbean Sea. Five ships were in the Far East with the East Indies Squadron. Six vessels formed the Pacific Squadron in the eastern Pacific Ocean. The Brazil Squadron in the South Atlantic had three warships. In the prestigious Mediterranean Squadron were three ships. Lastly, off West Africa, the seven-ship African Squadron guarded and encouraged lawful American commerce and pursued American ships illegally engaged in the slave trade to the island of Cuba. A few other ships were individually employed on special duties.

Some eleven thousand officers, sailors, and marines served in the pre-war navy. Efficient and with high morale, it was hardly a moribund force of obsolete ships and weapons. Between 1856 and

John D. Barnard received his B.A. in history from Towson University in 1973. Since 1975, he has been a civil servant with the State of Maryland. He is a member of the U.S. Naval Institute and is on the board of directors of the Baltimore Council and the U.S. Navy League. Articles of his have appeared in *Naval History* and *Sea History* magazines. Over the past four years, he has extensively researched the operational history of the USS *Constellation*.



Color print of the corvette USS *Constellation* underway in Naples Harbor in 1862 by the Neapolitan marine artist Tomaso de Simone. Courtesy of the U.S. Naval Historical Center.

1860, all new ships added to the fleet, except the sail frigate *Sabine*, had auxiliary steam engines with reliable new Dahlgren shell guns as some or all of their armament. All in all, the navy was well suited to carry out the tasks given it by the government. The only major faults were the stagnation of officer promotions caused by the lack of an effective retirement system and unreadiness to fight a major war due to a peacetime outlook, but these problems were not impossible to correct.¹

In early 1861, the forty-one-ship active fleet consisted of various types. Twenty-five ships were steamers, mainly new corvettes, and most had screw propellers. There were two large sail frigates, ten sail corvettes, three supply ships, and a small steam harbor tender. Twenty-seven more ships, nine steam frigates and corvettes and eighteen sailing ships,

were laid up, many awaiting repairs to hulls or engines. All of these, however, could be put into service fairly rapidly if needed. Twenty-one other ships completed the navy list. Most of them were old sailing ships laid up as unserviceable or in a harbor role, and others were in various stages of construction, chiefly lying on the stocks with building on them suspended.²

A tremendous task lay before the Union navy in April 1861. Three main wartime roles soon became clear. The first was to impose a blockade along the Confederate coastline to prevent cotton exports and the importing of military supplies, heavy machinery, and other equipment. The second was to cooperate with the U.S. Army in gaining control of the western river systems as well as the important points on the seacoast. The third was

to protect United States merchant shipping and interests worldwide.³

In contrast, the new Confederate States government had no navy in early 1861. Vessels would have to be newly built or purchased and converted to fighting ships. Slowly, a navy began to be formed with its missions being the defense of Southern harbors and coastal areas as well as the age-old strategy of attacking the enemy's commercial shipping using raiders. This last would, if successful, hurt the enemy financially by the loss of ships and cargoes. Freight would not get where it was needed, and merchants would feel the pinch of rising wartime cargo-handling and insurance rates. Thus, it was assumed, they would clamor for peace, probably at any price.⁴

Accordingly, at the end of June 1861, a small bark-rigged, screw-propeller steamer of 437 tons and five guns, flying the Confederate flag, slipped through the blockade off New Orleans and disappeared into the Caribbean Sea. Her name was the CSS *Sumter*. Formerly the packet steamer *Habana*, she had been purchased by the Confederate navy and converted to a commerce raider. Her captain was Raphael Semmes, a former U.S. Navy officer. Weeks passed, and as Union merchant ships began to fail to arrive at their destinations, it became clear that an enemy raider was loose on the high seas.

At that same time, the USS *Constellation* was off the west coast of Africa as part of the U.S. African Squadron. The 22-gun sail corvette was the second U.S. warship to carry the proud name. The first had been a 38-gun sail frigate launched in Baltimore, Maryland, in 1797. After sterling service, she was finally scrapped in 1853 as her successor's keel was laid at the Gosport Navy Yard near Portsmouth, Virginia. Launched on 26 August 1854 and commissioned on 28 July 1855, the second *Constellation*, with a few pieces of wooden framing from the old ship in her structure, was an all-sail, three-masted corvette of 1,280 tons of new design. She was 176 feet long between the hull perpendiculars, and had a crew of some three hundred officers and men. Her armament consisted of two 10-inch

pivot guns on the upper deck at bow and stern, and four 32-pounder, and sixteen eight-inch guns below on the gun deck. The ten-inch and eight-inch guns fired explosive shells; all of the guns were smooth-bores. In 1859, just before the *Constellation* went out to join the African Squadron, the ten-inch guns had been removed.⁵

The three-masted, square-rigged large corvette of twenty to twenty-four guns had become the most common type of medium-sized warship by the mid-nineteenth century and had largely replaced the frigate. Frigates still existed, but they had grown steadily larger and more expensive and, therefore, had decreased in numbers in the world's navies. Now the corvette, much less expensive to build and operate than a big frigate, outnumbered other types of medium-sized warships. Frigates or corvettes scouted ahead of the battle fleet of ships-of-the-line in those navies that had them in numbers. They escorted merchant ship convoys and attacked enemy merchant ships and convoys and did general patrol work. Constructed in the early 1850s when the U.S. Navy already had a good number of steamers, not all of which were satisfactory, *Constellation* was considered to be a very efficient warship. As she was being completed, however, the navy leadership finally accepted the fact that all future warships should have steam engines to augment their sails, thus making the fleet truly modern and effective in battle. The USS *Constellation* was the last all-sail warship ever designed for the U.S. Navy, and would be the last of a long line that had begun in 1775.

After commissioning in 1855, the *Constellation* spent two and one-half years with the Mediterranean Squadron. After a short period out of service, she sailed from Boston in July 1859 to join the African Squadron as its new flagship. Flag Officer William Inman would command the squadron and Captain John Nicholas, a veteran naval officer from an old and respected Virginia family, commanded the corvette.



Commander Henry K. Thatcher in the late 1850s or very early 1860s. He commanded *Constellation* in 1862 and 1863. Courtesy of the U.S. Naval Historical Center.

Established in 1843, the small African Squadron had done its best to protect lawful U.S. shipping off West Africa and catch American ships engaged in the transatlantic slave trade to the Caribbean, illegal under U.S. law since the 1790s, but successes by the navy were few until 1859 and 1860. In 1859, the government resolved to make a stronger effort. Seven warships were assigned to the squadron, four of them steamers. The year 1860 saw

major achievements by the navy off Africa. Eight American slave ships were captured, and nearly three thousand people, bound for Cuba as slaves, were freed. In September, after months of intermittent patrolling and inspecting merchant ships off the coast, *Constellation* took the U.S. bark *Cora*, which had originally loaded 705 slaves for Cuba. Six hundred and ninety-four were alive when the *Cora* was stopped. The naval prize crew sailed the slaver to the free colony of Liberia, landed the former slaves, and then took the bark to New York City. Her captain and officers were confined there to await trial for violating U.S. laws against participation in the international slave trade.⁶

Off Africa, *Constellation's* officers and men were isolated from the acrimonious debates and arguments at home over slavery and states' rights. At sea, duty was to be performed and the ship's routine carried out despite personal beliefs. Although a Virginian, Captain Nicholas, a naval officer since 1815, remained firm in his loyalty to the United States. Some of his younger southern-born officers felt differently. However, discussion in the wardroom of political affairs at home was discouraged by the captain and the executive officer as absolutely necessary to preserve morale and good order in the crowded warship.

Life in the squadron went on normally as 1861 began, but within a few weeks, word was received of Abraham Lincoln's election as president and the resulting secession of the states of the deep South. Strong feelings in *Constellation's* wardroom began to rise. The seamen and marines in the crew were largely unmoved, since most were from Boston or the northern states, or were recent immigrants from Europe. While officers could honorably resign their commissions and go south to join their states' military forces, the enlisted men had joined for a set period of service. For them to leave the navy or marine corps before their time ended was desertion, a very serious military crime.

Constellation's marine officer was First Lieutenant John R. F. Tattnell. Born in Connecticut, he had later lived in Georgia and

considered that state his home. On 28 February 1861, he wrote to Georgia's governor offering his services if that state should leave the Union, which it had on 19 January. Tattnall's father, Captain Josiah Tattnall, had already resigned and gone south to become a captain in the new Confederate States Navy. In the navy's squadrons overseas, Lieutenant Tattnall and other pro-Southern officers were in a difficult situation. Their brother officers at home could leave the service and then catch the next train or boat south. Off Africa, it was not so simple. It was hard to find merchant ships in African ports sailing directly to America, and packet service to Europe was limited. Officers like Tattnall had to wait and keep a low profile. Lieutenant Tattnall, could do nothing, after sending off his February letter, except wait and carry out his normal duties as commander of *Constellation's* marine detachment.

During early 1861, the corvette patrolled off the mouth of the Congo River. At home, the Confederate States of America, a new nation, was established. U.S. forts, other military establishments, and public buildings passed to Confederate control. The worsening situation finally prompted the U.S. Navy Department to recall for war service at home most of the ships deployed overseas. On 8 and 11 April, orders went out to the U.S. Mediterranean Squadron commander to bring home his three ships. Then came the shock of the bombardment of Fort Sumter on 12 and 13 April, and war was at hand. For the seven warships off Africa, however, operations continued as before. Knowledge of Fort Sumter would not reach them for several weeks more.

Early May saw orders prepared to recall the ships of the East Indies and African Squadrons. On 9 May 1861, the navy department sent to Flag Officer Inman the following order: "It has been decided to recall all the vessels of the African Squadron with the exception of the sloop-of-war *Saratoga*. . . . You will give orders for the return of the several vessels of the squadron, as soon as practicable after the receipt of this. Your flagship, the

Constellation . . . will enter Portsmouth, N.H."⁷

In late May, *Constellation* lay off the Congo River's mouth preparing a boat expedition of armed sailors and marines to seek out upriver a U.S. brig suspected as a slaver. The boats cast off and were towed up by a British warship. On 21 May, the brig *Triton*, registered in Charleston, South Carolina, was captured without resistance. Captain Nicholas wrote in his report to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles that "She had no slaves on board, but every preparation for their reception had been made."⁸ The *Triton* was sent home with her prize crew ordered to make for Norfolk, Virginia. Upon arrival, they found that war had begun, and Norfolk was under Confederate control. *Triton* was sailed to New York where the Federal court condemned her as a prize of war. Because of her Charleston registry, *Triton* was the first enemy vessel taken overseas as a prize by the U.S. Navy in the Civil War.

Throughout the summer of 1861, *Constellation* cruised off the coast of Angola, except for a short voyage to St. Helena in July. In June, an ill Captain Nicholas had been invalided home. Captain Thomas A. Dornin assumed command. Nicholas remained loyal to the Union and saw shore duty during the war, but his son served as an officer in the Confederate army. Flag Officer Inman had directed the squadron's ships to concentrate in the Luanda, Angola, area. On 7 or 8 August, he received by mail the order of 9 May recalling most of his ships. The vessels were dispatched promptly, and *Constellation* herself sailed on 11 August "bound to Portsmouth, New Hampshire direct," as Inman wrote in his report.⁹

At Luanda, marine lieutenant Tattnall was transferred to the USS *San Jacinto*. His sympathy with the Confederacy was now known and, under the prevailing circumstances, Captain Charles Wilkes of the *San Jacinto* was in no mood to tolerate disloyalty among his officers. He relieved Tattnall of his duties and put him under arrest. Beginning in April 1861, the navy department no longer accepted officer's resignations without com-

ment. Now the man's status would be set down as dismissed from the service, a humiliating thing for officers and gentlemen. When the *San Jacinto* arrived at Boston in late November, Tattnall learned that he had been dismissed from the United States Marine Corps. He was held as a prisoner of war for a few months. Later on, he was released and exchanged. Making his way south, he finally joined the Confederate States Marine Corps and served until the war's end, alternating between the army and the marines.¹⁰

During *Constellation's* passage home, two of her naval officers, Lieutenants Benjamin P. Loyall and Walter R. Butt, both of Virginia, wrestled with their consciences and concepts of duty. After Fort Sumter fell, army and navy officers were required to reaffirm their oath of allegiance to the United States that they had taken upon being commissioned. Failure to do so meant automatic dismissal or a forced resignation. On 28 September 1861, *Constellation* arrived at the Kittery Navy Yard near Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Soon after she moored, the required loyalty oath forms were given to her officers. All signed except Loyall and Butt. Their resignations from the navy were accepted within a few days.¹¹

Both men went south and joined the Confederate navy. Loyall saw action during 1862 in the Hampton Roads region and in 1863 was on the staff of the Confederate naval academy. In 1864, reassigned to the North Carolina coast, he participated in the daring capture of the gunboat USS *Underwriter* near New Bern. Later that year, he oversaw construction of the ironclad CSS *Neuse*. At the conclusion of the war, he was a commander in the Confederate navy.¹²

Lieutenant Butt served as a division officer aboard the ironclad CSS *Virginia* in her battles at Hampton Roads on 8 and 9 March 1862. In 1862 and 1863, he was stationed in the fortifications at Drewry's Bluff on the James River. Strong earthworks with heavy cannons were there to defend the river approach to Richmond. One officer referred

to the place as "a perfect Gibraltar." By early 1865, Butt was commander of the gunboat CSS *Nansemond* and fought in the Battle of Trent's Reach on the James River below Richmond, an unsuccessful attempt by the Confederate James River Squadron to attack Union ships on the river. After destroying the *Nansemond* in April of 1865 as the Union forces closed in on Richmond, Butt joined Admiral Raphael Semmes's staff until the end of the war.¹³

As for *Constellation*, in late 1861, work began at the Kittery Navy Yard to repair and ready her for war service. Commander Henry K. Thatcher was assigned as her captain. Born in Maine in 1806, he was a veteran naval officer. He had been appointed midshipman at age sixteen and first went to sea in the frigate *United States*. In the following years, he saw service in the Pacific, Caribbean, and Mediterranean, and was promoted to lieutenant in 1833 and commander in 1855. During 1858 and 1859, he commanded the sail corvette *Decatur* in the Pacific. When the Civil War began, he was executive officer of the Boston Navy Yard. In November of 1861, he was named to command the *Constellation*.¹⁴

At the beginning of 1862, the ship was nearly ready for sea. After a long paper struggle with the navy's Bureau of Ordnance, two long-range Parrott rifled cannon were released to the ship to augment her armament of eight-inch and 32-pound smooth-bores. The rifles mounted were a thirty-pounder as a pivot gun on the forecastle and a twenty-pounder as a pivot gun aft on the upper deck. By the end of February 1862, *Constellation* was ready. Where would she be sent?

The Confederate navy steamer *Sumter* had been at sea since June 1861, preying on American merchant ships. Eighteen vessels had been taken by her between July 1861 and January 1862 despite the best efforts of the U.S. Navy. All U.S. warships had kept a sharp lookout for the *Sumter*. Some had come close to engaging her, but she had always eluded them. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles was under enormous pressure by merchants and

shipowners to provide naval protection for their ships and cargoes.¹⁵ It was decided to send a warship back into the Mediterranean to watch over shipping there and provide the security expected by American diplomats, businessmen, and missionaries in that part of the world. The *Constellation* was selected, and in his orders to Commander Thatcher of 28 February 1862, Welles gave these directions:

Sir: As soon as the U.S. sloop of war *Constellation* is ready for sea, proceed with her with all practicable dispatch to the Mediterranean, touching on the way at the Azores, Lisbon, and Cadiz. The main object in sending the *Constellation* to the Mediterranean is the protection of our commerce from the piratical depredations of vessels fitted out by those in rebellion against the United States. The principal one of these vessels, the *Sumter*, which has so far eluded our cruisers, when last heard from was in the vicinity of Gibraltar. Your chief duty will be the pursuit of that vessel should she remain in that quarter. At the same time, however, you will exercise vigilance in all cases.¹⁶

On 11 March 1862, *Constellation* sailed for the Mediterranean. Two days before, the ironclads *Monitor* and *Virginia* had dueled at Hampton Roads, Virginia. The corvette headed out into the wintry Atlantic. It was wartime now, and an enemy ship might appear on the horizon at any moment, as the entire crew well knew.

One of the crew was Moses Safford, a twenty-eight-year-old native of Maine. His father had been a sea captain, and young Safford had gone to sea in fishing boats and cargo ships. He had had a good education, actively studied law in his mid-twenties and involved himself in politics in the Kittery, Maine, area. When the Civil War began, he hoped to enter the navy as a master's mate and potential officer. However, in late 1861, he accepted from Commander Thatcher the appointment of yeoman in the *Constellation*. This was the senior petty officer aboard responsible for receiving, storing,

and issuing equipment needed to maintain and operate the ship, such as rope, blocks, oil, and paint. Safford, a mature and literate man, kept a meticulous diary of his experiences in the *Constellation* throughout the war. His entry for 11 March reads as follows:

This day at three o'clock, P.M. the topsails are hoisted at masthead and fasts singled, all ready to sail from the Kittery Navy Yard. Half an hour later we are coming down the Piscataqua [River] with a breeze from the West. Upon approaching forts McClary and Constitution,



Commander Henry S. Stellwagen in the late 1850s or very early 1860s. He commanded *Constellation* between 1863 and early 1865. Courtesy of the U.S. Naval Historical Center.

the usual salutes are fired and the compliment was returned by our ship by hearty cheers from the men in the rigging. The breeze freshens and soon we are free from the harbor of Portsmouth, out upon the broad Atlantic. It is a pleasant night and as our ship sails on her way some are singing songs, some are playing upon the viol, guitar and tambourine, and many are looking sad, at the idea of leaving the associations of home for a cruise of three years. Nobody knows where. We are sailing under sealed orders.¹⁷

All the way across, a good lookout was kept for the *Sumter*, but when *Constellation* came into Lisbon, Portugal, on 1 April 1862 her officers and men learned that the raider's cruise had ended at Gibraltar in mid-January. The Confederate ship had arrived there worn out and badly needing boiler repairs. This news was unknown in America when the *Constellation* had left in March. With the *Sumter*'s presence known, Union warships soon arrived to keep her under close surveillance. By early April, repair having proved impossible, Captain Semmes decided he had accomplished as much with the *Sumter* as possible. He paid off his crew and left for England with some of his officers to see about getting a new ship. *Sumter* remained in Gibraltar with a small caretaker party aboard. She would remain a potential threat and tie down Union ships to watch her until December 1862, when she was sold.¹⁸

After leaving Lisbon in mid-April, *Constellation* went to Cádiz and then Algeciras, Spain, just across from Gibraltar. She was there for a week while Thatcher viewed the *Sumter*'s idle condition firsthand. She then sailed into the Mediterranean to the small Italian port of La Spezia, south of Genoa. This would become the corvette's home port and base of operations. *Constellation*'s basic task was to cruise and "show the flag" and to demonstrate that the United States could, in spite of a major disruptive civil war at home, continue to protect its citizens and diplomatic and com-

mercial interests overseas, especially in an important region such as the Mediterranean.

The summer of 1862 was spent visiting ports in Italy and Sicily and sailing to Turkey and along the coasts of what is now Syria and Lebanon. Everywhere the ship visited, she was a reassurance to American diplomats, missionaries, and businessmen of U.S. naval protection against any kind of threat or interference.¹⁹

Entering the harbor of Smyrna, Turkey, on 18 August, the big warship was an impressive sight. *Constellation* arrived in a manner befitting a ship of the United States Navy. Her sailors and marines lined the upper deck and were aloft on the yards. The Stars and Stripes streamed proudly from the mizzenmast's gaff. Europeans and Turks alike took notice as she fired her salutes, came up to her berth, and let go her anchor. Shore leave for the crew in exotic Smyrna soon followed, and Thatcher, now newly promoted directly to commodore, went ashore to meet with the U.S. consul and discuss the local situation. Five days later came naval ceremonial at its best. As *Constellation*'s crew lined the scrubbed and spotless upper deck and the marine guard presented arms, the gun salutes roared out. Commodore Thatcher and his officers then welcomed aboard the governor general of Smyrna and some of his staff for a visit and a formal tour of the ship.²⁰

By the end of 1862, the ship was back in Italian waters and, as was the custom, lay in harbor all through the winter months. This was the usual routine. It was a time to give the crew extended shore leave and perform needed maintenance work. Rigging, spars, sails, and other gear would be overhauled and the ship cleaned and painted. If the need arose, she could be rapidly made ready for sea.

In the spring of 1863, the cruising season began again with a voyage to the western Mediterranean. When *Constellation* returned to Italian waters, it looked as if war would catch up with her at last. Reports and strong rumors were circulating about a large, fast British-built steamer named the *Southerner*. It was said she would come into the

Mediterranean and then be turned over to the Confederate navy for use as a raider against U.S. merchant shipping. The Confederate warships *Alabama* and *Florida* were attacking American commerce in the Atlantic, causing severe damage. If the same were to happen in the Mediterranean, it would be a disaster. Commodore Thatcher requested reinforcements, but the navy department felt it could not spare a single ship to help.

The very real possibility of the *Southerner* appearing worried Thatcher. He obviously felt that a sailing ship like his was ill-equipped to deal with a steamer. He wrote these lines to the navy department at the end of June:

Sir: I have the honor to inform the Department that I have learned from many private sources, which I have every reason to believe reliable, that a very fast steamer, said to be called the *Southerner*, has been built in

England, destined for a Confederate cruiser against the United States commerce in the Mediterranean, and from the fact that a rebel commander, T. Jefferson Page, late of the U.S. Navy, is now at Florence and believed to be awaiting the arrival of this steamer with the intention of assuming the command, I have reason to believe these reports to be true. It is said, and generally believed here, that this vessel will arrive in a Mediterranean port with regular papers and cargo, but in all respects fitted in such a manner that she can at once be converted into a privateer. I have therefore believed it to be my duty to lay these facts before the Department, trusting that a well armed United States steamer may be speedily sent into the Mediterranean with a view to aiding in preventing the destruction of our extensive commerce in this sea.



USS *Constellation* anchored off the U.S. Naval Academy in 1879. This is the best available photograph of her for the period. She is still largely in her Civil War configuration. Upper yards on the masts have been taken down. Courtesy of the U.S. Naval Historical Center.

At this season of prevailing calms the *Constellation*, though an efficient vessel of her class, could not successfully pursue a steamer.²¹

The next month, Captain Henry S. Stellwagen arrived to replace Thatcher. Now the worry about *Southerner* and *Constellation*'s abilities was his. Thatcher had been ordered home where he would soon have a long-sought, more active role in the war. By 1865, he was an acting rear admiral commanding the West Gulf Blockading Squadron.

Captain Henry S. Stellwagen assumed command of *Constellation* at La Spezia on 18 July 1863. A native of Pennsylvania, he was another officer of long service. He had been appointed a midshipman in 1828 and, as a lieutenant in the frigate *Potomac*, saw active service in the Mexican War. After that came hydrographic survey work and duty with the U.S. Lighthouse Service. Promotion to commander came in 1855. When the Civil War began, he was put in charge of sinking stone-filled blockships in the entrance channels to North Carolina sounds, a job that proved impossible to do properly. Stellwagen then requested sea duty and was given command of the USS *Mercedita*, a wooden, screw propeller steamer of nine guns acquired by the navy in July 1861. His ship operated off the west coast of Florida. By the end of 1862, it had joined the blockading force off Charleston Harbor in South Carolina.

The Confederate ironclads *Chicora* and *Palmetto State* sortied in the predawn hours of 31 January 1863 against the Union ships off Charleston. Stellwagen's *Mercedita* was rammed, shelled, and severely damaged. With his ship flooding and helpless against her ironclad enemy, he surrendered. He and his crew were immediately paroled, and they and the *Mercedita* were released.²² Stellwagen had acted honorably, but Secretary of the Navy Welles felt the captain had allowed his ship to be surprised and had not adequately defended her. His loyalty and fighting abilities were thus suspect. Released from the requirements of his

parole by early summer, Stellwagen became available for duty. Welles ordered him to the Mediterranean to command *Constellation* and perhaps redeem himself.

Now *Constellation* was under a new captain anxious to do well. Word of the *Southerner*'s appearance was expected any day. She had to be found and destroyed or captured if she was being used as a commerce raider. Upon leaving La Spezia Harbor on 24 July 1863, *Constellation* encountered a big steamer coming in. Petty Officer Moses Safford's diary tells what happened:

As we passed out of the bay we saw a large steam ship of war under sail apparently intending to enter, but soon she took in her courses and stood on the wind as though waiting for us. This indicated that she was the *Southerner* as we had suspected and was waiting to give us battle. We went to quarters and stood toward her. Soon we saw that she showed the Italian flag, but we kept on and worked to the windward of her thinking that the Italian flag might be a ruse. Not until we approached very close did we feel sure that she was Italian and not a Rebel craft. Our men were very eager for a fight. I do not know what we could have done with a steam ship like this one, but before she had finished us they would have known that they had been in a fight.²³

That summer, *Constellation* cruised the western Mediterranean hunting the *Southerner* or accurate news of her. The corvette visited Marseilles, France, and touched at Barcelona, Valencia, and Algeiras, Spain. She was at the centrally located Port Mahon on the Island of Minorca on 1 October when news came that *Southerner* was evidently on its way to Algiers. Stellwagen ordered his ship to be fully prepared for imminent battle. On 6 October, *Constellation* proceeded to sea, bound for Algiers. On the 9th, she arrived. No suspicious ship was there, but Stellwagen soon learned his quarry really existed. *Southerner* had come into Algiers but was

an ordinary cargo steamer under the British flag, and everything appeared legal. She had landed her passengers, and then sailed with cargo for England. With no action for him to take, Stellwagen took his ship back to Italy. He wrote the following message to the navy department from La Spezia on 16 October 1863:

Sir: I have returned to this place via Algiers, where I went in consequence of the rumors of the *Southerner*, spoken of in letter [of] October 1, 1863. I there ascertained from E. L. Kingsbury, U.S. consul, that she had been there and landed 300 Moorish pilgrims, and then continued her voyage to England. He had seen her papers; all appeared right; her cargo, 600 bales of Egyptian cotton. She is about 1,500 tons; very fast. I find here there is still a suspicion she is to return to Malta to fit as a privateer under Captain Jefferson Page, who has lately left Florence, but that her charter was for six months. The authorities at Algiers offered all facilities for coaling, watering, etc., which, however, I did not require.²⁴

So the great threat had turned out not to be valid. The prospect of a sea battle in the Mediterranean had passed *Constellation* by for now. In those days of war and deep uncertainty about enemy plans and movements, the reports about the *Southerner* had been made in good faith and had to be accepted as distinct possibilities. The Confederate raiders *Alabama* and *Florida* were loose on the world's oceans, and they were definitely not rumors. The men aboard *Constellation* were all well aware that an enemy warship could certainly appear at any time, and then they would be fighting for their lives.

The winter that spanned 1863 and 1864 was again passed snugly in harbor, first at Naples and then La Spezia. Mid-May 1864 saw *Constellation* sail to the city of Tunis due to riots and popular unrest there caused by government financial problems. The ship's sailors and marines were prepared to

land and guard U.S. citizens and property in the city, but were not needed in the end. European warships were present, too. Order was restored eventually by the city authorities. While leaving Tunis Harbor on 27 May, *Constellation's* hull touched bottom, causing a leak to develop. This necessitated a few days at Malta for repairs before the summer cruise to the eastern Mediterranean could begin. The ship visited Alexandria, Egypt, and the coasts of present-day Lebanon and Israel during June and July 1864. While there, a group of officers and men took the opportunity to visit Jerusalem. On the return voyage to Italy, the ship stopped in Greece, and parties from the crew visited Athens.²⁵

Constellation arrived at Sicily in mid-August 1864. Waiting for her in the mail was an order, dated 31 May, from the navy department calling her home. She was to report to Rear Admiral David G. Farragut's blockading squadron in the Gulf of Mexico.²⁶ At the end of September, after being in the Mediterranean for two and one-half years, *Constellation* headed west through the Straits of Gibraltar for the United States. She stopped briefly at Tenerife in the Canary Islands and then at St. Thomas in the Danish West Indies. There, Stellwagen probably learned that Farragut's fleet had taken control of the entrance to Mobile Bay, Alabama, in a battle on 5 August and was still there. Upon entering the Gulf of Mexico, *Constellation* was put on a course for Mobile Bay. On 27 November 1864, her crew sighted the Union fleet and Farragut's flagship, the 24-gun steam corvette *Hartford*, in the bay.

The admiral was about to relinquish command of his squadron and sail for New York City. He decided immediately to send *Constellation* to the Union base at nearby Pensacola, Florida. He would stop there on his voyage, inspect the ship, and confer with Stellwagen. Two days later, Farragut came aboard at Pensacola. He admired the corvette's beauty as a sailing ship but decided that it was not what the West Gulf Blockading Squadron needed now. Fast, shallow-draft steam-

ers, able to cruise close inshore and swiftly pursue blockade runners in spite of any wind conditions were preferred now. *Constellation*, wind-driven only and with a deep draft of nineteen feet, could not meet the squadron's needs. Also, the enlistments of most of her crew had expired; a whole new crew would have to be found, and this would be impossible at Pensacola. Farragut expressed his regrets and told Stellwagen to make any quick repairs that were needed, take on food and water, and sail around Florida to Hampton Roads, Virginia. He should then report his ship's arrival to the navy department and let it decide the vessel's fate.²⁷

Accordingly, the corvette left Pensacola on 4 December. A few days later, a storm brewing up

forced her to go to Havana, Cuba, for four days. There Stellwagen took careful note of the blockade runners in the harbor that plied to and from Galveston, Texas. His crew also enjoyed an energetic shore leave in their last foreign port.²⁸

Constellation departed Havana on 15 December and passed around the tip of Florida and headed up the U.S. East Coast. On the morning of 19 December, she was east of Wilmington, North Carolina, in light winds and patchy fog. Suddenly a long-hulled, paddle-wheel steamer materialized. The corvette's lookouts shouted a warning. The officers on deck realized it was most likely a blockade runner. The alarm was sounded, and the course was altered toward the other ship. Topmen raced



USS *Constellation* as she is now in Baltimore Harbor. Photograph taken by John D. Barnard.

aloft to set more sail, and the men off watch poured up onto the gun deck and upper deck to join the watch on duty in clearing the ship for action. The crew of the forecastle thirty-pound Parrott rifle frantically readied their gun. Speed was vital. The blockade runner's captain had already changed course and was steering to steam into the wind to escape. This was the standard move to make since a square-rigged ship like *Constellation* could only sail about six points (or $67\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$) from the wind's direction and no closer. Gradually, the two ships seemed to draw together. Stellwagen ordered his forward guns to commence firing. The thirty-pounder rifle barked sharply as did the 32-pounder forward on the gun deck. The other ship, though, was already slightly out of range and was rapidly increasing speed. It soon became clear that steam would beat sail this time. The swift paddle steamer soon had outrun *Constellation*. A disappointed Stellwagen resumed his course north. Petty Officer Moses Safford described it later in his diary:

This morning we had a little excitement. At daylight the lookout at the masthead descried a vessel. It proved to be a typical blockade runner-painted white, very low and sharply built. When first sighted she appeared to be waiting with fires banked for the assurance from shore that the coast was clear to run in. When however our ship headed in her direction smoke began to come out of her funnel and she made off to the windward at good speed. The wind was light at the time, having just died down, but we kept after her with all out sail and fired a gun to heave her to. She did not accept the invitation or heed the warning. Our ship was kept as close to the wind as she could go and the 30 pdr. Parrott was brought into use. The distance was about four miles I should judge, and the Parrott at its extreme elevation could hardly make that distance. Several shots however came so close to her that she began to zig-zag her course. The 32 pdr. was tried twice, but fell far short. About twenty

shots were fired in all and they at least had the effect of making the smoke come blacker and blacker out of his stack.

Our object in firing was partly to attract the attention of our steam war ships which might be in the vicinity. This seemed to be successful. A steamer appeared in pursuit and perhaps its crew will get the prize-money which we saw slip away from us. If not the men on the blockade runner probably enjoyed the excitement as much as we did. It doubtless served to break the monotony of their sea life as it did ours.²⁹

Captain Stellwagen's later report to the navy department told of the same incident this way:

[We] discovered coming out of a dense fog what appeared to be a blockade runner standing to the westward, about three miles distant. She was a long side wheel steamer, schooner rigged, painted white, two smoke stacks fore and aft. I immediately made all sail and gave chase. As soon as prudent I fired one blank cartridge. She continued her course and in a few moments commenced firing at her. Fired seven shots from the forward pivot Parrott gun and two from forward thirty-two, all of which fell short, but in good range. A great many persons were seen on her deck, and manifested much anxiety during our firing. She made steam rapidly, and changing her course steered dead to windward as fast as possible. She soon disappeared, finding further pursuit useless I continued our course.³⁰

The next five days saw *Constellation* slowly making her way up the coast battered by a storm. For the crew, it was a miserable time with cold food and the ship's interior constantly wet. Finally, on Christmas in 1864, the ship arrived safely in Hampton Roads and anchored. *Constellation's* war was over. Stellwagen wrote to the navy department saying that unless it was willing to make expensive

and lengthy repairs and use her as a cruiser at sea again, the best use for the ship was in a harbor role such as receiving ship or supply storage ship.³¹

Over the next few days, the crew were paid their final wages; most left the navy. Moses Safford returned home to Maine and led a full life until his death in 1914. The ship's officers went on leave. Stellwagen, after a brief leave, was given command of the twelve-gun steam sloop USS *Pawnee* operating in the Charleston area with Rear Admiral John Dahlgren's blockading squadron. He commanded the *Pawnee* from late February to April 1865 and saw action in the war's final stages.

As Stellwagen had suggested, *Constellation* became a receiving ship at Hampton Roads, a floating barracks for new recruits and sailors awaiting reassignment. She served in that role until the war ended and afterwards, in various ports, until 1869. By then, she was no longer considered a first-line warship. In 1871, she became a sea-going training ship for naval academy midshipmen and mainly performed that task until 1894, when she moved to Newport, Rhode Island, for duty at the naval recruit training center there. Finally stricken by the navy in 1955, she was towed to Baltimore for preservation as a museum ship. From 1961 to 1994, she was exhibited in the belief that she was the old 38-gun frigate. However, by the mid 1990s, enough realistic research had been done to indicate the extant *Constellation* was the 1850s corvette, and

between 1996 and 1999, she was restored to her proper appearance as the 22-gun corvette of 1854.

As with most Union warships in the Civil War, *Constellation* never saw any great naval battles. Only once, against the blockade runner in 1864, did she fire her guns in anger. Only a few U.S. Navy ships, principally the *Monitor*, *Hartford*, and *Kearsarge*, became famous by their exploits in battle in the Civil War. *Constellation*, like many others, was very much a "warrior for the working day" to paraphrase Shakespeare. She was a ship engaged in duties that brought no lasting fame but which were still important to the Union cause.


She faithfully demonstrated the power of the United States and upheld national prestige for two and one-half years in the Mediterranean, an area of the world to which the United States had important commercial and diplomatic ties. Her presence there deterred Confederate warships from striking at U.S. merchant shipping, and it reassured Americans in a far-off region that the navy could and would defend their commercial and diplomatic rights and that they were not forgotten in spite of war at home.

USS *Constellation*, like the other U.S. warships that were deployed in foreign service from 1861 to 1865, was part of the great overarching mantle of Union sea power that contributed so much to final victory in the Civil War.

~ NOTES ~

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BRITISH OFFICERS AND STRIKING SAILORS: MUTINY IN THE ROYAL INDIAN NAVY, FEBRUARY 1946

by Chris Madsen

The Royal Indian Navy mutiny in February 1946 is a little-known historical event that has not attracted much scholarly work outside India. Although comparable in scale and scope to the mutinies of Kronstadt sailors during the Russian Revolution, the German High Seas Fleet in November 1918, or the Chilean Navy in September 1931, India's naval mutiny occurred within a colonial navy in a country on the verge of national independence from foreign rule.¹ This context has preoccupied much of the existing literature. Martin Wainwright, Anita Inder Singh, and Partha Sarathi Gupta have assessed the shifting balance of power between the British and Indians on the subcontinent and its implications for imperial strategy and defense.²

Chris Madsen is assistant director of warfare studies at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. His publications include *The Royal Navy and German Naval Disarmament, 1942–1947* (London and Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1998) and *Another Kind of Justice: Canadian Military Law from Confederation to Somalia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1999). He received a doctorate in naval history from the University of Victoria in 1996.

British military and naval authorities presumed that their presence was still welcome in an independent India and that the country could be enticed into the Commonwealth alongside Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The unquestioned loyalty of Indians in the armed forces, however, could no longer be assumed. Most Indian writers have attributed the naval mutiny to various external factors, such as political agitation among sailors, the influence of the "Quit India" movement, and the effect of the contemporary Indian National Army trials.³ In retrospect, Indian sailors became the heroes and freedom fighters of Indian nationalism and growing anti-British feeling.

Advocates of independence no doubt took political advantage of Indian sailors' actions, but the causes of the mutiny originated with accumulated resentment and discontent inside the Royal Indian Navy (RIN). The event was an explosive act of collective protest against inequities and administrative defects within the navy rather than a planned movement against British imperial interests in India. The RIN expanded too quickly and unevenly from a tiny pre-war force into a substantial wartime navy, causing significant problems for post-war demobilization. Longstanding grievances over service conditions swelled up into an explosive situation. Before and after the mutiny, the disciplinary milieu discriminated against Indians and main-

tained British control. Like many other naval mutinies, a combination of poor working and living conditions, unequal pay, bad food, and arbitrary treatment from officers explains why sailors mutinied in the RIN.

Although claiming an old and rich maritime tradition, organized naval forces in India largely developed to serve imperial interests within the British Empire. During the early nineteenth century, Great Britain established itself as the predominant naval power in the Indian Ocean. In 1830, the Bombay Marine, originally an armed squadron of the commercial British East India Company, was officially renamed the Indian Navy.⁴ Its ships provided local coastal defense against rival imperial powers, suppressed piracy, protected seaborne trade, and served British interests in the surrounding region. After the Royal Navy assumed responsibility for naval defense in the waters around India in 1858, the Indian Navy divided into two non-fighting support forces named the Bombay Marine and the Bengal Marine. Eventually, these two forces again combined and became the Royal Indian Marine in 1892. During World War I, the Royal Indian Marine grew in size to counter the activities of German surface raiders in the Indian Ocean, transport supplies and troops to nearby war theaters, support amphibious operations, and conduct defensive patrols. Although Admiral of the Fleet Lord Jellicoe recommended organization of a stronger naval force after a visit to India in 1919, the Royal Indian Marine reverted back to a non-combatant role and the Royal Navy again handled India's naval defense, a service for which the Indian Government paid an annual subscription of one hundred thousand pounds to London.⁵ In the adverse financial and political climate of the early 1920s, war-built sloops and transports were paid off one-by-one with no replacements, and trained personnel left the naval service in droves.

The Royal Indian Navy, the Royal Indian Marine's direct successor, was born as an unwelcome stepchild of the Royal Navy. In order to prevent irreversible decline, a committee chaired by

General Lord Henry Seymour Rawlison, commander-in-chief India, suggested reform of India's naval service into a small combatant force of sloops, patrol vessels, and minesweepers, to be placed under the command of a flag-ranked British officer. Based on the committee's recommendations, the Admiralty allowed the Royal Indian Marine to fly the white ensign in late 1928. The Indian legislature, however, defeated a naval discipline bill because Indian politicians objected to paying for naval forces over which they had no control and at the time possessed no commissioned officers of Indian descent.⁶ Despite lingering concerns, the legislature passed a reintroduced bill with some amendments as the Indian Naval (Discipline) Act in 1934. During the intervening years, small numbers of young Indians passing through the training ship *Dufferin* at Bombay began to join the small colonial navy instead of India's burgeoning merchant marine.⁷ The RIN formally came into existence on 8 September 1934 under Rear Admiral Humphrey Thomas Walwyn, RN, the erstwhile director of the Royal Indian Marine, now designated flag officer commanding the Royal Indian Navy (FOCRIN). The Indian navy's headquarters was located in Bombay.

In the years before World War II, the RIN forwarded various plans for its organization and future expansion. Walwyn's successor, Rear Admiral Arthur Edward Frederick Bedford, RN, proposed that the colonial navy assume some of the local defense functions performed by the Royal Navy. The idea was more in principle since the tiny naval service was entirely inadequate for any expanded operational responsibilities. Financial considerations blocked Bedford's scheme for increased personnel strengths, shore-based training establishments, recruitment of more Indians, and replacement of older warships with newer designs. Unlike the Royal Navy in Great Britain, the RIN was not the senior service in India because the Indian Army took precedence in overall defense spending.⁸ In early 1938, the Admiralty agreed to

waive India's annual contribution and substantial miscellaneous charges in return for the RIN maintaining a naval squadron for employment with the Royal Navy and defense of India's ports.

On this basis, Vice Admiral Herbert Fitzherbert, the new FOCRIN, forwarded a nine-year expansion plan that provided for six modern escort vessels, a build-up of local naval defenses, a doubling of personnel in the regular force, formation of naval reserves, training and instructional establishments, and procurement of eight motor torpedo boats. After gaining the views of the Admiralty, an expert committee on the defense of India, chaired by Admiral Lord Alfred Chatfield, recommended acquisition and loan of less expensive warships in order to balance India's limited ability to pay with the minimum insurance needed for the country's naval defense.⁹ The RIN continued to labor under a tight fiscal regime, and facilities remained predominantly centered within the dockyard at Bombay. Officers, mostly white, underwent training with the Royal Navy in Great Britain, while petty officers and ratings were recruited primarily from the Punjab region of northern India and trained on board ship. At the outbreak of World War II, the RIN consisted of eight older ships, manned by 114 officers and 1,732 other ranks.¹⁰ Although other navies in the Commonwealth countries were not much larger, the RIN was nonetheless small by most international standards.

Wartime demands and ever-increasing operational commitments forced a rapid and dramatic expansion of the RIN. Available commercial ships were converted into naval auxiliaries, and new warships were built in British, Australian, and Indian shipyards. The fleet consisted mostly of smaller warships, such as sloops, minesweepers, trawlers, gunboats, and a few corvettes. Since the Indian Ocean and South East Asia held a relatively low strategic priority compared to the European and Pacific war theaters, the Commander-in-Chief East Indies frequently used RIN warships to protect convoys, conduct defensive patrols, sweep sea

mines, and fill other operational gaps. Sizeable numbers of motor torpedo boats and landing craft were also added to the RIN as the British shifted to offensive operations against the Japanese in Burma.¹¹ To man RIN ships, Fitzherbert and his naval staff scoured the Indian merchant marine, enlarged the recruiting base to the rest of India, accepted trade and professional people through the reserves, and secured transfer of officers directly from the Royal Navy.

The last source gradually dried up as the Royal Navy faced severe manpower shortages during the course of the war. When the Indian Government asked for thirty commanders or lieutenant-commanders from the Royal Navy in 1943, the naval assistant to the Second Sea Lord likened the request "to sending 30 highly qualified professors to teach in a kindergarten school!"¹² Trained and experienced officers were urgently needed for important duties in the British and other allied navies. The Admiralty instead offered to send Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve officers on temporary loan and had for some time encouraged the RIN to recruit more officers from Indian sources. As an Admiralty civil servant wrote, the Royal Navy was producing "officers from unpromising material with very limited training and it is thought that the time has come when India should do the same."¹³ The emphasis was still on white Anglo-Indians, but the Admiralty was willing to train Indians in Great Britain if they possessed a good knowledge of English. By October 1944, regular commissioned officers of European extraction still outnumbered Indians by almost four to one, although Indians represented the majority in the reserves (albeit concentrated in the low ranks of lieutenant or sub-lieutenant).¹⁴ The relatively late entry of Indians into the pre-war colonial navy meant that few possessed sufficient seniority or experience for advancement to higher rank during wartime. Only pressing personnel shortfalls and the Admiralty's new policy compelled the RIN to seek out more Indians as officer

candidates, either through direct entry or from the ranks. In contrast to the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force, most senior and command positions in the RIN were basically reserved solely for British officers.

Amidst the pressure of almost reckless growth, the RIN vainly tried to consolidate its gains in terms of administration. Shore-based instructional establishments, supply depots, and naval bases opened in various parts of the country to meet the needs of the enlarged navy.¹⁵ Speciality and technical training, virtually nonexistent before the war, was furnished to large numbers of officers and other ranks. The naval headquarters, which moved from Bombay to New Delhi in March 1941 and subsequently reorganized several times, added more staff and departments to coordinate with the Indian Government, the other Indian services, and subordinate commands. Vice Admiral John Henry Godfrey, RN, replaced Fitzherbert as FOCRIN. Most recently director of naval intelligence at the Admiralty, Godfrey brought the staff experience and administrative knowledge necessary to sort out the difficult problems and growing pains afflicting the young navy, but he lacked the charm and diplomatic style of his predecessor. The Admiralty always considered the flag appointment in India as a dead end post, either to reward or remove admirals before compulsory retirement. Godfrey, however, took the work seriously and became a staunch supporter of the greater development of Indian sea power. In a country traditionally indifferent to maritime affairs, he advocated creation of a navy league to influence public and political opinion in favor of larger and stronger naval forces.¹⁶ Vice Admiral Godfrey and the naval staff took the Admiralty, the Indian Government, and most Indians farther and faster than they perhaps wanted to go with the Royal Indian Navy at the time. It was a remarkable example of a policy driven by institutional momentum and a forceful personality in an environment that is devoid of clear direction from above.

On the basis of the dramatic wartime expansion, the New Delhi naval headquarters laid ambitious plans for the size and function of the future RIN. A dedicated post-war planning directorate produced a scheme that envisioned acquisition of destroyers, cruisers, and aircraft carriers by the end of the decade, to create a balanced naval force comparable to other Dominion navies, and, if necessary, capable of independent action. Throughout the process, Godfrey and the naval staff ignored the political and financial realities working against a substantial navy in India. The Indian Government, ever confident in the prowess of the Indian Army, perceived little need for more than a small navy of escort vessels and transports, while the Admiralty wanted the RIN to remain a coastal defense force with a limited antisubmarine warfare capability for cooperation with the Royal Navy in the Indian Ocean.¹⁷ Indian nationalists, on the other hand, viewed the largely British-run naval force with suspicion and sometimes contempt. In the absence of higher direction, the naval staff indulged in some very extravagant dreams and aspirations. In November 1945, the RIN's liaison officer at the Admiralty advised the naval assistant to the second sea lord that India intended to request four hundred British officers on loan for the post-war fleet.¹⁸ The open-ended nature of post-war plans necessarily impacted negatively on the RIN's demobilization after the end of hostilities.

Despite some advance planning, the naval staff mishandled the RIN's demobilization and reduction from its wartime apex. Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, the commander-in-chief of armed forces in India, established a triservice committee to examine and make recommendations upon the size and reorganization of the Indian armed forces after the war, but Godfrey's representative, Commander Eric Cardew Streatfeild-James, RIN, attended no meetings after 19 January 1945.¹⁹ The RIN lagged behind the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force in making uniform and tangible demobilization policy over the coming months. Release regulations, largely modeled upon those for

the Indian Army, retroactively took effect from 8 May 1945. These regulations adopted a priority system based upon a combination of age and length of service with special consideration on compassionate grounds or for anyone over the age of fifty or with skills desperately needed in the civilian marketplace. The second sea lord, Vice Admiral Sir Algernon Osborne Willis, believed that the end of hostilities presented an acute danger period for possible mutiny, and he planned the Royal Navy's demobilization activities accordingly.²⁰ The RIN's demobilization planning under Streatfeild-James was less comprehensive but was aimed at least towards early classification. Staff officers separated all naval personnel into priority groups by 10 August, and release of officers and other ranks started on 1 September.

Demobilization proceeded with the understanding that the seagoing fleet would be required at an inflated strength for nine months after the end of hostilities to fulfill various occupation, patrol, and transport duties. At the time of Japan's surrender, the RIN consisted of 473 ships and approximately 30,260 personnel. Most immediate reductions were achieved by closing down naval bases and shore establishments. Indeed, the Admiralty's intention was to withdraw almost wholly from India as soon as possible and concentrate at Ceylon so as "not only to cut down expenditures immediately to the essential minimum . . . but also to obtain the maximum return for disposable assets."²¹ The liquidation of real estate and material holdings quickly outpaced the staggered release of naval personnel.

In a perfect world, the RIN's demobilization scheme might have succeeded, but the machinery proved too complicated and unwieldy for the Indian situation. Before release, all naval personnel required settling of outstanding pay, accounts, and paperwork, which the naval staff centralized in designated demobilization centers. The system worked reasonably well in regard to officers because the number was manageable. Reserve officers, who had made possible the impressive wartime expansion,

returned to civil vocations within a few weeks; on the priority principle, the best trained and most experienced left first. The system, however, never worked satisfactorily with petty officers and utterly broke down with ratings. The numbers were overwhelming, and the Indian bureaucracy impeded real progress at every turn. (For example, the documentation that Indian officials insisted upon prior to release was often lost, misplaced, or incomplete, and release required no less than seven signatures from separate authorities.) By 1 December 1945, the RIN strength was still 24,829, less than a twenty-percent decrease.

Since the authorized ceiling for the post-war fleet was still unknown, the naval staff retained trained and experienced ratings, particularly among the technical specialties, as long as possible. Indian sailors, eager to return home and restart interrupted lives, followed media reports about mass demonstrations by American soldiers in the Philippines and Europe as well as disturbances within the Royal Indian Air Force over the slowness of demobilization. Overcrowded in the few remaining shore establishments with no real prospects of release at an early date, they naturally drew parallels with their own situation. The Castle Barracks in Bombay, the focal point of the mutiny, accommodated over a thousand men in facilities designed for several hundred. Sailors slept on floors because not enough beds were available. The uneven implementation of demobilization accentuated already festering grievances over service conditions within the RIN and contributed to the outbreak of wide-scale disorder.

Time in the RIN turned into a prolonged ordeal for many sailors. Military service remained voluntary in India throughout the war, and the Indian armed services sent recruiters into villages, towns, and districts across India to persuade prospective applicants to join up. Due to the highly technical nature of sea service, the RIN set relatively high educational and physical standards.²² Unfortunately, naval officers competed with their

army and air force counterparts for the best recruits. As a result, recruiters and agents resorted to all sorts of false promises, tricks, and half-truths to ensure that the right type of Indians chose the RIN. Pamphlets and advertisements emphasized steady pay and opportunities for long-term employment.²³ Unrealistic expectations were quickly dashed once young men encountered actual wartime situations. Naval service frequently meant long periods of time at sea away from relatives and friends, danger in the face of the enemy, and considerable boring and menial work. In return, remuneration and rewards proved much smaller than the men had been led to believe.

The RIN pay and allowances system discriminated against Indians, especially among those in the lower ranks. Officers and petty officers of European extraction received pay rates equal to those prevailing in the Royal Navy plus a special allowance for service in India. Based on pre-war practice, wages for Indians remained inferior to those paid their white counterparts of similar rank. Tinkering with marriage and travel reimbursements after 1942 lowered the differential, but standard pay was substantially less than in the Royal Navy and the other Indian services. Ratings and "Hostilities Only" sailors, the latter recruited in large numbers from the merchant marine, were by far in the worst position. Their pay and allowances remained relatively stagnant throughout the war as merchant sailors demanded and received competitive wages to meet the high cost of living in India. As enticements, pay raises were granted to ratings in branches with specialized knowledge and technical skills, but the effort only generated more discontent by creating further inequality within the lower deck. Glaring disparities in pay became readily apparent when the RIN worked alongside the Royal Navy under the same conditions.

Other Indian ranks desired rates comparable to British personnel, and the longstanding issue of unequal pay assumed added significance at war's end. Obligatory terms of service locked ratings

into an unfavorable situation and left them entirely at the whim of the New Delhi naval headquarters, which projected no significant releases in personnel until at least 1 April 1946. Chief petty officers and petty officers, normally the most dependable element in the naval hierarchy, were disgruntled over meagre gratuities paid for railway travel, family accommodation, and pensions. Better pay and allowances represented a major and consistent demand throughout the mutiny.

Added to accumulated resentment over compensation, other ranks complained about the preparation and quality of food in RIN messes. Responsibility for victualling and cooking rested with the supply and secretariat branch (called the accountant branch before 1944), a wartime organization with no permanent basis in the pre-war RIN. Paymaster Captain Arthur Henry Parsons, RN, served as director of supply and secretarial duties until March 1946.²⁴ Since a general shortage of accountant officers in the Royal Navy with practical experience precluded more secondments, the Indian Government granted direct commissions to candidates from Indian sources with some basic accountancy knowledge, mostly bank clerks. These officers were unfamiliar with naval procedures and generally lacked the broad training necessary to manage a multitude of supply problems on ships and large shore establishments. A few even used their positions for personal profit at the expense of the navy and the men they were supposed to clothe and feed. Sailors criticized the same substandard food day after day, the presence of pebbles and other foreign substances in dal, and the disregard of religious sanctions against certain types of meat.

Although Parsons formed a committee to inquire into the standard of cooking towards late 1945, problems with food worsened. For the sake of economy, the RIN closed down base victualling organizations at certain ports and drew supplies from the Royal Indian Army Service Corps or private contractors. In December 1945, 116 civilian workers and overseers were discharged from the supply and secretariat branch. Too few paymasters

remained to supervise preparation and cooking of food on a daily basis, as they were required to do. Overworked cooks inevitably took shortcuts and re-served old meals. Although food remained plentiful, deficiencies within the supply organization explained why already poor-quality rations markedly deteriorated. Sailors finally refused to eat deplorable food any longer, and to escape punishment, they explained their noncompliance largely on religious grounds.

RIN personnel were drawn from a diverse range of religious and cultural backgrounds. The Admiralty took some pride in accepting different races and creeds into a single fighting organization under imperial and Commonwealth auspices. Unlike regiments in the Indian Army, the RIN mixed together Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, and other groups rather than maintaining segregated ships and shore establishments. Warships operated under India's two official languages at the time, English and Urdu.²⁵ Although a laudable goal, integration created a host of difficulties and misunderstandings. Sailors refused certain duty on the basis of caste, demanded time off at holy times and religious holidays, and ate only food prepared in the proper ways. Reconciling the differences often presented quite a problem, particularly since wartime expansion brought many officers into the RIN unfamiliar with indigenous languages and cultural sensibilities. For example, an incident involving a young, white sublieutenant who struck and admonished a Muslim leading seaman performing prayer with the Quoran immediately escalated into a major religious affront and earned the mistrust of large numbers of Muslim sailors towards British officers.²⁶ Repeated again and again, seemingly insignificant slights collected into discernible grievances by the time of the mutiny. The Indians strongly protested unfair and arbitrary treatment against their culture, religion, and personal rights.

Under normal circumstances, grievances and complaints were handled through established

service channels. The divisional system, mandatory in the Royal Navy and its associated parts since 1806, decentralized command and responsibility for work, discipline, training, morale, and welfare. Resting on the principles of leadership and human understanding, the system encouraged familiarity and confidence between the divisional officer and his subordinates through personal contact. In a functional division, means existed for sailors to communicate concerns and grievances to the divisional officer, who either addressed them directly or informed more senior authorities. During the war, junior officers worked hard to secure a solid foothold for the divisional system within the RIN. Much progress was made in a short time, but rapid expansion and frequent transfers impeded good and lasting relations between officers and other ranks. After the end of hostilities, demobilization broke up established divisions and removed sympathetic reserve officers. Indian other ranks were thrust into shore establishments and demobilization centers under the command of perfect strangers. The resulting *ad hoc* divisions were just too large for any officer to become truly familiar with the background or even the names of his charges. Bonds of mutual trust broke down in a weak divisional system. Divisional officers seldom bothered to investigate thoroughly, and the threat of punishment for unfounded complaints always hung over sailors who dared to speak up through the accepted channels.

Frustrated and dissatisfied with the official procedure, sailors resorted to numerous minor acts of defiance and sabotage. Desertion and absences without leave increased, food was refused, and saluting and other marks of respect waned. Far more sinister, slogans such as "Quit India" and "Kill the White Bastards" appeared on the walls of naval barracks and establishments. Discontented sailors hid behind anonymity and fanned the political and racial tensions just below the surface of the RIN. Attempts by naval authorities to identify responsible individuals only provoked further resentment and mistrust. Overcrowded, poorly

paid, and ill-fed, Indian sailors came to believe that the predominantly British naval leadership no longer cared about them. In this ominous situation, only one spark was needed to ignite the powder keg of mutiny.

The actions of Commander Frederick William King, RIN, provided the immediate cause for the outbreak of disorder. King, a long-serving, regular commissioned officer, had been commandant of HMIS *Talwar* since 21 January 1946. Godfrey felt that the signals establishment in Bombay required some smarting up, and King's reputation as a strict disciplinarian appeared appropriate. Unfortunately, King was no gentleman; he verbally abused and humiliated the sailors under his command. On 8 February, King burst into a barracks and called several ratings preparing for divisions "Indian bastards." The communications ratings, somewhat better educated than the average Indian sailor, lodged a formal written complaint against his behavior. As commanding officer, King handled his own complaint and threatened fourteen ratings with severe consequences if they pursued it any further. On 17 and 18 February, frustrated *Talwar* sailors declined to take meals or show up for divisions.²⁷ King and his officers were booed and shouted at when they tried to solicit groups of congregated sailors. Rear Admiral Arthur Rullion Rattray, RIN, the flag officer Bombay, personally intervened and replaced King, but the situation was soon far beyond his immediate control.

Disturbances spread throughout naval establishments in the Bombay area. Indian sailors no longer listened to the commands of Rattray or British officers and elected their own strike committees. Processions of excited sailors paraded down city streets and clashed with police and military guards. After troops and naval ratings fired on each other at the Castle Barracks, the insurgents sent wireless messages to warships in the harbor to join the mutiny and prepare for armed action. Sailors seized control of the vessels and evicted British officers and any Indian officers who remained hes-

itant. One by one, warships in revolt hauled down the white ensign. The incidents in Bombay quickly expanded into collective commotion affecting the entire RIN.

Indian sailors across India and on foreign stations made common cause with the mutiny. The communications ratings in Bombay possessed the skills and equipment to contact and converse with forces over a wide geographical area. Shore bases and ships at Karachi, Madras, Calcutta, Cochin, Lonavla, Jamnagar, Vishakhapatnam, Mandapam, New Delhi, Aden, Bahrain, as well as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands answered the call to revolt. Indian sailors at these locations shared many of the same grievances over demobilization, inadequate pay, bad food, and arbitrary treatment from British officers. In all, over fifty-six warships, upwards of twenty naval establishments, and approximately ten thousand men mutinied.

The speed and magnitude with which disorder spread took the New Delhi naval headquarters by surprise. Nonetheless, timely action by local commands, the popularity of certain officers among sailors, and the remnants of a still functional divisional system ensured the loyalty of some other ranks and a handful of ships. In certain cases, Indian officers convinced sailors that open mutiny was far more serious than simply a large-scale strike against service conditions. Sailors, especially among the leaders of the strike committees, fully realized that renunciation of established naval authority and the use of armed force meant no turning back without some sort of retribution from the British. Only success and political recognition could bring legitimacy to otherwise illegal actions.

Naval authorities were determined to restore discipline and order within the RIN. The mutiny represented the largest and most violent challenge to British command in a series of cases of collective disobedience. Since 1935, Indian sailors had rebelled against authority in a significant way on no less than thirteen separate occasions. Godfrey and other officers later claimed that this pattern was clear evidence of a mutiny tradition within the RIN.

More likely, such disturbances reflected breakdowns within the divisional system since most involved protests over pay, food, accommodations, and racial discrimination. The standard British response was to punish instigators and participants through courts martial, summary punishments, and wholesale discharges from naval service.

The naval law branch, directed by Commander George Walker, RINVR, the judge advocate of the fleet, became one of the FOCRIN's most important instruments for the maintenance of control. Unlike his counterpart for the Royal Navy, India's judge advocate of the fleet was an active service naval officer, analogous to the position of the judge advocate general for the Indian Army.²⁸ Walker took a proactive role in regard to monitoring morale in the RIN, and naval courts under his direction were the expected result if Indian sailors decided to defy naval authority. India was in a different legal position than dominions like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand because neither the Naval Discipline (Dominion Naval Forces) Act of 1911 nor the Visiting Forces (Commonwealth) Act of 1933 had been applied to the RIN by comparable Indian legislation. On the question of allowing RIN officers jurisdiction over Royal Navy personnel, the Admiralty throughout the war tried to avoid "a situation in which powers of punishment would be legally exercisable."²⁹ Since it was believed that British sailors were less likely to accept summary punishments from Indian officers and would instead elect trial by court martial, administration of the RIN's disciplinary system remained relatively self-contained. The judge advocate of the fleet handled all appeals from courts martial, and executive officers exercised their legal powers over Indian sailors to the fullest extent allowed under the statutes and regulations.

In the case of mutiny, the legal sanctions available to British officers were considerable. The Indian Navy (Discipline) Act of 1934 and the Indian Naval Reserve Forces (Discipline) Act of 1939 applied the British Naval Discipline Act's provisions to all RIN officers and other ranks. Urdu transla-

tions of the Articles of War and the Naval Discipline Act in regard to punishments and offenses were displayed prominently on every ship and regularly read out at divisions. As sailors were informed, the penalty for mutiny or inciting mutiny was death or any less punishment as determined by court martial. The authority of commanding officers to impose corporal punishment in the colonial navy had been suspended, but exception was made for open mutiny, at which time a maximum of twenty-five lashes not less than twelve hours apart could be inflicted on any rank below chief petty officer to set an immediate example.³⁰ Such punishment required approval from the FOCRIN and the Indian Government, but once approval was given, the only limitation was on the use of sticks and canes. In general, naval regulations demanded respect and obedience from Indian sailors towards their superior officers and provided harsh penalties for misbehavior or mutinous conduct. Mutiny was the only naval offense for which the judge advocate of the fleet allowed no appeal from a sentence of death. The dim view taken towards mutiny in the RIN was a legacy of the Royal Navy.

The Royal Navy was no stranger to mutiny and mass demonstrations by sailors on the lower deck. The great disturbances at Spithead and Nore in 1797, the bloodletting on the frigate HMS *Hermione*, and the large-scale strike at Invergordon in 1931 were still well known among most British naval officers.³¹ The Admiralty drew historical lessons from the past in order to provide officers with guidance for future occasions. Lectures by Rear Admiral Lancelot Ernest Holland, RN, to the Royal Naval Staff College at Greenwich outlined the principal causes of recent cases of mutiny and mass indiscipline within the Royal Navy and stressed the importance of immediate action by commanding and divisional officers "to restore discipline on a permanent basis in the shortest possible time."³² In simplest terms, mutiny existed when two or more persons combined to defy or resist lawful naval authority; the offense covered a broad range of

conduct, from simple refusal to perform duty to the killing of superior officers. Mutiny possessed a rather imprecise legal definition under the Naval Discipline Act, but most British naval officers took it for granted that there were adverse consequences of collective disorder.³³

The seriousness of mutiny increased in proportion to the degree of challenge to established authority, the numbers involved, and the amount of violence employed. Modern navies usually preferred to describe lesser collective actions by sailors as incidents or strikes because the word mutiny carried many negative connotations about lack of control and anarchy.³⁴ Even the slightest hint of blame for mutiny was enough to ruin or retard a naval officer's career. Although the Admiralty declined to publish a second volume of its staff history, *CB3027 Mutiny in the Royal Navy*, to cover the early twentieth century, the director of the training and staff duties division distributed notes based upon Holland's lectures to wartime commands for the information and instruction of naval officers on correct ways to handle mass indiscipline. Prejudiced by the Royal Navy's historical record, British naval officers possessed an exaggerated fear of mutiny and regarded the offense, in whatever form it assumed, as a serious matter.

The rising violence within the RIN and the official response to it left little doubt that Godfrey and other British officers believed that they were dealing with a full-scale mutiny of dire proportions. Sailors on ships in Bombay Harbor and Indian Army troops brought in to suppress the uprising exchanged intermittent gunfire. In a radio broadcast, Godfrey pledged to sailors that complaints would be investigated and asked them to "take into account the overwhelming forces at the disposal of the [Indian] Government at this time, and which will be used to their uttermost even if it means the destruction of the Navy of which we have been so proud."³⁵ At Karachi the next day, British troops assaulted the rebel-held sloop HMIS *Hindustan* with artillery and mortars; since the receding tide prevented effective use of the ship's

four-inch guns, the crew surrendered after a short, fierce battle in which eight ratings were killed and thirty-seven were wounded.

The forces opposing the mutiny only grew stronger with time. At Godfrey's request, the commander-in-chief East Indies dispatched to India a naval squadron with a cruiser and destroyers. The small warships in rebel hands were no match for the combined firepower of the larger British vessels. The first sea lord, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, placed naval reinforcements at the disposal of the FOCRIN and the Indian Government in order to forestall possible accusations "that brutal British sailors have opened fire by orders of the British Government on the poor Indian sailors."³⁶ The Admiralty agreed with Godfrey that the situation required firm handling and accepted the possibility of further bloodshed. Indian sailors faced the choice between ending the mutiny and accepting whatever punishment naval authorities imposed on them or eventually fighting a losing battle with superior British military and naval forces.

The intervention of Indian political leaders allowed Indian sailors to bring the mutiny to a peaceful conclusion. Only the Communists and radical socialist members of the Congress Party unconditionally supported the naval mutiny, which from the start they portrayed as a class and racial struggle against British oppression. The sailor's central strike committee in Bombay, presided over by Leading Signaller M.S. Khan, maintained some semblance of coordination among the scattered insurgents and conducted talks with naval authorities and political representatives. Although "Quit India" rhetoric inevitably entered into discussions, Khan and the central strike committee focused on the original demands for improved service conditions and faster demobilization. Indian sailors, who had organized themselves without outside help, became disheartened by the apparent lack of support for their actions from India's mainstream political parties. Both the Congress Party and the Muslim League refused to sanction an event that party leaders perceived as premature and detri-

mental to the transition to independence from British rule.³⁷ Sardar Patel, a prominent member of the Congress Party sent to Bombay to confer with the central strike committee, called upon sailors to surrender and promised Khan that there would be “no victimization” of mutiny participants. With British warships menacingly arriving in force, Indian sailors prudently chose life over martyrdom. In accordance with instructions, RIN ships hoisted black flags to signify their capitulation as Royal Marines and British soldiers secured the vessels and guarded sailors in shore establishments. The naval insurrection was over, and Indian sailors gloomily awaited their fate.

The sensitivity of the Indian situation and the credible grievances of striking sailors demanded discretion from naval authorities. The first task was to find out what exactly went wrong and who was responsible. Boards of inquiry investigated the causes and circumstances behind the mutiny in specific ports and establishments but could find no firm evidence of collusion between sailors and supposed political agitators.³⁸ Testimony instead disclosed deep-seated resentment among other ranks about their treatment in the RIN and a large measure of indifference towards naval service in general. Most British officers rallied around the senior naval leadership, but Godfrey returned to London in disgrace. For him, the mutiny was the final blot on a long and controversial career.

The unpleasant job of dealing with the aftermath of the mutiny and punishment of the main participants became the responsibility of Godfrey's replacement, Vice Admiral Geoffrey Miles, RN. Miles, fresh from a stint with the Tripartite Naval Commission in Berlin, assumed the post of FOCRIN on 28 March 1946. Significant political opposition existed against the trial of Indian sailors, and the British administration in India wished to avoid repeating the public spectacle of the recent Indian National Army trials. Miles encountered some difficulty in persuading the viceroy, Field Marshal Viscount Wavell, that courts martial were

necessary to maintain future discipline in the RIN.³⁹ Naval authorities eventually resorted to summary punishments instead of seeking the maximum penalty of death before a court martial for the offense of mutiny with violence. In all, 523 sailors were summarily tried, and most were discharged with disgrace from the RIN as undesirable elements.⁴⁰ Sailors alleged to have taken active roles in the mutiny, either as ringleaders or instigators of violence, also received terms of imprisonment ranging from ninety to sixty days. Some naval officers were censured for their conduct during the mutiny, but a court martial acquitted Commander King on a charge of using the bad language that induced the mutiny.⁴¹ Miles deferred further courts martial, pending the outcome of a formal commission of inquiry on the mutiny.

Amid pressure from Indian political leaders and segments of the Indian Government, Auchinleck had broached the idea of appointing a commission of inquiry at a defense meeting on 8 March 1946. The commission, formally announced a month later, was composed of three Indian judges, a British vice admiral, and a British major-general. It examined the causes and events behind the mutiny. After four months of hearings and testimony, the commission issued a 598-page report that catalogued numerous problems with service conditions, administration, and discipline in the over-expanded RIN. It also criticized the New Delhi naval headquarters and British officers for the troubles.⁴² Although the presence of the two British service members most likely tempered the report's final conclusions, the commissioners felt that sufficient evidence existed to support the claims of striking sailors about deplorable conditions and unfair treatment.

Miles and the naval staff in New Delhi accepted the commission's findings with reserve. In a letter to Auchinleck, Miles acknowledged that the main lesson for the RIN was “never again to recruit officers and men en masse and throw them into ships semi-trained,” but he believed that the commission, in order to garner popularity with public

opinion, had "gone all out to exaggerate and put into prominence the evidence of racial discrimination at the expense of the good name of the Royal Indian Navy."⁴³ Miles, who considered himself an objective observer since he arrived in India after the mutiny, decried a lack of balance and disregard of contrary evidence in the commission's proceedings. The absence of seniority among Indian officers and obvious motivational and morale problems within the RIN received little scrutiny, although British officers undoubtedly deserved much of the blame for the mutiny. With the participants punished and the apparent causes of the event made public, Miles began the difficult task of rebuilding the post-mutiny RIN into an efficient and national naval force.

The Royal Indian Navy, renamed the Indian Navy after 1950, relied heavily upon British equipment and management well into the next decade. Upon India's partition, a naval committee divided the fleet, whereby Pakistan received sixteen warships and valuable training establishments while India retained thirty-three warships. With some assistance from the last British viceroy, Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, India acquired frigates, destroyers, and a cruiser—the former HMS *Achilles*—from the British. British officers on secondment from the Royal Navy still filled most senior positions because the highest ranking Indian officer at the time was a young acting captain. Mountbatten told the Admiralty that it would "be several years, before they could possibly entrust command of the Navy to an Indian with any hopes of making a success of it."⁴⁴ With the mutiny and partition in recent memory, the British and Indians adopted a go slow approach towards greater Indianization within the Indian Navy.

The continued presence of British officers in the Indian Navy after independence created intricate legal problems. British personnel were technically no longer subject to the Indian Navy (Discipline) Act, although they still retained pow-

ers of command and discipline over Indian sailors.⁴⁵ An Indian Naval Forces (Temporary Governance) Order allowed Royal Navy officers to convene and sit on courts martial under the Indian Navy (Discipline) Act for the time being. Vice Admiral Sir William Edward Parry, RN, after he became the RIN's commander-in-chief on 15 August 1948, made reform of the navy's code of service discipline a priority as part of a general plan for reorganization and development.⁴⁶ Although the Indian Army and Indian Air Force desired introduction of triservice defense legislation, Parry argued that the Indian Navy's relationship with the Royal Navy was too close to deviate from the British model. It was uncertain whether the Admiralty would allow British officers to serve under Indian legislation if India chose to be outside the fold of the British Commonwealth. A draft bill, prepared by the judge advocate of the fleet, incorporated selected recommendations from the first report of a British committee under Justice Sir Gonne St. Clair Pilcher with regard to changes to the naval court martial system and kept the existing definition of mutiny.⁴⁷ Despite the 1946 mutiny, the Indian Navy continued to follow British tradition and practice with respect to naval discipline. India's Navy Act, which emulated Britain's revised Naval Discipline Act in many respects, received approval from India's parliament and took effect from 1 January 1958.⁴⁸ The disciplinary provisions of distinctly Indian legislation applied to the Indian Navy after this date.

Independent India charted a new course in its defense and foreign policy. The Indian Navy's ambitions for a blue water fleet based around an aircraft carrier increasingly diverged from Admiralty schemes for an escort and coastal defense force on a cooperative Commonwealth pattern.⁴⁹ The major security threats to India were land-based rather than maritime. British flag officers in India and Pakistan found themselves in the awkward position of planning and building up naval forces for a war against each other. The Admiralty intended to recall the British admiral in New Delhi, in the event unresolved disputes over Kashmir erupted into

open conflict between India and Pakistan. On 22 April 1958, Vice Admiral Ram Dass Katari replaced the last British flag officer commanding the Indian Navy, Vice Admiral Sir Stephen Hope Carill, RN, to become the first Indian as chief of the naval staff.⁵⁰ The Indian Navy gradually turned from Great Britain to the Soviet Union in its procurement and training activities. In official Indian defense circles, British influence in the evolution of the Indian Navy and its disciplinary system was downplayed and even reproached. In 1973, India's government granted freedom fighter status and pensions to those sailors discharged by the RIN after the mutiny.

In conclusion, the RIN mutiny in February 1946 revealed profound problems and strains in a swollen wartime colonial navy with an overburdened administrative structure. Godfrey wanted a navy to match India's emerging status as an independent national state, but he and other British officers misjudged the depth of accumulated discontent among Indians in the British-run Royal Indian Navy. Policy decisions and weaknesses in administration delayed demobilization, heightened existing grievances over service conditions, and aggravated relations between Indian sailors and

their British superior officers. The supercharged political atmosphere of pre-independence India merely compounded the RIN's already existing troubles. Intense frustration over British management fuelled the explosive outbreak of collective disorder and accounted for the mutiny's rapid expansion throughout the RIN. Indian sailors demonstrated a remarkable capacity for determined, united action when they felt aggrieved or unfairly treated by white superior officers. Naval authorities, on the other hand, viewed the mutiny as a serious challenge to good order and discipline that demanded strong countermeasures. Striking sailors surrendered after the British assembled overwhelming military and naval forces to crush the mutiny, much in the tradition of 1857 when the British ruthlessly suppressed the Indian sepoy mutiny. Although the main participants were summarily punished and a commission of inquiry adopted a critical stance, British influence remained persuasive in the leadership, development, and discipline of India's navy for more than a decade after the mutiny. The RIN mutiny may have special standing in popular mythology about India's independence, but it reflected mostly a flashpoint in a very troubled navy.

≈ ACKNOWLEDGMENT ≈

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earlier version of this work was presented at the International Conference on Maritime History in Calgary on 25 June 1998. Professor Holger Herwig and Commander Ken Hansen of the Canadian Navy read earlier drafts of this article.

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The Gondola *Philadelphia* and the Battle of Lake Champlain

JOHN R. BRATTEN

A veteran of the American Revolutionary War, the *Philadelphia* is the oldest intact warship on display in North America. After its recovery from the bottom of Lake Champlain in 1935, the fifty-four foot long vessel, was moved to the National Museum of American History at the Smithsonian Institution.


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
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
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
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THE FIRST MARINERS

by Robert G. Bednarik

Maritime colonization by *Homo erectus* commenced in Indonesia well over eight hundred thousand years ago. It led to the peopling of much of the region by early hominids and, by possibly sixty thousand years ago, to the occupation of greater Australia through *Homo sapiens*. Current replicative experiments are demonstrating that all of this maritime expansion must have involved the use of seaworthy watercraft. One implication of these first maritime expeditions is that the hominids concerned are suggested to have had language and a much more sophisticated technology and culture than hitherto thought. The technological and cognitive background of these achievements is being examined through a long-term replicative study.

Robert G. Bednarik is director of the International Institute of Replicative Archaeology in Melbourne, the convener of the International Federation of Rock Art Organizations (IFRAO), and the editor and secretary of the Australian Rock Art Research Association (AURA). His principal research interests are the epistemology of Pleistocene archaeology, hominid cognition and technology, and the origins of human constructs of reality. He has produced over four hundred refereed scientific articles in nine languages, and almost six hundred further publications in thirty-two languages.

The islands of Nusa Tenggara, formerly known as the Lesser Sunda Islands, are separated from Sumatra, Java, and Bali by the world's most important biogeographical filter, named after the British naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace. The Wallace Line, which runs between Bali and Lombok, indicates the furthest extent of typical Southeast Asian mammals. These had been able to colonize the islands west of the barrier during Pleistocene periods of low sea level.¹ The geologically young islands of Indonesia are still rising from the sea, those east of Bali have never been joined to either the Asian or the Australian mainland, and most have not been connected to other islands in the past. Apart from a very few exceptions, they were never settled by any large mammalian species.

Proboscideans swam across many of the sea barriers, presumably in herd formation, and the remains of elephants, *Stegodon*, and *Stegolophodon* have been found in Pleistocene deposits on many of the region's islands. They form the most conspicuous component of the strictly endemic fossil faunas, occurring both as full-size and dwarf species. Elephants are superb long-distance swimmers that have colonized dozens of islands around the world, including the Santa Barbara Islands off the Californian coast.²

Humans also settled the islands of Nusa Tenggara, not by swimming but after they had developed maritime navigation capability. By about 840,000 years ago, hominids had established a sub-

stantial population on Flores, which suggests that they had earlier settled Lombok and Sumbawa, the two major islands between Bali and Flores. In the Soa Basin in central Flores, their stone tools occur under up to 150 meters of sedimentary rock, together with the remains of *Stegodon trigonocephalus florensis* and other extinct species.

The antiquity of the Early Pleistocene artifacts from the Soa Basin indicates unequivocally that the hominids who made and used them were *Homo erectus*, the species from which modern humans evolved, and which had existed in Java since at least 1.81 million years ago.³ Further east, on the island of Timor, their stone tools were again found together with a fauna of *Stegodonts*, and a fragment of a very large marine shell was found to bear evidence of fire.⁴

Homo erectus thus colonized a good part of the Indonesian island world, presumably helped by the region's outstanding wealth of bamboo species suitable for building seaworthy rafts. The repeated occurrence of the stone tools together with *Stegodont* bones, at six sites so far, might indicate that this elephant species was a major food source, but giant rats (*Hooijeromis nusatenggara*) have also

been suggested as a possible terrestrial staple of these early mariner people.⁵

There is no seafaring evidence of such antiquity anywhere else in the world, although it has been mentioned from time to time that the Strait of Gibraltar may have been crossed early by hominids.⁶ The presence of stone tools at a site on Sardinia provides the earliest known secure indication of seafaring in the Mediterranean. These finds have been suggested to be on the order of three hundred thousand years old but are not as yet as securely dated as those in Indonesia.⁷ Sardinia was connected to Corsica at times of low sea level, but never to the Italian mainland. Human skeletal remains from Crete combine both modern and Neanderthaloid features and are thought to be about fifty thousand years old, indicating seafaring ability in the late Middle Paleolithic period.⁸ To reach Crete, a crossing of at least thirty kilometers was required even at lowest Pleistocene sea level. Upper Paleolithic evidence we have of European seafaring is also from the Mediterranean, consisting of a 20,000-year-old human finger bone from Sardinia, and the discovery of obsidian from Melos, about eleven thousand years old, in a cave on mainland Greece.⁹

Similarly, the presence on Honsho of obsidian from Kozushima, about fifty kilometers from the main island of Japan, some thirty thousand years ago, renders sea crossings in both directions necessary, indicating the availability of advanced navigation technology.¹⁰ Another Japanese island reached by Pleistocene seafarers is Okinawa, as shown by the remains of four humans at Minatogawa, dated between sixteen and eighteen thousand years B.P. Finally, the two human femora fragments and one humerus from Arlington on Santa Rosa Island, reportedly thirteen thousand years old, indicate Ice Age maritime navigation on the west coast of North America. While the details of the early settlement of the Americas remain shrouded in mystery, the evidence on the Santa Barbara Channel islands may well imply that the original colonizers were primarily a coastal people



Stegodont molar from the Middle Pleistocene Weaiwe Formation at Motaoan, Timor, recovered next to a stone implement.

who traveled much by watercraft. Moving down the continent's west coast from the Bering Strait, they perhaps only began to settle the vast interior when growing population pressures prompted them to cross the Rocky Mountains.

The Pleistocene has so far yielded no material evidence of navigation, such as boats, paddles, rafts, or identifiable parts thereof. There are no rock art images resembling watercraft known that could safely be attributed to the Pleistocene. The earliest navigational material finds are all from northwestern Europe, and from the early Holocene. They are Mesolithic paddles from the peat bogs at Holmgaard (Denmark) and Star Carr (England); a worked reindeer antler that might have been a rib of a skin boat in the Ahrensburgian of Husum, a site in Germany; and the somewhat younger canoes and dugouts from Pesse (Holland, 8265 ± 275 carbon years), Noyen-sur-Seine (France, 7960 ± 100 carbon years), and Lystrup 1 (Denmark, 6110 ± 100 carbon years).¹¹

This pattern of occurrence implies a severe preservational bias, no doubt emphasized by the effects of the Pleistocene sea-level fluctuations. Nevertheless, in the waters to the north of Australia, maritime journeys were conducted almost habitually during the late Ice Age. We can only know about long-term settlements that resulted in archaeologically visible populations. Numerous attempts no doubt failed, either initially or at least in the long term, but evidence from about thirty-three to twenty-seven thousand years ago indicates that many islands had been settled by that time by seafarers with an essentially Middle Paleolithic technology.¹² Most of these islands are small, and they could not have been sighted until a raft reached their proximity: the Monte Bello Islands (one hundred kilometers from Australia), Gebe Island (west of New Guinea), New Ireland (east of New Guinea), and Buka Island (180 kilometers from New Ireland).

This evidence demands a rewriting of the story of human evolution. Pre-modern hominids were not, as frequently claimed, devoid of complex cul-

ture and technology, language, symbolism, and self awareness—they were not mere carrion-scavengers at the mercy of their environment. They had the ability to plan projects that took months to complete, and they had the courage to entrust themselves and their families to contraptions designed to harness four forces of nature: buoyancy, wind, waves, and ocean currents. The first mariners in history, most likely in Bali, set the course not only for Lombok, but also for the destiny of humanity. Since their momentous decision, the human ascent itself has been a continuous history of the skilled application of cultural systems to utilize natural ones. Thus, seafaring was the most decisive factor in initiating the technological ascent of humans that ultimately gave rise to our culture.

Human language, it seems, was already sufficiently developed a million years ago to express abstract concepts. This is twenty times as long ago as most archaeologists find acceptable to preserve their current paradigm. It is at massive odds with this dominant model, but that is not entirely unexpected. The cultural and cognitive sophistication of Lower Paleolithic hominids has been implied by the discovery of beads (in three continents), petroglyphs, hunting spears, composite artifacts, portable engravings, and the evidence that mineral pigments were used and crystals and fossil casts were collected. Indeed, the collection of "proto-symbolic" objects was apparently even practiced by australopithecines of South Africa, almost three million years ago. Thus, the Indonesian evidence reminds us that models of hominid evolution that disregard this cultural, technological, and cognitive evidence have become irrelevant and superseded, having been refuted consistently for decades. The Flores evidence, specifically, has been available to us for forty years, and has remained ignored for this period in Anglophone archaeology.¹³

The complete lack of any direct physical evidence of maritime technology from the entire Pleistocene renders it pointless to speculate about the circumstances of these endeavors without addi-



Wooden paddle made entirely with Lower Paleolithic stone tool replicas.

tional information. No sustained replicative experimentation of archaeology has been conducted in relation to this subject before 1996. The First Mariners project then commenced to determine the most likely means employed by *Homo erectus* in crossing Lombok Strait more than 840,000 years ago, and the most likely circumstances of first landfall in Australia more than sixty thousand years ago. Our rather limited knowledge from other areas of technology of the periods in question, particularly in stone tool knapping and wood and bone working, serves as a reference source for these projects. Some aspects of relevant material use can be replicated precisely on the basis of form of, and work markings on, archaeological finds as, for instance, bone harpoons. Others must be determined according to derived probability estimates systematically based on experimentation. A series

of expeditions currently endeavors to create authentic conditions for the construction of primitive vessels and their sailing across the sea barriers in question. This involves the use of appropriate stone tool replicas in felling and working bamboo and in constructing and sailing the rafts.

Literally hundreds of issues of technology need to be addressed in the course of these experiments, including the means of carrying freshwater, primitive fishing at sea, locating sources of stone tool materials for raft construction, and, of course, issues of maritime design. The understanding of Pleistocene technology to be acquired in this way by far exceeds the understanding accessible by traditional archaeological approaches.

Construction of the first full-size experimental vessel was commenced in August 1997, and the *Nale Tasih 1* was launched at Oeseli in southern

Roti on 14 February 1998. It sailed for sea trials with a crew of eleven on 6 March.¹⁴ Middle Paleolithic stone tool replicas had been used in the construction of this twenty-three-meter, oceangoing bamboo raft of about fifteen tons plus cargo. The objective was to establish whether it would be capable of sailing from Roti to Australia in a reasonable time. Some aspects of this raft were judged to be unsuitable under the unfavorable conditions brought about by the El Niño effect. Four days later, the vessel was beached for destructive sampling, and the entire raft was dismantled and dissected for inspection and material testing. The results provided a great deal of information that would affect the design and material choices for the

additional rafts to be constructed by the First Mariners project.

A radically different, simpler design was adopted for *Nale Tasih 2*, an eighteen-meter bamboo raft of only 2.8 tons. Construction of this vessel began in August 1998 near Kupang, West Timor, and on 17 December, it left Kupang Harbor with a crew of five. The raft had been constructed from bamboo, rattan forest vines, handmade gemuti ropes of palm fiber, wood, lontar pipa string, and palm leaves, especially of the lontar palm. On board were two mangrove logs (hollowed out by termites and sealed off with wood, beeswax, bark, and tree resin) that contained 350 liters of drinking water. The A-frame mast bore a small sail made from



The *Nale Tasih 2*, sailing under extreme conditions in heavy seas, approaching Australia on 28 December 1998.

palm fiber. The *Nale Tasih 2* was well equipped with spare parts, including two sails, a steering oar, vines, and other cordage, and to effect repairs, it carried sixty-five stone artifacts, replicas of Middle Paleolithic types made from black chert, and a stone mortar and pestle. Food provisions included fruit, cassava, salted meat, native millet, palm sugar, and salt, but the intention was to derive most food from the sea. For this purpose, the raft was equipped with several harpoons and fish spears, and it also carried a wooden fire box, some firewood, and dry coconut husks.

The *Nale Tasih 2* traveled without an escort boat or radio. It reached the continental shelf of Australia, which formed the continent's shore sixty thousand years ago, on the sixth day, thus having completed its primary objective. To gain more knowledge in handling such a raft, the crew con-

tinued on towards Darwin. On the eleventh day, the seas became rough, and the raft was sailed under extreme conditions for two days. The steering oar broke, the upper yard broke in two, and at one stage, all four forward guy ropes of the mast snapped in unison.¹⁵ However, all repairs were effected successfully, if under the most dramatic conditions. On the thirteenth day, rough seas of five-meter waves forced the raft towards Melville Island, north of Darwin, a coast heavily populated by saltwater crocodiles. As a precaution, the crew was taken off three hours before the raft was to reach the shore, transferring to an oil ship, the *Pacific Spear*, on the evening of 29 December 1998. Three days later, the raft was recovered in calmer seas, from where it had beached itself on the south coast of Melville Island, and towed to Darwin for public exhibition. Lashed together by nothing but



Jacobus Zakawerus (tribal name Om Mberu) on the *Nale Tasih 4* as it approaches its target coast, successfully crossing Lombok Strait on 31 January 2000.

forest vines, it had withstood almost one thousand kilometers of travel, partly under the most severe maritime conditions, without serious damage.

In March 1999, the eleven-meter bamboo raft *Nale Tasih 3* set out from the eastern-most point of Bali to attempt a crossing of Lombok Strait. Propelled by six oarsmen, it reached the halfway mark of its journey and was then forced north by strong seas. Once it became evident that it would miss the northwestern corner of Lombok, the attempt was abandoned under appalling weather conditions, and the crew transferred to the escort vessel. By the end of that year, a similar, twelve-meter-long simple platform of bamboo, *Nale Tasih 4*, lacking any sail or means of steering, was being built for a second attempt. This vessel was as rudimentary as a raft can possibly be, weighing only 1,080 kilograms, and was to be propelled by twelve paddlers. It crossed Lombok Strait successfully on 31 January 2000, taking just under twelve hours to cover fifty-one kilometers. The raft and paddles had been made with stone tools modeled on Lower Paleolithic finds of the region. This included all work processes, such as stripping and splicing the rattan bindings, and shaping the wooden paddles. The raft was assembled in under two weeks and on its journey reached a maximum speed of 4.2 knots, but its progress was badly hampered by strong currents in the deep-water section of the strait. The experiment showed how even a treacherous stretch of sea such as Lombok Strait could be crossed with purely Lower Paleolithic means.

This expedition completed stage one of the First Mariners project. Field work for the second stage, which is taking place in the Mediterranean, commenced in September 1999 on the coast of Morocco, where two prototype rafts were constructed entirely with Lower Paleolithic stone implement replicas, and then taken for sea trials.

One of these vessels, a pontoon-type raft, was made of bundles of cane, the other of inflated animal skins. The next research activity of the project will focus on Italy, including archaeological work in Elba and Sardinia.

The First Mariners project, which is not expected to be completed before the end of 2005, involves several further raft expeditions as well as extensive archaeological research on land in several more countries, including the United States. Its primary purpose is to examine quantitatively each of the many variables involved in Pleistocene seafaring, to create the conditions for constructing multiple scenarios within a realistic framework of probability. In this procedure, the confidence that the most probable scenario can convincingly be identified is a function of the variables or determinants accounted for satisfactorily. Therefore, numerous experiments are essential, and all need to be conducted under fully controlled conditions. While the most sensible, economic, or logical course of action is not necessarily the one always taken by hominid mariners, there are several arbitrary limiting factors. For instance, these journeys had much to do with survival, and we can reasonably assume that they were on the very limits of the technologically possible at the times in question. The most probable scenarios can then be tested by reference to known parameters of technological competence at the time. These are derived from the archaeological research forming part of the overall project. This would seem to be the only scientific method available to us to generate informed and plausible explanations for the very early maritime feats of hominids. The work has already prompted significant revisions to our ideas about these highly enterprising ancient mariners.

≈ NOTES ≈

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FROM FO'C'SLE TALES TO UNION STRIKES: WORKING-CLASS TRADITION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR WORKER CONTROL AMONG NORTH ATLANTIC FISHERMEN IN THE LAST DAYS OF SAIL

by Michael Wayne Santos

In August 1907, Marion Perry won the fishermen's race for Boston's Old Home Week celebration. Three weeks after that, his celebrity grew when he snubbed President Theodore Roosevelt during the latter's visit to Provincetown to lay the cornerstone for the Pilgrim Monument. The story goes that Perry was down on the wharves working on a rigging problem when a presidential envoy showed up, inviting him to an audience with

Roosevelt. When Perry ignored the man, the messenger tried again, only this time louder. Perry allegedly bit through his pencil, and said, "All right, all right! Tell the President if he wants to see me, he knows where to find me!" With that reply, he went back to his work.¹

Whether or not all the specifics of the story are true is irrelevant. Certainly we know that its basic elements are correct—three weeks after the race, Perry refused an invitation to meet the president, who was in Provincetown to lay the cornerstone for the Pilgrim Monument. To the fishermen who loved to tell the tale, the important thing about the story was how it illustrated the fishing skipper's nature. It certainly played to the captains' sense of themselves. Fishing captains saw themselves as free and independent men who commanded respect aboard their vessels because of their ability to think like a cod fish, carry sail in a howling gale, and keep track of dorymen scattered over a mile away from the mother ship. Ashore, they were heroes, leading citizens, and businessmen who took an active role in community affairs.

Their independence of mind made them disdain the niceties of polite society in favor of their

Michael W. Santos is a professor of history at Lynchburg College in Virginia and the founding director of its Center for the History and Culture of Central Virginia. He received his B.A. in history from Stonehill College and his master's and doctorate degrees from Carnegie-Mellon University. His previous publications deal with New England fishermen in the last days of sail and with Pittsburgh iron workers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This article is based on some of the work he did for his recently published book entitled *Caught in Irons: North Atlantic Fishermen in the Last Days of Sail*.

own value system. In many ways, Perry's actions embodied the spirit of the fishing skipper that so captivated writers like Rudyard Kipling and James Connolly. Yet, if one looks beneath the bravado, beyond the romantic images of pitching decks and dramatic races home from the Banks, one sees that Perry and his contemporaries had a lot in common with skilled workers in other trades.² Like the fishing captain, who represented the final authority at sea and often recruited his own crews, skilled laborers possessed a high degree of autonomy on the shop floor, and often hired, fired, and paid their helpers.

Regardless of industry, skilled workers maintained an informal moral code that upheld generally accepted rules. Fishermen were no different. They talked of living by an "unwritten law" that everyone accepted but no one discussed—everyone pulled his weight with no arguments and no complaints. One did what had to be done without being told.³ Paid on shares, fishermen had a stake in the marketability of their product just like skilled miners and iron workers.

According to Charles Sabel, an expert in workplace relations, a craftsman is "proud of his fellowship with his companions whose skill he respects, a man hesitant to forego that fellowship for a place in a world whose values he mistrusts in so far as he understands them."⁴ Perry's reluctance to hobnob with politicians was one manifestation of this characteristic of craftsmen.

Fishermen have one of the liveliest oral history traditions among American workers. Indeed, it was this tradition that helped to foster the sense of fellowship that Sabel talks about. Fishermen's stories perpetuated a value system, kept alive traditions, and defined a sense of self. In short, it created a unique working-class culture, as distinct and real as that of any other skilled group.

Our tendency in maritime history to sometimes view the vessel as a world apart has blinded us to that reality. So, too, has the charm of many of the fo'c'sle tales recorded by Connolly and oth-

ers. Meanwhile, traditional labor history, with its emphasis on the smokestack industries, struggles for control of the shop floor, and the dynamics of ethnic and race relations has all but ignored fishermen as part of the work force.

To appreciate the meaning of the fishermen's experience as workers, we need to examine what they talked about in the fo'c'sle in a new light. Stripped of their romanticism, these stories give us clues about the informal work rules and attitudes that defined the fishermen's culture. Just as significantly, recent interviews with schooner men suggest that they responded to auxiliary power and steam trawling in much the same way that skilled workers responded to the encroachment of technology in the smokestack industries.

Indeed, viewed in the context of the research done by David Montgomery and other labor historians, fo'c'sle tales and interviews suggest that, like other skilled laborers, fishermen followed a predictable pattern of responses to workplace realities.⁵ When workers' skills were essential to the production process, their superior knowledge gave them functional autonomy on the shop floor; completely self-directed, they operated without interference from the boss while maintaining an informal moral code that limited output and upheld work rules against "hogging" work.

When technology and corporate restructuring undermined worker control of production, workers turned to unionization as a means of maintaining control on the shop floor. According to Montgomery, union work rules signaled a shift from spontaneous solidarity to deliberate collective action. Benson Soffer noted that one of the chief functions of unions for these men was to establish clear rules that would decrease competition between them. Thus, unionization was less an expression of strength than an effort to preserve established norms from the encroachments of management. This reality was clearly evidenced among fishermen challenged by auxiliary power, beam trawling, and the consolidation of corporate control and power.

TRADITIONAL WORK PATTERNS
AMONG THE SCHOONERMEN

Such changes, however, lay in the future. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, middle-class readers of James Connolly and Rudyard Kipling were eager to believe that fishermen were romantic folk heroes cut from the same cloth as the American cowboy. Certainly, it was not a stretch for them to accept Connolly at his word when he wrote that if one hung around Fishermen's Corner or the Master Mariners' Hall long enough, one could come to believe "that the main interests of [Gloucester's] people were not so much the catching and marketing of fish from the banks as they were the building and racing home of fast fishing schooners."⁶ In penning this passage, Connolly was responding to the fo'c'sle yarning that he had come to know so well while hanging around the wharves of Gloucester. Just as significantly, as a writer, he knew that such stories had an appeal that was sure to sell magazines to middle-class readers hungry for adventure.

However, the stories were more complex than that. As part of a working-class culture focused on wresting a living from the sea, fo'c'sle tales perpetuated a set of values and expectations passed down from generation to generation. Like skilled workers in other high-risk occupations, stories and shared dangers fed craft identity and a sense of solidarity. Indeed, to listen to nineteenth-century miners and fishermen was to hear the same themes. For example, John Brophy, who grew up in the coal mines of western Pennsylvania and learned his trade alongside his father, believed that "one of the great satisfactions that a miner had . . . [was] that he was his own boss within his workplace." Informal work rules and pride "inclined [a miner] to lose face with his fellow workmen if he misses his turn because of poor workmanship."

"The miner in my day," Brophy went on, "was aware that all knowledge didn't start with his generation." Miners before him had experienced what he had, and "had passed this knowledge on to their

children, and their children had passed it on." Coming from four generations of English miners on one side of his family, Brophy had a "strong sense of pride" in this inheritance.⁷

This sense of connectedness was clearly perpetuated by an oral tradition that recounted stories and folklore and that showcased values of independence, competence, and pride.

Similarly, a fisherman's pride came from knowing that not every man could be a fisherman, and those who could not were weeded out early and fast. As one old schoonerman put it, "bad ones" tended not to last, because word got around and no one wanted "them aboard ship or at the bar." This created a tight-knit and closed fraternity, where, "Fishermen [knew] each other from up and down the coast. . . . It was all one big group."⁸

Stories were learned early and often centered on the skill of the fishing captain. One fisherman recalled that as a boy in the early 1880s he went mackerel seining with his dad aboard the *Astoria*. It was there he heard about the famed *Sarah M. Prior* and her skipper Tom McLaughlin. The crew was fond of telling stories about both. The *Prior*, they declared, "was the ablest vessel to carry sail in a blow, and the smartest sailer by the wind in a fresh breeze." Of McLaughlin, they said he was not only a smart fisherman but a great sail master as well. Many's the time he would turn for home with a hold full of haddock and the wind "blowing a heavy nor'wester." "With a long hard beat ahead of him . . . he would set her "four-lowers" and drive her for all she was worth."⁹

Every fisherman had heard stories like this countless times but never seemed to tire of listening to them or recounting them himself. Charlie Harty, for instance, was known among fishermen as "the greatest man to trim and sail a vessel out o' Gloucester." Reportedly he loved nothing better than sailing, even to the point of missing meals to stay at the wheel of his vessel during a race home with one of his rivals in the seining fleet.¹⁰

Joe Silva, a young immigrant from the Azores, made his reputation aboard the *Governor Russell*

when he refused to douse sail when challenged by Maurice Whalen of the *Henry L. Belden*. It was blowing like "stink," and the helmsman asked Silva when they should take in the main. Silva got a piece of chalk, walked to the weather side, and made a mark about a foot below the rail. "There," he said, "when she rolls down to there, call me." With that, he went below, having won the nickname "Roll Down Joe."¹¹ Nor was Silva the only one who reveled in the glory that came from flying every stitch of canvas. Skippers won nicknames for such incidents all the time. Captain Gippert of the *Hesperis*, for example, was known as "Strings," because he had once been quoted as saying, "My canvas will be all strings before I'll take it down."¹²

Even the *Atlantic Fisherman*, the self-proclaimed "home paper of the fishermen," devoted space to fo'c'sle gossip. Articles trumpeted the specifics of outstanding runs in some detail. As late as September 1922, for example, readers learned that Captain "Paddy" Mack, of the recently launched *Mahaska*, sent word to the South Boston Fish Pier that his craft was the fastest in Nova Scotia. Mack boasted that he had "whipped" *Bluenose* to windward "each time they came together in anything like a breeze."¹³ Not to be outdone, Captain Albert Picco of the *Elizabeth Howard* arrived in Boston on 25 November 1922, reporting a record run of three hundred and fifty miles in thirty-one hours.¹⁴

At the heart of all these stories was not so much an obsession with "building and racing fast fishing boats" as valuing those things necessary to make a living. Middle-class readers of Connolly's stories might be enthralled by the tales of derring-do, but to the fishing captain and his crew, the ability to carry sail and win races home from the Grand Banks was an economic imperative. Stories of successful races almost always ended with a discussion of the crew's take as a result of the victory. The oft-repeated stories about Sol Jacobs's determination and grit were usually told to explain why he was the number one highline skipper except for a year or two in the mid-1880s.¹⁵ Captain Al Miller loved to

tell the story of when he beat Marty Welsh and the *Lucania*, despite having his foretopsail and balloon jib carried away. The first into market, he got the buyers to pay ten cents a pound, selling his whole catch of sixty thousand pounds for six thousand dollars, or a share of \$152 per man.¹⁶

Races made reputations because they tested a skipper's skills, and that, when all was said and done, translated into money. The successful captain was a driver both of the ship and of his men. He knew the limits of each but willingly pushed both to the line. Fishermen respected a skipper who knew his stuff because the system encouraged mutual dependency and responsibility. Paid on shares, a captain's reputation as a highliner guaranteed that he attracted a good crew and kept it.¹⁷

Reflecting Sabel's observations about the fellowship born of mutual respect for skill, one fisherman observed that in the end, "It was up to your pride . . . you wanted to be as good as the other guy."¹⁸ Another made these points:

Because you live together, out there together, and work together . . . if you can't trust a man alongside of you, you don't want him there. . . . A good shipmate . . . knows his business, doesn't say nothing . . . when you're working it's team work.¹⁹

This was especially true for the skipper, who had to be counted on to know where his dorymen and their trawls were, especially on the Grand Banks, where sudden fogs often separated men from their vessels.²⁰

In 1922, the *Atlantic Fisherman* published a poem that, like their tales, reflected the code by which the fishermen lived. The anonymous author of "The Fisherman's Way," captured the spirit of life aboard a fishing schooner with these lines:

The rules, whut there is, are fair, and square,
"Each man is expected to do his share."
Ef he don't wa'al, sumbody parts his hair
Fer that is the fisherman's way. . . .

"We're holdin' our own, without no fuss,
No son-of'-a-gun takes the wind frum us,
Our spars are springin'? They might be wuss."
Fer that is the fisherman's way. . . .

They don't stop to figger out which is worst,
To swamp and go down er die of thirst,
But say "Damn the man thet gives in first."
Fer that is the fisherman's way.²¹

The fisherman's competitive spirit infused almost everything he did, and for good reason—speed and teamwork meant money. It also meant a rush of adrenaline unequalled by most experiences ashore. Among the mackerel seiners, for example, there was just as much excitement in a race of seine boats to capture a school of fish as between two schooners on the homeward run.

Raymond McFarland, who went fishing with his uncle Captain John McFarland aboard the *Yosemite*, vividly described one such contest.²² The *Yosemite*, *Senator Lodge*, and another schooner were idly jogging back and forth one morning. Suddenly, cries from the mastheads announced a school of fish a mile and a half away. The *Yosemite* and *Lodge's* hands leaped into action, and in a moment their seine boats were away. As both boats raced on, the captains stood tall in their sterns, eyes fixed on the school, guiding the boats with a sure hand toward their quest. Their quiet confidence and steady leadership inspired their crews. While John Mills of the *Lodge* was quicker, Captain McFarland's course was truer, and he won the contest. Writing years later, his nephew could still recall the exhilaration. As the men in the *Lodge* boat cussed, the *Yosemite* crew basked in the thrill of victory. According to McFarland, this was the exhilaration of it:

Gone was fatigue, we were kings of the sea! . . . We had won a great race fairly, against the best men that Gloucester could furnish. That was honor enough for us and five generations of descendants.

Even more mundane activities, like baiting trawl, brought out the fishermen's competitive edge. In 1914, there were some who wanted to hold a contest on Boston's T Wharf to see if Gloucester, Boston, Provincetown, or Portland fishermen were the fastest baiters. The average fisherman could bait a tub of trawl with five hundred hooks in thirty minutes in a cold hold. Some, it was reputed, could do it in twenty. While an official contest never took place, there were doubtless many unofficial ones held between fishermen on their own vessels and between crews of rival schooners.²³

CHALLENGES TO WORKER AUTONOMY

Since much of the fishermen's ethic reveals a similarity in work rules and the sense of camaraderie found among other skilled workers, it is hardly surprising that they reacted to the encroachments of technology and industrial capitalism in much the same way as craftsmen in other industries did.

The new era was ushered in on 29 March 1900. Sol Jacobs, the so-called "King of the Mackerel Killers," launched the *Helen Miller Gould*, a 117-foot, clipper-bowed schooner equipped with a 150-horsepower Globe gasoline engine. Though she burned in October 1901, the *Gould's* short career highlighted the advantages of auxiliary power. The highliner for 1900, she broke all existing records, stocking \$40,660 at a share of \$863.²⁴ By the next decade, the combination of Tom McManus's knockabout schooner design and the introduction of crude oil and diesel engines had created what Howard Chapelle characterized as the apex in the long evolution of New England fishing schooners.²⁵

The transition to power aboard the schooners redefined shipboard life for the fishermen as it had for sailors aboard merchantmen and naval vessels some two to three generations earlier.²⁶ If part of the skipper's expertise and reputation focused on his ability to carry sail productively, the use of steam or diesel power deprived him of an important part of his sense of self and of his pride in possessing a

skill and an understanding of his boat that few other men could claim.

Like the skippers of auxiliary merchant steamers in the nineteenth century, fishing captains aboard auxiliary schooners had to acknowledge, even if grudgingly, that they no longer held a monopoly on the knowledge necessary to command their ship effectively. Now the engineer, with his ability to coax another knot or two from a balky diesel, might mean the difference in a close race to market. Certainly, the captain's ability to keep a full press of sail on mattered little in an era where sail was becoming the auxiliary source of power.

Nor was resenting the engineer limited to the skippers. When asked to recall the names of some of the engineers they served with, most fishermen could not do so, usually noting fishermen and engineers did not mix very well. Like their predecessors aboard the merchantmen and navy ships, fishermen and engineers divided themselves by function and experience, and built up resentments as a result. One old doryman explained this:

There was kinda bad . . . feelings there [because] the engineer . . . never went out in the dory . . . [and] they give him more [than equal shares]. Not that it was all that much, but it was a little more. Oh, they worked for it, but . . . the fishermen kinda resented it.²⁷

The introduction of auxiliary power had undermined the age-old schooner men's credo of "share and share alike." Technology was creating an unofficial job hierarchy aboard the auxiliaries that fishermen found disconcerting. As Sabel points out, technical prowess—not place in an officially defined hierarchy of jobs—was what counted for the skilled worker.²⁸

As if all this were not bad enough, the creation of the Bay State Fishing Company in June 1905 seemed to introduce even more insidious technologies and labor structures into the North

Atlantic fisheries.²⁹ Organized by a group of Boston investors to build a steel-hulled beam trawler like those used by the English in the North Sea, the firm seemed to many fishermen an effort to consolidate corporate control as U.S. Steel had done in the iron and steel industry a few years before. When Bay State Fishing became part of the National Fisheries scheme in 1906, their fears were confirmed. The National Fisheries Company tried to combine the Boston fish dealers, fix prices, and further encourage beam trawling.

The threat from beam, or otter, trawling was obvious to the fishermen. Dragging a net bag across the ocean floor to catch fish would deplete fishing stocks in short order. By 1912, the Bay State Fishing Company had six steamers in its fleet, and more were expected. With each vessel averaging forty-nine trips and two million tons of fish that year, sailing fishermen mobilized to stop the obvious threat to their livelihood.

Pushing for a bill to outlaw the landing of fish caught by otter trawl, they succeeded in getting Congress to authorize the Commissioner of Fisheries "to investigate the method of fishing known as beam or otter trawling and to report to Congress whether or not this method of fishing is destructive to the fish species or is otherwise harmful or undesirable."³⁰ The fishermen argued that the new method depleted fish stocks, marked the beginning of industrial fishing, and would ultimately lead to a monopoly.

While all three objections reflected a concern over the threat these vessels posed, the last two in particular focused on the loss of freedom and egalitarianism that for generations had been part of the social fabric of communities like Gloucester. Migrating from Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, many of the fishermen out of Gloucester represented upwards of a hundred years of family experience in the fisheries.³¹

Fishing, for most of these men, was not a conscious choice, but part of a family tradition handed down from father to son. As one old timer put it, "If it's good enough for my father, it's good enough

for me.”³² Though their choice of fishing seemed inevitable, there was an attractiveness to it that made fishermen more than mere pawns of fate. In a story similar to that repeated by countless immigrants to Gloucester, one man noted that from an early age, he had “water in his blood.” Instead of going to school, he “somehow or other ended up hanging around at the wharves all the time.”³³

The appeal of fishing for one immigrant from Aquaforte, Newfoundland, was clear. “You were free. You didn’t have a boss over your shoulder all day long. . . . You were in the dory, you and your mate. You were your own boss after you left the mother ship. The quicker you got the trawl, the quicker you got on board and got coffee. So you had goals to work for.”³⁴

The fishermen’s work ethic had a leveling effect aboard the fishing schooner. According to a Boston man who went fishing at age nine, “It didn’t make any difference where you came from, as long as you knew your business . . . and they could find out in no time whether you knew your business or not.”³⁵

For Gloucester’s Captain Frank Nunan, a point person in the fight against the trawlers, the Bay State Fishing Company had monopolistic designs on the fisheries. “[T]he backing of the beam trawlers,” he stated emphatically, “will fight before they give up their plan . . . to control the fish business; to have their own wharf; to have their own store for fitting out steamers; to have ice houses, railways and lastly, to sell their own fish.”³⁶

Like entrepreneurs in steel and other industries, the Bay State executives, at least in Nunan’s mind, were attempting to integrate the industry horizontally to maximize control and profitability. The value of having everything from raw materials, transportation, and processing facilities under a clearly delineated corporate hierarchy was obvious, but it came at a high cost to workers in the smokestack industries. Unions had been busted, worker autonomy was lost, and skill had been diluted to the point where most everyone in the mill was a semiskilled machine tender, easily trained

and easily replaced.³⁷ The Gloucestermen were certainly not willing to see a similar redefinition of their working conditions, at least not without a fight.

Commenting in the *Fishing Gazette*, Nunan delineated the issue this way:

It is labor and independence against something not right. By way of an illustration, take the day before Christmas, or the day before a big storm.

The Old Way—“Well boys, go home. We won’t go out tonight.”

The New Way—“Well, wife, the fish company says I must go out tonight. You know I am hired and I must go, for if I don’t there is someone to take my place on the wharf. Goodbye. Think of me tomorrow.”³⁸

Such a reality seemed all the more viable given most schoonermen’s assumptions about the competency of crews aboard the steam trawlers. According to the *Portland Express*, “They can come from Mattawankeag as well as from Orr’s island, it matters little whether their knowledge of rigging is confined to tying a knot around a cow’s neck so it will not slip and choke her to death.”³⁹

That steam trawlers required both skilled fishermen and skilled engine-room workers was irrelevant to the argument of the dorymen. As with the other skilled workers who, when challenged by technology, created artificial distinctions between themselves and other workers, schoonermen were defining the trawlermen as industrial laborers. Assuming these men were less skilled, the sailing fishermen believed technology made them easily replaceable. Whether they worked on a fishing boat or in a steel plant did not much matter. The dynamics of wage slavery, for the all-sail fisherman as well as for skilled employees in the smokestack industries, was the same.

Unlike the schooner fleet, steam trawling paid a wage rather than sharing the profits of a trip. It seemed obvious to the fishermen that such a system

would inevitably destroy the egalitarianism that permeated community life in towns like Gloucester and would replace it with the class tensions that defined the experience of industrial cities.

A strike by the trawlermen for higher wages and shorter hours in July 1912 simply confirmed this impression as fact. Never mind that the strike lasted only a week and that the trawlermen won a wage increase of ten dollars a month. Nor was it particularly significant that the beam trawlers were generally safer than dory trawling and had been promoted by some reformers for that reason since the late 1880s.

One fisherman clearly summarized the underlying concern of many of his compatriots. Despite the danger and hard work inherent in fishing aboard a dory schooner, "There was a sort of respect and affirmation of what it took to be a fisherman in the old days."⁴⁰ Like skilled workers in the smokestack industries, what the dorymen feared most about the encroachment of technology and industrial values was the loss of this respect and affirmation, and with it, their sense of control over their own lives and destinies. According to Charles Sabel, job security without the accompanying acknowledgment of craft identity meant little to the skilled laborer.⁴¹

By 1916, many of the fishermen's fears had been realized. Following the Fisheries Commission's decision to allow beam trawling to continue, executives of the Bay State Fishing Company restructured their firm as a diversified fishing and processing company. They chartered the Bay State Fishing Company of Maine with rights to breed, pack, can, and sell all species of fish. The firm merged the fishing operations of the original Bay State Fishing Company with the processing and marketing activities of Boston's most successful wholesale outfits. The goal was clear—corner the market and, insofar as possible, foster a monopoly on the New England fish trade.

In the same year, the Boston Fish Pier Company was formed, acquiring twenty-eight dealerships. By 1917, thirty-seven independent firms

had been amalgamated into two. The impact for the Bay State Fishing Company was impressive. In that year, it was responsible for landing thirty-six million pounds of fish, approximately one-third of Boston's annual total.⁴²

While such success was responsible for encouraging the spread of the steam trawler, it also contributed to what might be termed the proletarianization of the fishermen by 1920. That the trawlermen were wage slaves was evidenced clearly enough for the schoonerermen by a rise in labor strife on the wharves. First, there had been the 1912 strike, and then came the 1915 walkout for union recognition. This was followed finally by the 1918 strike for an increase in crew size, with captains, mates, and engine-room gangs each pushing for a wage hike.⁴³

The following year, it became painfully obvious that the line fishermen were likewise becoming victims of monopoly capitalism. With the wartime economic boom over, market demand decreased, causing fish prices to fall to two cents a pound in 1919. While the trawlers' tendency towards big harvests no doubt contributed to the problem, their crews, who were paid a monthly wage and a bonus, were not greatly affected. On the other hand, dorymen, who worked on shares, were.

As a result, the fisherman's union demanded a fixed minimum price for fish, which the wholesalers flatly refused. Seeing no other alternative, the schoonerermen struck in July, and by the middle of August, a Board of Arbitration settled the dispute in favor of the fishermen.⁴⁴ Although they had won, the 1919 strike was a tacit acceptance of the "New Way" that Captain Nunan had warned against back in 1912. One doryman noted years later that "The union was set up to cope with beam trawlers." It was not needed aboard the schooners, because there, you were "on your own."⁴⁵ As it had for the skilled workers studied by Montgomery, collective action, even when it was successful, was an admission that the fishermen's independence and autonomy was no longer assured.

This point was apparent to anyone who under-

stood the routine aboard a steam trawler. Every morning, the skipper was required to check in with headquarters by radio. The quantity of fish he had aboard, how many sets he had made, his location, weather conditions, other vessels fishing in the vicinity, and anything else that might help the company know exactly what was going on with all its vessels was reported. The data were then tabulated and evaluated, and skippers were ordered to stay out or head in, depending on the gluts or scarcities in the market.⁴⁶

Skill, expertise, and the ability to "think like a cod fish" were not necessary to be a trawler captain. If the schooner captain was a self-starter, independent, and knew his business intimately because he had worked his way up from the fo'c'sle, a trawler skipper seemed just to need to know how to take orders. His status aboard ship came not so much from a hard-earned reputation as from an officially prescribed job hierarchy in which he was the relative equivalent of a shop floor foreman or middle-level manager. By the mid-1920s, Captain Nunan's scenario of what would happen if beam trawlers won out—when "the Fishing Company says I must go out . . . I must go, for if I don't there is someone to take my place"—had become truth for a good many American fishermen.

In the end, sailing fishermen, like their counterparts in other industries, succumbed to the val-

ues of the dominant industrial capitalist culture. This should have come as no great surprise. After all, the bottom line was that someone other than the fishermen, miner, or factory worker owned the means of production. While that owner needed his workers' skills, he, or some rival, also had a strong incentive to find a more efficient way of getting the job done. It was just the nature of capitalism.

The difference between the fishermen and their contemporaries in the smokestack industries was that the fishermen were romanticized by industrial capitalist culture, even as it was sweeping away the last vestiges of their way of life. Stories by James Connolly and Rudyard Kipling lionized the fishermen, just as they blurred the fact that the dorymen's experience was in so many ways similar to workers who labored in less exotic settings. The irony is that Connolly's words on the passing of the Gloucestermen ultimately serve as a fitting epitaph for most skilled workers during the early twentieth century, though neither he nor his audience fully appreciated that fact. As he wrote in the late 1920s, "To linger sighing over the industrial current of the times is a waste of time perhaps . . . but nevertheless, these were great men . . . and what man who knew . . . them but will continue to wish that everyone else could have known them for what they were?"⁴⁷

≈ NOTES ≈

1. Jeremiah Digges, *In Great Waters: The Story of the Portuguese Fishermen* (New York: McMillan Company, 1941), 201–12; and James B. Connolly, *The Book of the Gloucester Fishermen* (New York: John Day Company, 1927), 239–40. James Connolly mentions the incident, but gets Perry's name wrong, calling him Captain Santos.
2. For more on the skilled laborers' attitude toward work, see David Montgomery, "Worker Control of Machine Production in the 19th Century," *Labor History* 17 (1976): 485–509; David Montgomery, *Workers' Control in America: Studies in the History of Work, Technology, and Labor Struggles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Charles F. Sabel, *Work and Politics: The Division of Labor in Industry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); and Benson Soffer, "A Theory of Trade Union Development: The Role of the 'Autonomous' Workman," *Labor History* 1 (1960): 141–63.
3. Interview with Uno Peterson by R. Wayne Anderson, Chelsea, Mass., 9 and 16 June 1982; interview with Robert O'Brien by R. Wayne Anderson, Watertown, Mass., 2 March 1982, Northeastern University Oral History Project (hereafter NUOHP); interview with Robert Merchant by Virginia Jones, Stonington, Conn., 1 April 1978, Mystic Seaport Museum Oral History Collection (hereafter MSMOHC); and Raymond McFarland, *The Masts of Gloucester: Recollections of a Fisherman* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1937), 74.
4. Sabel, *Work and Politics*, 89–92.
5. Much has been written on changes in labor-management dynamics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and worker responses to them. At the heart of most of the redefinition of work was the introduction of new technology that made skill obsolete and management's search for efficiency a high priority. New corporate structures, vertical and horizontal

integration, and "Taylorism" all contributed to the workers' loss of power and control in the workplace. For a good overview of the changing realities throughout industrial America at the time, see Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); David Brody, *Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the 20th-Century Struggle* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), chapter 1; Alfred D. Chandler Jr., *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1977); Alfred D. Chandler Jr., "The Emergence of Managerial Capitalism," *Business History Review* 58 (1984): 473–503; Richard Edwards, *Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Basic Books, 1979); Montgomery, "Worker Control of Machine Production in the 19th Century;" Montgomery, *Workers' Control in America*; David Nelson, *Managers and Workers: Origins of the New Factory System in the United States, 1880–1920* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975); Daniel T. Rodgers, *The Work Ethic in Industrial America, 1850–1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); and Soffer, "A Theory of Trade Union Development." There are also some excellent industry-specific studies. See, for example, Cecelia F. Bucki, "Dilution and Craft Tradition: Bridgeport, Connecticut, Munitions Workers, 1915–1919," *Social Science History* 4 (1980): 105–24; Robert Ozanne, "Union-Management Relations: McCormick Harvesting Machine Company, 1862–1886," *Labor History* 4 (1963): 132–60; and Robert Ozanne, *A Century of Labor-Management Relations at McCormick and International Harvester* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967).

6. Connolly, *Book of the Gloucester Fishermen*, 245.
7. This was quoted in Brody, *Workers in Industrial America*, 3–4.

8. Peterson interview.
9. George Wesley Pierce, *Going Fishing: The Story of the Deep Sea Fishermen of New England* (1934; reprint, Camden, Maine: International Marine Publishing, 1989), 164.
10. Ibid.
11. Connolly, *Book of the Gloucester Fishermen*, 285–86; and interview with Robert Merchant by Virginia Jones, Gloucester, Mass., 16 November 1977, MSMOHC.
12. Interview with Walter Furlong by R. Wayne Anderson, Charlestown, Mass., 10 June 1982, NUOHP; and Merchant interview.
13. *Atlantic Fisherman*, September 1922.
14. Ibid, December 1922.
15. Pierce, *Going Fishing*, chapter 15.
16. Ibid, 179–84.
17. Interview with Leo Hynes by Gregory J. Fulham, Nashua, New Hampshire, 29 April 1980; O'Brien interview; and Pierce, *Going Fishing*, 166. The point is implicit in much of McFarland, *Masts of Gloucester*.
18. Interview with O'Brien.
19. Interview with Peterson.
20. Interview with Furlong; and interview with William Martell by Gary Adair, Nancy d'Estang, and Erik Ronnberg Jr., Gloucester, Mass., February 1991, MSMOHC.
21. *Atlantic Fisherman*, August 1922.
22. McFarland, *Masts of Gloucester*, 175–81.
23. Andrew W. German, *Down on T Wharf: The Boston Fisheries as Seen through the Photographs of Henry D. Fisher* (Mystic, Conn.: Mystic Seaport Museum, 1982), chapter 3. Connolly claimed five hundred hooks in half an hour. See Connolly, *Book of the Gloucester Fishermen*, 297.
24. For more on the *Gould*, see Gordon W. Thomas, *Fast and Able: Life Stories of Great Gloucester Fishing Vessels* (Gloucester: Gloucester 350th Anniversary Celebration, 1973), 57.
25. Howard I. Chapelle, *The American Fishing Schooners, 1825–1935* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), chapter 8.
26. For more on the impact of steam aboard nineteenth-century merchant and naval vessels, see Edward W. Sloan, "'Vulcan Now Rides in Neptune's Barge': Steam Propulsion and Seafaring Enterprise in Post-Civil War America," in *American Industrialization, Economic Expansion, and the Law*, ed. Joseph R. Frese and Jacob Judd (Tarrytown, N.Y.: Sleepy Hollow Press and Rockefeller Archive Center, 1981), 55–84; and Edward W. Sloan, "The Evolution of Seagoing Steam: Stages in a Maritime Revolution," *Log of Mystic Seaport* 44 (1992): 87–98.
27. Interview with Martell.
28. Sabel, *Work and Politics*, 89.
29. For an excellent discussion of the introduction of beam trawling to New England, see German, *Down on T Wharf*, chapter 7; and Andrew W. German, "Otter Trawling Comes to America: The Bay State Fishing Company, 1905–1938," *American Neptune* 47 (1984): 114–31.
30. *United States Bureau of Fisheries, Report of the United States Commissioner of Fisheries for the Fiscal Year 1914*, appendix 6, by A. B. Alexander, H. F. Moore, and W. C. Kendall (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915), 5.
31. Interview with Captain Lawrence Allen by John Kochiss, Lunenburg, Nova Scotia, 11 November 1969; interview with Frank Mitchell by Fred Calabretta, Reading, Mass., 24 July 1992, MSMOHC; interview with Hubert Cluett by David Masters, Gloucester, Mass., 15 March 1978, Gloucester Arts and Humanities Program (hereafter GAHP); interview with Al Edmunds by R. Wayne Anderson, East Boston, Mass., 20 June 1982; interview with Furlong; interview with O'Brien; and interview with Peterson. Lunenburg fishermen described similar situations, a point worth noting since many Gloucestermen started life in Lunenburg. See Peter Barss, *Images of Lunenburg County* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978), 19–24.
32. Interview with Captain John Francis by Nancy d'Estang, Mystic, Conn., 19 October 1987, MSMOHC.
33. Interview with Cluett.
34. Interview with O'Brien.
35. Interview with Edmunds.
36. *Fishing Gazette*, 3 February 1912, as quoted in German, "Otter Trawling Comes to America," 121.
37. The most dramatic examples of the transformation of work came in the steel industry. See David

Brody, *Steelworkers in America: The Nonunion Era* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Francis Couvares, *The Remaking of Pittsburgh: Class and Community Culture in an Industrializing City, 1877-1919* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984); John A. Garraty, "The United States Steel Corporation versus Labor: The Early Years," *Labor History* 1 (1960): 3-38; David Nelson, "Taylorism and the Workers at Bethlehem Steel, 1898-1901," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 101 (1977): 487-505; and Katherine Stone, "The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry," *Review of Radical Political Economics* 6 (1974): 61-95.

38. *Fishing Gazette*, 3 February 1912, as quoted in German, "Otter Trawling Comes to America," 121.

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
44. German, "Otter Trawling Comes to America," 125.

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47. Connolly, *Book of the Gloucester Fishermen*, 288-89.

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WISCONSIN'S NEW SCHOONER

by J. S. Dean

Wisconsin's new schooner, the *Denis Sullivan*, was inspired by the three-masted schooner *Moonlight*, built in Milwaukee in 1874, and by four Great Lakes schooners built between 1852 and 1868: *Challenge*, *Clipper City*, *Lucia A. Simpson*, and *Rouse Simmons* (famous for her cargo of Christmas trees). The 134-foot (from bowsprit to jibboom), 125-ton, three-masted schooner has a 23'6" beam, draws 8'9", a mainmast of 95', and carries eight thousand square feet of sail. Such a ship in the 1870s could be built for about ten thousand dollars in the currency of the time; today, the cost is about \$4.2 million, and it took nine hundred thousand hours of labor to build. That is no mean expenditure, but Wisconsin's flagship serves as a floating classroom and as a nautical ambassador for the state throughout the Great Lakes.

The *Denis Sullivan* is named after Captain Denis Sullivan, an Irish immigrant who moved first to Dunnville, Ontario, near Lake Erie, and then in 1873 to Milwaukee, where a year later he was given command of the 213' schooner *Moonlight*, a ship known for her cargo capacity of fourteen hundred tons and her turn of speed that could take her the 895 miles from Chicago to Buffalo in under four days. Captain Sullivan's grandson, Jere Sullivan, officially named the ship.

On the Great Lakes, the nineteenth century was the age of the schooner, a design so admirably suited to reaching along the lake winds, that nearly

eight hundred schooners sailed the waters of the lakes in any given year. Their cargo was lumber, carried often ten feet high on the main deck, a practice that made them tender and liable to capsize, but the profit was worth the risk. These boxy craft carried ore from the ranges in Upper Michigan, and once smelted, took pig iron to the steel mills and foundries of Gary and Cleveland. The Midwest's grain fields and orchards provided cargoes of wheat and apples, and in the 1880s, Milwaukee was the world's largest shipper of such cargo.

Once unloaded, the schooners took on a different cargo, passengers. Most immigrants to the Midwest got there by shipping aboard a schooner. Before 1865, many black slaves made their way to Canada aboard schooners. Later, many blacks worked as stevedores alongside whites. Muscle was muscle. The states and provinces that border the Great Lakes all have a significant maritime history, and this explains the Wisconsin Lake Schooner Education Association's choice of a schooner to represent the state.

As with many other modern historical ships, the *Denis Sullivan* is not a replica of a specific ship. Only for three nineteenth-century schooners do we have complete plans. Most were built from half models, then lofted, the last one in Milwaukee over one hundred years ago. This present schooner was designed by Sturgeon Bay marine architect Timothy Graul. Construction called for some new and some old techniques. Until the twentieth century, futtocks and ribs were cut from single pieces of white oak. All of the oak, incidentally, is local. A curiosity is the band saw used to cut that oak.

This saw was loaned by the State of Pennsylvania. It is a venerable 125-year-old piece, probably first steam-operated, now with an electrical motor, and is the one used to rebuild the *Niagra*. The large band saw's head tilts, rather than the bed, thus giving the shipwrights the ability to make compound angle cuts.

With good timber becoming scarce, the twentieth century began using laminated pieces, which are stronger, and do not waste as much wood. That is the technique used here. The knees are of tamarack, dredged from the swamps of Northern Wisconsin. The planking (there are some 450 custom-fashioned planks) is white oak 2½" x 8" to 30' lengths, fastened above the waterline by 8" galvanized nails countersunk and plugged with a bung. Below the waterline, the age-old method of fastening the planking to the ribs is used. Trunnels (tree nails, or dowels) swell for a tight fit. The planking is then caulked and payed in the traditional way: white cotton is put in the gap between the planks, followed by oakum, both pounded in by beetle and caulking iron, finally sealed by using strands of tar (the shipwrights may, in fact, use modern marine caulk for this last step).

The *Denis Sullivan's* three masts and the rest of her spars (except for the bowsprit and jibboom, that are of spruce) are of 150-year-old white pine, donated and especially blessed by the Menominee Indian Nation. The rough square cuts were made by chain saw, with further cuts by hand planers. Each of the spars was coated with one hundred coats of linseed oil to prevent checking and cracking once stepped and subject to the weather. The mast hoops are white oak, steamed and bent in a jig. The hoops are held together not with the traditional copper rivet, but with a brass nut and bolt. Her standing rigging uses elevator cable, which is not such an innovation because steel cable was used in Great Lakes schooners from about the 1850s. The cable was coated with pine tar and wrapped in white linen. It was then served by marlin to keep to oil in the cable, and to give a good handhold when going aloft. Her deadeyes are of

locust, carefully cut, drilled, banded, and boiled in water and oils. Below deck, there are two 180-horsepower Cummins diesel engines, a captain's cabin, galley, bunks for about thirty, three heads, and showers. The ship was built by fifteen professional shipwrights drawn from New England, as well as hundreds of volunteers since the shipyard was established in 1994.

Thus, an important new spread of canvas has appeared on the waters of Lake Michigan.

TALL SHIP *Californian* COMES HOME TO THE SAN DIEGO MARITIME MUSEUM

Californian, the official tall ship of the State of California has a new home. On Friday, 28 June 2002, a transaction was completed that found the large topsail schooner joining the historic fleet at the San Diego Maritime Museum. *Californian* was purchased with funds donated by the Hughes and Sheila Potiker Family Foundation of San Diego.

"Over the years, the Potikers have been impressed with our museum's exhibits and the quality of our many educational programs," said Raymond Ashley, executive director of the San Diego Maritime Museum.

"When the ship came up for sale, the Potiker family felt she would be a perfect vehicle to expand our programming in the community. They kindly negotiated the purchase and provided us with funds to transfer the vessel from Orange County's Nautical Heritage Society to our museum."

Although the details of the transaction are not being released at this time, *Californian* was recently appraised at \$1.4 million. This donation constitutes the largest gift in the museum's seventy-five-year history.

Californian was built from the ground up in 1984 at Spanish Landing in San Diego Bay. She was launched with great fanfare, and today has an international following as the "official tall ship of the State of California."

A resolution was adopted in 1983 and passed

unanimously in the Senate naming *Californian* the official tall ship ambassador for the State of California even before her keel had been laid. She is the only ship to carry such a prestigious title in this state.

Since her launching in San Diego, the ship has played host to thousands of school children on seagoing educational programs up and down the West Coast. She has also made educational voyages to Hawaii and Mexico, and has, in an eighteen-year period, developed an internationally respected and distinguished career.

Californian is a replica of the 1847 revenue cutter *C. W. Lawrence*, a stately vessel that patrolled the coast of California in the defense of law and order. The revenue service was a precursor of today's coast guard.

Designed for speed, *Californian* has nine sails, carries seven thousand square feet of canvas, measures 145 feet in length, and weighs 130 tons. She casts a distinctive and instantly recognizable silhouette and has become one of this country's most well-known tall ships from coast to coast.

"For us this represents a huge step," said Ashley. "Having *Californian* provides us with capabilities as an educational institution that we thought were years away.

"One of the other things we are very excited

about is that in receiving this wonderful vessel we inherit a very large and extended family of crew, followers, and supporters."

While *Californian* adds historical significance to the museum's collection, she is also a fully operational and coast guard-licensed passenger vessel. The museum plans to use her extensively to introduce the youth of San Diego to an exciting and varied educational and skills-based curriculum.

Programming currently being discussed includes supplementary science-based experiences for elementary school children as well as programs for "at risk" youth. The museum provides educational programs in science and history to thousands of San Diego school children throughout the year in partnership with various school districts in the greater San Diego County.


Californian joins the museum's existing fleet of five other historic vessels—*Star of India*, *Berkeley*, *Medea*, *Pilot*, and *Butcher Boy*. *Californian* will assist *Pilot* and *Butcher Boy* in helping to tell San Diego's great maritime history in maritime law enforcement, commerce, and recreation.

Electronic graphics of the tall ship *Californian* are available upon request. For more information, contact Joseph Ditler, director of communications of the San Diego Maritime Museum, at (619) 921-3467 or ditler@sdmaritime.com.

FIGHTING SAIL ON LAKE HURON AND GEORGIAN BAY

The War of 1812 and its Aftermath • By Barry Gough

Canadian Barry Gough's new work makes an important and long-awaited contribution to our understanding of the struggle for domination in the Upper Great Lakes and the American heartland during the War of 1812. A critical time for both the old northwest and the peoples who lived along the U.S.-Canadian border, it was also a time when the territories that became Wisconsin and Minnesota were formed, the fur trade was established, and the Indian nations attempted to preserve both their homeland and their independence. It is a unique study in that it goes far beyond the Battle of Lake Erie, where traditional historical accounts end, adding new chapters to the history of Detroit and Michilimackinac.



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~ BOOK REVIEWS ~

JOSEPH E. TAYLOR, *Making Salmon: An Environmental History of the Northwest Fisheries Crisis*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999. xv + 421 pages, 20 maps, 9 illustrations, 30 photographs, notes, bibliographical essay, index. Hardcover. 6.29" x 9.31". ISBN 0-29597-840-6. \$34.95.

The history of the salmon crisis in the Northwest is entangled with political, environmental, and social complexities that make solving the problems of declining runs and poor fish health exceedingly difficult. Joseph Taylor's insightful book pleads with readers to understand that, although some solutions seem easy and logical, any quick answer to this enduring crisis will continue hurting Northwestern salmon. No single party stands guiltless while salmon runs become successively smaller and less resilient. Anglers blame commercial fishermen, fishermen blame each other, some blame Native Americans, and many people point to dams. Nobody, however, dares to question excessive consumption on all fronts. Herein lies the problem—simplistic solutions point to some "other" group as responsible while always preserving some form of environmental exploitation.

Before Anglo-Americans transformed the Northwest with unbridled exploitation, Native Americans maintained a sustainable relationship with the environment through ceremony and myth. Although their catches were probably comparable to early industrial catches, the myths surrounding salmon were an effective, if not intentional, tool that moderated and thus sustained

salmon harvests. This relationship was doomed, however, as more settlers came to Oregon and Washington and realized the bounty of the natural environment. Unequal treaties were forced upon a disease-ridden Native American population beginning in the middle nineteenth century, and from then on the only moderation to salmon harvesting was due to technological limitations. Capitalistic economic rules replaced aboriginal mores. The resultant fishing, logging, trapping, farming, and urban expansion condemned future generations of Northwestern salmon.

Unwilling to check consumption, Northwestern politicians and the federal government funded—and continue to fund—research, development, and maintenance of salmon hatcheries throughout Oregon and Washington. Taylor investigates how this proposed panacea began in the mid-nineteenth century with the United States Fish Commission (USFC) evolving from a scientific research institute into an organization dominated by and living from hatchery proceeds. It is quite obvious that more political science went into making salmon than biological science, even when evidence clearly suggested that some form of objective inquiry was needed. To say Taylor's examination is thorough is an understatement. He manages to trace minutely the development of the USFC through numerous commissioners and administrations while showing how each development in the organization usually engendered harmful repercussions for Northwestern salmon populations. The sadly ironic truth reveals that the rhetoric of hatchery proponents was without sub-

stance. Statistical evidence shows no real success of hatcheries in increasing the size and vitality of salmon runs, and yet they continue to be funded.

Although Taylor's efforts meticulously discern the political permutations of Northwest fisheries and their resultant problems, I would like to see more background devoted specifically to the fish. Readers are blessed with an exhaustive and penetrating political inquiry into unchecked capitalistic consumption, but unfortunately leave the text knowing little about *Oncorhynchus* life, migratory patterns, predators (besides the human ones), natural diet, spawning habits, and detailed evidence of declining numbers over the past century. This information would be appreciated by those readers unfamiliar with salmon, and would strengthen Taylor's already pointed arguments and examples. In a similar vein, explicit descriptions and photographs of the numerous manners in which salmon populations are harmed could also benefit this admirable work. For example, many readers are undoubtedly completely unfamiliar with the numerous types of fishing gear mentioned in the book (pound nets, fishwheels, seines, and gill nets). Still others will read about dams blocking passage up and down a river, but not fully appreciate the impact of these structures as they induce early spawning or grind fry passing through turbines. Taylor mentions deforestation and urban expansion hurting populations, but this topic by itself could stand alone as a complete chapter, investigating specific case studies and their impact on local watersheds. Describing these tools, structures, and activities, and their exceedingly efficient capacity at killing salmon, would add an important visual component to the book and induce an element of emotive response, thereby strengthening Taylor's argument. Where he does an exceedingly fine job chapter after chapter is in investigating the political and social insanity surrounding salmon in the Northwest and how a profound lack of insight continues to function as a catalyst for all the ways in which salmon health and population are harmed.

THEODORE I. ERSKI
McHenry County College
Crystal Lake, Illinois

CHERYL A. FURY, *Tides in the Affairs of Men: The Social History of Elizabethan Seamen, 1580-1603*. Contributions to Military Studies 214. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 2002. xii + 293 pages, bibliography, index. Hardcover. 6¼" x 9½". ISBN 0-31331-948-0. \$67.95.

Even though it appears in a series ostensibly devoted to military history, *Tides in the Affairs of Men* is a contribution to the history of labor. Cheryl Fury seeks to interpret the work culture of a skilled profession that has previously not been treated among studies of crafts in sixteenth-century England. This group is seamen. Working from a wide variety of sources, particularly Admiralty Court records and wills, Fury tries to reconstruct the lives and mentalities of people who worked in and around the commercial and military maritime worlds of Elizabethan England.

Chapter one explores the training and recruitment of sailors. Apprenticeship, modeled upon the practices common to most land-based trades, was a common method of training boys in maritime skills, as well as socializing them into the maritime community. It was, however, available only to a privileged minority, often sons of men already engaged in maritime trades. Above all, she emphasizes the independence that seamen cherished and guarded. In a period when the Tudor state sought to regulate trades and employment practices, and when inflation and economic dislocation threatened most of the population, seamen were proud of their right to take their employment wherever they might and seek favorable conditions, eschewing overly dangerous voyages and negotiating better pay and conditions. Such independence led some captains to dupe their crews; the most famous example is that of Francis Drake, who knew he would never get a crew if he admitted that he was

intending to sail around the world and consequently invented a different purpose. At the same time, this independence was being undercut by two factors. First, an increasing number of landsmen were lured into the maritime world by the hope of profits through privateering and piracy. Secondly, the crown, needing a navy to fight the Spanish but unwilling and unable to pay for a standing fleet, turned to privateers, thus increasing their numbers and disruptive influence, and to impressment, thus bringing the dregs of society to the sea and removing for a time the ability of trained sailors to negotiate their own terms.

Chapter two looks at the maintenance of order on a ship. Fury emphasizes the peacefulness of most ships, a fact that she attributes to the mutual interest that commanders and crews had in the peaceful running of a ship, and to the established traditions of open and timely complaint and the willingness to address such complaints. She also discusses the harsh punishments used on ships, especially in cases in which the captain possessed a royal commission and the right to maintain martial law that went with it; she regards such punishments as, on the one hand, part of the wider early modern norm, and, on the other, as the exception against a norm of surprisingly peaceful relations between master and man. These good relations tended to break down in the same exceptional circumstances that tended to disrupt the maritime community in general. In privateering vessels, arguments about prizes could turn into mutiny, and in the navy, harsher conditions and resentment against impressment made the atmosphere less conducive to rational dialogue between ranks.

Chapter three is curiously organized and sandwiches a discussion of seamen's wage and debt practices between a discussion of seamen's culture on board ship and a discussion of seamen's religion. With regard to wages and debt, Fury again emphasizes harmony between employer and employee. Organizers of voyages respected the customary rights of seamen, and complaints were few. The exceptions, once more, were privateering and the

navy. Seamen who opted for privateering voyages faced greater risks in the hope of greater rewards. They were not guaranteed wages, but hoped for great winnings. The result was frequent disputes about shares of booty, rights of pillage, even the direction the voyage should take, a matter in which even the humblest sailor felt he had a voice since his livelihood was at stake. In the navy, sailors lost their customary employment rights and suffered impressment, low and tardy wages, and harsh discipline. The section on seaman's culture discusses briefly the common superstitions, music, dance, and language that bound the maritime community together. The section on religion suggests that seamen were aggressively Protestant, at least in situations when confronted with Catholic enemies, especially ones rife for plunder. (Some of this section is taken from Inquisition records, albeit indirectly through secondary sources in English). Fury questions the depth of religiosity, noting that this was a Protestantism that existed alongside a vigorous belief in the controlling hand of Providence and the efficacy of prayer in averting disaster. She also notes contemporary concerns that the maritime community was a godless lot, even if this concern does not seem to be born out by her study of seamen's wills. The logic of this chapter is that the labor practices that form the meat of its sandwich are to be understood as a cultural phenomenon alongside shipboard dancing and swearing at Catholics. Nevertheless, when all is said and done, Fury concludes that the particular maritime subculture should not really be seen as unique; it was one craft subculture among many in preindustrial England, and one that encountered authority in a similar way to many others.

The long chapter four is in some ways the centerpiece of the book. It examines the high morbidity and mortality rates aboard ship and the measures that were taken to offset them. Food supply essentially follows the pattern outlined elsewhere in the book. On private merchant vessels, supplies tended to be adequate, if one sets aside ignorance about nutrition that caused a shortage of

vitamins, especially C and B, to be a constant. Food supplies were shorter among privateers, for whom food was the major expense in the absence of wages, and in the navy, in which incompetence, corruption, royal parsimony, mismanagement, and inflation caused the quality of food supplies to deteriorate in the late sixteenth century. Crises would also occur in victualling that made it the greatest cause of concern and dispute among seamen on long voyages.

Beyond the problems of food supply, seamen also suffered from disease, ship surgeons who could be worse than the injury, and inadequate clothing. Their workplace was dangerous, especially because of ship design limitations and the effects of alcohol, not to mention enemy action. Finally, although custom and law dictated that sick seamen should be cared for, even on land, the navy in particular dodged these requirements. Naval ships would tend to dump sick sailors *en masse* in the first home port they reached. This was obviously a problem for authorities on land and was only gradually addressed through statute and charity. Fury suggests that innovation was generally slow. There were plenty of sensible ideas about improving conditions, including notions of good sanitation, technology to purify sea water, and the realization that fresh fruit could prevent scurvy. It was even suggested that a fiendish Italian breakthrough by the name of macaroni might solve a lot of problems. These ideas met inertia and ingrained custom. The only successful and determined innovators were career sailors who had made the transition from the mercantile world into the navy, men who could appreciate the value and logic of maintaining a healthy crew and who were in a position to do something about it. Fury's heroes here are the Hawkinses, father and son.

Chapter five discusses the family life of seamen, or the lack of it. Fury acknowledges the grain of truth that lies behind the stereotype of the raucous, drunken sailor on shore leave. Tragedies and violence could result from the pent-up energy released by a crew returned to land. There is more to this

phenomenon, however, than the stereotype. The average sailor was less likely to marry than his socioeconomic counterpart on land, because of his roving life and the inability to accumulate sufficient funds to set up a home. Most sailors, therefore, tended to remember shipmates in their wills and, moreover, seem to have lacked real ties to communities on land. Unsurprisingly, wealthier sailors were more likely to marry and establish ties with communities on land, both by having an established home and through developing the usual charitable connections. Again unsurprisingly, marriages tended to be disproportionately between maritime families. In one of the best sections of the book, Fury deals sympathetically and imaginatively with the plight of the maritime wife, frequently left with responsibility for family and financial affairs, often deprived of her husband through long voyages, death at sea, or desertion. Finally, in a short, sad section, Fury simply notes that retirement from the sea was simply not an option for most seamen. Retirement was impossible in the vast majority of cases, even for those rare few sailors who did manage to survive to old age.

Fury concludes that sixteenth-century seamen enjoyed a balance between independence of action and a strong collective sense that enabled them to negotiate with their superiors. She posits that the maritime community functioned along much the same lines as other early modern societies: it was hierarchical, but order was maintained through negotiation, protest was allowed and proceeded along established channels, coercion was harsh but usually involved a fair amount of bluster, and breakdowns into riot or mutiny were rare and sometimes ritualized. This conclusion does have something of an air of a preconceived notion; after the descriptions of the hardships and miseries of the seafaring life, the freedom of negotiation seems more like the ability to choose between awful and slightly less awful. Likewise, the alleged solidarity seems to break down along lines determined by skill level and wealth at every turn. Indeed, my greatest criticism of the book would be that Fury does not at

any point define the term "seaman" or the term into which she elides it, "maritime community." Sometimes, partly for reasons of establishing a sufficient source base, this term seems to include all sailors from commanders to the merest hand, including people with specific training such as pilots and, on occasion, related people such as shipwrights. At other times, she seems to want to oppose common sailors with their commanders. Many of her questions are answered by appreciating a difference of conditions experienced by the wealthy versus the poor and the skilled versus the unskilled. This problem is compounded by change over time. For the most part, Fury takes the period as a whole and generalizes across it; at other times, she observes changes, particularly the influx of landsmen into maritime occupations at all levels. When did these landsmen become seamen—when they first embarked or after they had been assimilated? These problems are to some degree inevitable from the nature of the evidence, but they might have been addressed more explicitly.

I must express a little regret that the book for the most part reads like a quintessential academic book, and like the adapted doctoral thesis it is. It possesses all the best virtues of thoroughness and explicit structure, but even though Fury has turned up a mass of wonderful material, she does not display a gift for the well-told story, the perfectly turned anecdote. Moreover, the structure is at times a little curious, leading to some repetition.

I would not want to leave this review with a negative tone, though. *Tides in the Affairs of Men* is a good book and approaches a fascinating subject with energy and a commitment to answer a lot of questions. Its virtues lie in a sympathetic use of a wide variety of sources and a sensible comparative perspective. I am sure it will be well received by students both of maritime history and early modern European history more generally.

ALAN COOPER
Colgate University
Hamilton, New York

ANGUS KONSTAM, *Historical Atlas of Exploration, 1492–1600*. New York: Checkmark Books, 2000. 192 pages, maps, illustrations, index. Hardcover. ISBN 0-81604-248-9.

Angus Konstam has produced a truly interesting summary of European exploration during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. He covers some forty voyages and land expeditions that explored and claimed new lands for the Portuguese, Spanish, English, and French crowns, beginning with the Portuguese probes along the west coast of Africa well before Columbus and continuing through Francisco Vásquez de Coronado's trek through what is now the U.S. Southwest. He covers most of the well-known explorers—including Cabral, Cabot, Cortés, Pizarro, Magellan, Drake, Cartier—and many lesser known ones—such as Alfonso de Albuquerque, Gaspar and Miguel Corte-Real, Alvaro Mendana de Neyra, Hugh Willoughby, and Richard Chancellor.

The book is organized into two-page vignettes, each describing the career of a particular explorer. These contain a biography, a summary of the expedition and its place in history, a map, and one or more color illustrations. The illustrations include portraits, photographs and drawings of locations or ships, and recreations of encounter, trade, battle, and other scenes. Inserted among the travelogues are vignettes summarizing cultures of the Americas, China, and Japan, and other themes in order to provide some historical synthesis to the whole.

Mr. Konstam presents the excitement and some of the context of a period of explosive curiosity about the larger world—a period that shaped the modern consciousness. It has neither notes nor bibliography. This is a work for a general reader that might be particularly suitable to kindle the historical imagination of a junior high school or older student. It would be a good reference book for public or school libraries.

My chief complaint with *The Historical Atlas of Exploration* is the lack of good copyediting of the manuscript. Thus, the Gulf of Urabá is incorrectly

located on the map on page 123, the Manchu (rather than the Ming) dynasty is described as ending in the mid-seventeenth century on page 141, Cartier's voyage of 1514 is described as his second rather than his third on page 148. Also, I would have preferred that customary surnames or sobriquets be used for Spanish or Portuguese personalities. Among the many examples that could be cited are Cabeza de Vaca (not de Vaca) for Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, Balboa (not de Balboa) for Vasco Núñez Balboa, and Pedrarias (not de Avila) for Pedro Arias de Avila.

Angus Konstam has been curator of arms and armor at the Tower of London and chief curator of the Mel Fisher Maritime Museum in Key West, and has published other books on nautical themes. This book was originally published by Prima Editions in England and issued in the United States by Facts on File under the imprint of Checkmark Books.

E. JEFFREY STANN
Chevy Chase, Maryland

HARRY KELSEY, *Sir Francis Drake: The Queen's Pirate*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Nota Bene, 2000. 592 pages, 93 illustrations, appendices, notes, bibliography, index. Softcover. 5" x 7¾". ISBN 0-30008-463-3 paper. \$18.95.

Sir Francis Drake is perhaps the most recognizable name associated with the maritime expansion of Elizabethan England. He continues to fascinate us: a new biography of this famous sea dog is published almost every year. For centuries, he has enjoyed the reputation of one of Gloriana's finest and most daring seamen—a circumnavigator and a fiercely patriotic Protestant pirate. Those of us who do research in the field of sixteenth-century maritime studies have known that the Drake legend could not stand up to serious scrutiny. Harry Kelsey has produced a systematic, large-scale work to explode the myth.

Kelsey's Drake is a "social climber," a Devon man of humble origins who uses his connections with his Hawkins and west country kin to learn seafaring, a merchant's trade, and piracy. Drake is shown to be ruthless, greedy, and clever enough to use his times to best advantage: Drake zealously plunged himself into the commercial tensions between Spain, which regarded itself as the master of the New World and all its wealth, and England, a second-rate power whose queen, merchants, investors, and seamen were determined to cut themselves in on the enormous profits that could be garnered from these markets.

While most of us would not fault him for being opportunistic, Kelsey's Drake has few redeeming characteristics. His reputed piety is largely a sham—a show for Catholic visitors and prisoners, and a tool for maintaining discipline among seafaring men whose livelihoods usually depended not on guaranteed wages but on possible booty taken. Drake is shown to be a man almost completely devoid of compassion, as evidenced by his mistreatment of a captured black woman used by his crew for pleasure and then abandoned on an island when she was seven months pregnant. He was a paranoid commander who repeatedly sought out a scapegoat from among his fellow officers to persecute as an example to any who would question his directives. Neither was he particularly gifted as a tactician and leader: he often failed to provision his fleet properly, plan his attacks fully, or take into account the opinion of other officers, which was a long-established practice in the English maritime community. Although his legend seems to be intimately connected to the successes of the Elizabethan navy and privateers, his most obvious triumphs came quite early in his career. In 1588, as at several other points, the very unreliable Drake sacrificed the goals of the crown to pursue his own desire for wealth. England's "victory" over the Spanish Armada in 1588 owed more to Spain's lack of planning and the so-called Protestant winds than any contribution from Drake. Thus, the portrait that emerges from the pages of this biography

is of a thoroughly unlikable man who amassed his fortune from illegal proceeds and stole a lasting and glorious reputation (through the use of propaganda during his own day and afterwards) that he in no way earned.

This book has rightly received praise from some of the "big names" in the field of early modern maritime studies. In my estimation, the success of Kelsey's book is that it is a rare combination of serious scholarship and readability that will appeal to the general public and to an academic audience. Those readers looking for more than a "good read" will appreciate the useful index, helpful maps, informative endnotes, and Kelsey's grasp and allusions to both the secondary and primary sources (including several in Spanish and Dutch besides the obligatory English). Without question, the book is an important one in terms of revisionist history of the period. Kelsey clearly goes well beyond K. R. Andrews, one of the first and most important historians to tackle the myth of Francis Drake, in damning his subject.

In terms of the flaws of the book, Kelsey is limited in terms of his subject's lack of a "paper trail." Drake was not one to leave his own thoughts for contemporaries or posterity. Thus, there is much about his personal relations and motivations that we can only guess at, although as an author, Kelsey is not one to speculate on the basis of existing information. This tends to leave the reader frustrated at times. For instance, we do not have any information or musings on the impact of important events such as the death of his mentor and kinsman, Sir John Hawkins, on Drake during their final disastrous voyage. Also, Kelsey could have provided more background information in a number of places. Obviously, the queen's pirate moved within the framework of England's foreign, religious, and commercial policy, and a more thorough examination would serve to illuminate both the period and its impact on Drake. For instance, some discussion of Pope Alexander VI's Treaty of Tordesilla in 1494 would help explain Spain's hostile view of interlopers—especially Protestant

ones—into its New World trade, as would an explanation of the precarious financial basis on which Philip II's empire rested. Such information would have done much to illustrate why Drake's reputation was created by the fear of his enemies rather than the admiration of his friends. While Kelsey does make reference to shipboard relations and the rank and file who manned Drake's ships, they seldom factor into his explanations of Drake's behavior. For Kelsey, the mutiny and subsequent court martial of the *Golden Lion* in 1587 is important only as an example of Drake's turbulent relations with his officers. While this is true, he never explores the fact that the men complained of provisioning problems. Furthermore, Drake sentenced the principal mutineers to death, and yet these men escaped any sort of penalty once back in England. This incident is very telling in terms of Drake's relations with his men and the crown. These criticisms aside, it is evident that Harry Kelsey has written a very welcome, provocative, necessary, and affordable addition to the historiography of the period.

CHERYL A. FURY
University of New Brunswick
& St. Stephen's University
Saint John, New Brunswick

HEPWORTH DIXON, WITH A NEW INTRODUCTION BY BARRY M. GOUGH, *Robert Blake: Admiral and General at Sea*. Mount Kisco, New York: Regatta Press, 2000, a reprint of the original first published in London by Chapman & Hall in 1852. xxiii + 372 pages, 1 illustration, index. 5¾" x 8¾", ISBN 0-96748-261-5.

In recent years, a number of classic works of naval history have been reprinted and given new leases of life. Clowes's *History of the Royal Navy*, Nicolas's *Dispatches and Letters of Lord Nelson*, and a number of the early volumes of the Navy Records Society, along with a number of other key works,

have returned to publishers' lists, making life considerably easier for those interested in the history of the British Royal Navy. The first full-length biography of Robert Blake, originally published in 1852, might not seem to be a particularly obvious candidate for addition to this repertoire. Hepworth Dixon was no specialist naval historian; Barry Gough's incisive new introduction describes him as "a social commentator, travel writer, historian, biographer, and playwright" (not to mention a barrister who never practiced), but these are hardly obvious credentials for a biography of the Royal Navy's greatest sea commander of the seventeenth century. Blake has been the subject of two biographies in the second half of the twentieth century, by J. R. Powell in 1972 and Michael Baumber in 1989. These cover Blake's career and draw on a wider range of sources than those available to Dixon, and therefore make it even more seemingly perverse to reprint a book that "was more successful with the general public than it was with serious historians," even in its own day, as Gough indicates, paraphrasing Charles Kingsley's entry on Dixon in the *Dictionary of National Biography*. Dixon's research was exemplary by the standards of his time, given his own dilettante background and the material available to him. He "mined" a large number of printed sources, some local archives in the west country, the British Museum library, state papers, and the Admiralty papers—many of them kept in sometimes chaotic conditions at Deptford dockyard. As a result, Dixon's *Blake* was and is superior to many a pulp biography turned out by Dickensian hacks.

Dixon's frequently purple Victorian prose can be trying, and although Gough states that he "did not exalt the Puritan cause," this is truer in comparison with some of his contemporaries than it is in relation to modern opinion. Throwaway stereotypes abound in Dixon's *Blake*—cavaliers have a "gay heart and lust of pleasure," their enemies possess "a grave demeanour, an austere life, a fiery enthusiasm and fixed beliefs," the hero himself is alleged to have had "a true Roundhead contempt

for wealth," King Charles II is dismissed as "the paramour of Lucy Walters, Barbara Palmer, Kate Peg, and Moll Davies," and the Dutch possess a "lower nature," not to mention "coarse and laborious habits." Although Dixon makes few serious mistakes, he provides hardly any information or insights that a modern historian would wish to depend on. It may still be the case today that Dixon's *Blake* will appeal more to a general audience. Like many British writers of the nineteenth century, Dixon took for granted that his audience possessed a far greater level of prior knowledge of seventeenth-century political, religious, and military history (not to mention geography) than any modern product of the British or American education systems would be likely to possess. Consequently, large tracts of Dixon's work might today prove impenetrable to all but the most determined non-specialist reader. *Robert Blake* does fulfill a purpose probably not intended by its new publishers, namely the provision of insight into Victorian attitudes toward the period of the English Revolution and the genesis of the professional Royal Navy, both subjects of increasing interest in historiographical circles. Many "classics" still cry out for reprinting (for example, one of Dixon's main sources, Granville Penn's *Memorials of the Professional Life and Times of Sir William Penn*), and *Robert Blake*, for all its merits, cannot stand comparison with such works.

J. DAVID DAVIES
Bedford Modern School
Bedford, England

ALAN MCGOWAN, *HMS Victory: Her Construction, Career and Restoration*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999. x + 222 pages, 79 illustrations of which 10 are in full color, 85 pages of technical drawings, glossary, bibliography, index. Hardcover. 10" x 11¾". ISBN 1-55750-387-7. \$59.95.

Those of us engaged in what has come to be known as the heritage industry are familiar with the apocryphal story of George Washington's axe. According to this cautionary tale, the famous axe is carefully preserved and proudly displayed, although its authenticity is rendered problematical owing to the fact that, through the years, the handle has been replaced three times and the head twice. In Alan McGowan's beautifully produced volume on HMS *Victory*, two of the central questions raised by this parable immediately come to mind: first, what, exactly, is being preserved and, secondly, why?

McGowan's book goes far in answering the first question, but the answer to the second, clearly articulated in the forward by Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, has been elevated above debate by the forces of national pride and naval tradition. Still, one can perhaps only fully appreciate the preservation of HMS *Victory* by first recognizing that the ship's ascension to its current revered status was in no way a given immediately following the British success at Trafalgar. In fact, the idea of preserving HMS *Victory* for the reasons that now seem so compelling and obvious dates only to around the time of the vessel's centennial anniversary, in the 1860s, with the real effort beginning several decades later. Knowing that there was a long period of alteration and reparation during which Nelson's most famous ship was not seen or treated as a national monument, one can perhaps reflect more philosophically on the connection between the "what" and "why" of HMS *Victory* in particular, and the ship preservation movement in general.

The biographical component of the book (and biography is an appropriate term for the story, so affectionately told, of this long-serving, much-celebrated artifact) is organized chronologically in six chapters. The first chapter aptly sets the stage for all that follows by providing a short, effective summary of Britain's eighteenth-century navy. Chapter two gives a concise account of the building of *Victory* and chronicles her active service, with special attention to maintenance and repair during the

years before the battle of Trafalgar. McGowan's account here serves to underline what is too often obscured in the public presentation of historic ships—which usually evoke for the visitor a particular moment frozen in time—namely, that in the course of their active careers, ships are subject to constant repair and changes (sometimes dramatic) to both their layout and appearance. Moreover, the longer the service, the more this rule applies. Chapter three takes the reader from Trafalgar through to the ships honored location and status in a dry dock at Portsmouth, while the next three chapters offer a detailed, technical report of the many preservation efforts, impressive in both number and scope, undertaken up to the present. Indeed, in chapter six, McGowan even outlines planning for the future up to and beyond the two hundredth anniversary of Trafalgar in 2005. This particular chapter, with its summary schedule of maintenance, ought to be required reading for anyone about to embark on a ship preservation project. For here is a model, defining a very high standard that clearly and starkly presents the ongoing commitment required for the proper preservation and public display of a historic vessel. Admittedly, not all historic ships are as old, as complex, or subject to the same visitor pressure; but neither do they have the support and facilities of the Royal Navy at their disposal. The seventh and final chapter of the book, "Aspects of Restoration," departs from the biography and instead offers the reader information and insight on fifteen specific topics from components such as boats and rigging, to reports on *xestobium refuvillosum*, the oak-damaging death watch beetle, and a copy of a restoration progress report for the period between September 1991 and February 1992. All of this is followed by some eighty-five pages of superb technical drawings by the Canadian architectural draughtsman John McKay, complete with explanatory annotations. Both a glossary and an index are available to help the reader through the book, along with a list of sources. This list of sources, however, is rather disappointingly short, considering the subject matter.

There is certainly much to admire in this volume, and anyone with an interest in conservation or involved in ship preservation should consider it an essential addition to their library. For the general reader, the book's concentration of technical reportage in the later chapters may prove tough going, but this is offset somewhat by the clear writing style and wonderful illustrations provided. As for the museum professional, thinking of the parable of George Washington's axe, the story of HMS *Victory* is instructive on several levels. First and foremost, it is an example *par excellence* of what can be done, given the will and resources. McGowan's detailed reporting highlights the full extent of the ways and means, human and financial, required. The story of HMS *Victory*, both as an active ship and as a numinous artifact of the first order, serves to underscore how relative and subjective are our cherished notions of authenticity and preservation, particularly when it comes to historic vessels. It must be remembered that ships are essentially large and complex machines that are built and operated with the understanding that their life span is limited and that their need for maintenance is abundant and constant.

This truth lurks behind many of the problems now confronting those responsible for historic ships. The cover article in the October 2000 issue of *Museums Journal* (published in the U.K. by the Museums Association) entitled "Is Britain's Museum Heritage Sinking?" drew special attention to the challenge of ship preservation. In it, Roger Knight, formally the deputy director of the National Maritime Museum, is cited as noting that fully half of the forty-six ships included in the "core collection" selected by the United Kingdom's National Historic Ships Committee are now in danger. In the words of Mr. Knight, "it seems . . . inevitable that some high-profile preserved ships, even household names, will go to the wall in the next ten years" (page 23). While HMS *Victory* may be the ship least likely to face "the wall," the gloomy prospects described by Mr. Knight—and the British situation applies in some

measure, lesser or greater, to all nations—confront us with the need to think carefully about the "why" and the "what" of historic ship preservation and, by so doing, to establish a tough, viable criteria to guide us in investing our valuable, limited resources in a way that best serves our public trust and institutional mandates. McGowan's superb, detailed case study of one of the best known historic ships will offer museum curators important insight into this difficult issue, just as it will also inform the general reader and delight the specialist.

GARTH WILSON
Canada Science and Technology Museum
Ottawa, Ontario

NATHANIEL PHILBRICK, *In the Heart of the Sea: The Tragedy of the Whaleship Essex*. New York: Viking Penguin, 2000. 302 pages, six illustrations, photographs, maps, paintings, preface, epilogue, notes, bibliography, acknowledgments, index. ISBN 0-67089-157-6. \$24.95. Also available as an audio book.

On 20 November 1820, the Nantucket whaler *Essex* was attacked and sunk by a sperm whale. The twenty-one-man crew took to three whaleboats. Fearing cannibals on nearby islands, they began a desperate journey to reach South America, thousands of miles to windward. Only two boats and eight crew were rescued on 18 and 23 February, 1821. In 1981, Thomas Heffernan published *Stove by a Whale: Owen Chase and the Essex* (Wesleyan University Press), relying on the first mate's account and his own exhaustive research. In 1984, the account of Thomas Nickerson (the *Essex's* cabin boy) written in the 1870s and 1880s was discovered and published. Nickerson was in Chase's whaleboat, yet his revelations shed new light on shipboard dynamics, contradict Chase on several critical watersheds, and alters our perception of the saga.

Nathaniel Philbrick has stood on the shoulders of giants, added his own material, and elevated our

understanding of the *Essex* saga to new heights. Philbrick compares survival situations of Captain Bligh, Shackleton, the Donner Party, and others, putting the *Essex* saga into personal and historical context. His analysis of starvation and survival are morbidly fascinating, giving great insight into the crew's progressing predicament.

Because of the use of endnotes rather than footnotes, *In the Heart of the Sea* reads more like a novel than Heffernan's scholarly opus *Stove by a Whale*. Having rebuilt and sailed several square-riggers, I was drawn into the saga, "joining" the crew. On separate occasions, I have been five days at sea without fresh water, three days without food, five days without sleep, and on a five-week malnourished wilderness trek. Having felt only the first nips of the wringer, I felt new empathy for the crew as chapters seven through eleven unfolded. Look around your shop or office and imagine three days in a confined space with your coworkers, equipped only with supplies you could muster in a few hours.

In the Heart of the Sea contains several interesting etymologies, namely the origin of the term "K-rations," the correction of the term "Widow's Walk" to "*The Walk*" (page 242), and the Right Whale as the "right" whale to kill, along with numerous Nantucket and whaling expressions. The influence of the *Essex* tragedy on Herman Melville and *Moby Dick* is amplified. Philbrick's portrayal of Nantucket island life is revealing and intimate. NOAA pilot charts indicate the directions, intensity, and frequency of winds, magnifying the Nantucketers' audacious choice, leading to the ultimate irony of inexorably doing what they sailed thousands of miles to avoid. Pollard's humble station and Chase's later success as a "fishy" captain illustrate that professional and personal successes are not mutually inclusive or exclusive. Given the islanders' propensity to discretion, it is no wonder an *Essex* replica has not been built to haunt the Mystic or South Street Seaport fleets.

The only criticism I have is Nickerson's confusing mention of being in the "netting of the main

staysail" (page 60). The *Essex* sail plan (page xviii) shows no main staysail, even though such were common. I wonder if Nickerson meant the foretopmast staysail, and the netting under the jib boom, or the ratlines of the mainmast. From either location, his view of the skipper's reaction would have been good. This is a minor complaint, but it is out of character given the book's attention to detail. Perhaps the only missing items are an interview with the attacking whale, Pollard's letter to his wife, yet undiscovered, and sketches of the survivors upon rescue, an oversight of those present in 1821.

Mr. Philbrick gives credits where credits are due, evidenced by his lengthy notes, bibliography, and acknowledgments, and most certainly has "lived up to the material's potential." His masterful rendering of the *Essex* tragedy compels one to pursue references offered for further research. This is an invaluable addition to any library.

CHRISTOPHER A. FERGUSON
Tenants Harbor, Maine

KENNETH R. MARTIN, *Heavy Weather and Hard Luck: Portsmouth Goes Whaling*. Portsmouth Marine Society Publication 24. Portsmouth, N.H.: Published for the Portsmouth Marine Society by Peter Randall, 1998. 212 pages, illustrations, index, bibliography. ISBN 0-91581-923-6. \$22.50.

More than any other historian, Kenneth R. Martin has pioneered the documentation of the wildcat American whaling ports that sprang up during the boom years of the fishery from 1830 to 1850: Wilmington, Delaware; Bath and Wiscasset, Maine; Maui, Hawaii; and now Portsmouth, New Hampshire. His work establishes a historical framework and illuminates the personalities of the entrepreneurs, captains, sailors, and citizens of ports that are not associated with whaling.

Heavy Weather and Hard Luck: Portsmouth Goes Whaling is a well-told tale of venture capitalism in

a seaport striving to revitalize itself in the early 1830s. With his characteristic readable style, Martin outlines events leading up to the city's decision to enter the industry, the vessels involved, the character of the people manning them, and the reasons for the demise of the industry in New Hampshire's principal seaport. He asserts that the reason ports like Portsmouth attempted to enter such a specialized industry, given the booming national economy in the early 1830s, was that a bevy of instant corporations sprang up in some very unlikely places, all dedicated to the proposition that the whaling bonanza was open to all. He emphasizes the difficulty of such an enterprise, noting that the business was centered in a few communities in southern New England and Long Island that had taken it up in colonial times and perfected it over many generations.

For the ship history enthusiast, the stories of all the vessels to whale out of Portsmouth itself, as well as the vessels built in Portsmouth and whaling out of other ports, are clearly outlined. In chapter one, he documents in detail the 1832 formation of the Portsmouth Whaling Company and the complicated business of outfitting and manning the company's selected vessel, the ship *Pocahontas*. Chapter two is devoted to the *Pocahontas* on her voyage to the sperm whaling grounds in the Pacific, in which Martin draws heavily from foremast hand William H. Walker's journal of this cruise. Reading whaling journals is a slightly tricky business, as anyone who has ever tried can attest, because one is tempted to make sweeping generalizations about the whole industry based upon the experiences of two or three individual logbook or journal keepers. As a professional whaling historian, however, Ken Martin has read dozens, probably hundreds, of these accounts, and is able to interpret these journal entries in a meaningful way. His interpretation of Walker's journal leaves us a priceless tale of bad luck, mismanagement, and inexperience that not surprisingly translated into a failed voyage. The *Pocahontas* returned to Portsmouth after a four-year voyage with 1,090 barrels of sperm oil, half her

potential capacity. Under a different captain, she sailed again in 1836 on a two-year voyage to the South Atlantic. This voyage, she made a fair return of oil, but while at sea the national economic Panic of 1837 had hit Portsmouth. With the value of her cargo lessened, the Portsmouth Whaling Company, rather than continue its risky investment, was dissolved in 1838, and the *Pocahontas* was sold into the merchant service shortly thereafter.

The pinnacle of Portsmouth's whaling achievement comes in chapter three with the stories of Charles Cushing's investments in whaleships for the South Atlantic right whale fishery. Cushing owned the ships *Triton* and *Plato*. Both vessels made profitable returns of whale oil and bone between 1833 and 1837. Unfortunately, logbook and journal sources relating to these voyages are limited, and we find out far less about them than some of the other well-documented voyages in the book. Throughout, however, wherever there is a scarcity of primary material, Martin fills in the blanks with judicious quotations from the many published contemporaneous whaling narratives. Likewise, the many illustrations are all primary sources in themselves. Selecting with the eye of a connoisseur, the author uses fine original whalemens' paintings and drawings, original portraits of people and vessels, and the occasional photograph of a pertinent artifact or street scene.

An artifact was one of the driving reasons for the creation of this book in the first place. A recent acquisition by the Portsmouth Athenaeum of a journal kept by Leander S. Huntress aboard the ship *Ann Parry* of Portsmouth between 1839 and 1842, prompted the Portsmouth Marine Society to investigate whether there was enough historical material for a book on Portsmouth whaling. This journal account documents the trials, tribulations, successes, and failures typical of a whaling voyage. It contains some illustrations, including drawings of sperm whales and a cenotaph memorial to a shipmate who had died in a fall from aloft. Taken in combination with other athenaeum account books and logbooks, along with journals of

Portsmouth vessels in the collections of other institutions, plenty of very good primary source material has survived.

This is an outstanding whaling history because it places Portsmouth whaling in the larger context of nineteenth-century economic history. It profiles the character of the individuals who make up that history, allowing the reader to see the world of a whaler through the eyes of the whalers and of the owners at the same time. This was not an easy accomplishment, but one worthy of the historian who wrote it.

MICHAEL P. DYER
The Kendall Institute
New Bedford, Massachusetts

LOUIS ARTHUR NORTON, *Joshua Barney: Hero of the Revolution and 1812*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 246 pages, 12 illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. Hardcover. ISBN 1-55450-490-3. \$32.95.

Broadsides belching fire and metal, blood on sandy decks, huzzahs from bluejackets, and naval captains leading their men in the face of the enemy: these are the events awaiting the reader in Louis Norton's *Joshua Barney: Hero of the Revolution and 1812* from the Naval Institute Press's new Library of Naval Biography. This monograph examines the life of an officer whose career spanned the two great American wars with Britain. Critical of previous biographers, Norton contends that "although the semblance of the man is known . . . his story is in need of retelling" (page xviii). Compiled from original and secondary sources, Norton takes the reader through the victories and defeats of this mariner while striving to "remove the haze of time while preserving the patina of historical perspective" (page xviii). Consisting of ten chapters and an epilogue, several themes pervade the book. These include Barney's love of the sea, his large sensitive ego, and a vehement hatred of the British.

Growing up near the Patapsco River in Maryland, Barney yearned for a life at sea. Despite parental reservations, at age eleven, he began his maritime career. While in this pursuit, Barney gained knowledge far above his years, learning the valuable assets necessary to excel at a nautical profession. With the onset of the American Revolution, Barney used his newly gained skills in the services of the Continental navy and as a privateer. Following the war, he attempted life as a businessman ashore, but his desire to stand on a pitching deck led him back to blue waters where he served as a merchantman, French navy officer, and American naval officer once again.

Barney's ego also contributed to his decision making. In 1794, the secretary of war disseminated a list of six men appointed as captains in the U.S. Navy. Because Barney believed there was a discrepancy in the seniority of rank, he chose not to accept the commission. Norton aptly contends that "Thus the services of one of the most capable naval officers in the nation were lost over pride" (page 130). This directly influenced Barney's judgment to accept a commission as a *capitaine de vaisseau* in the French navy. Turbulent events in that country altered his euphoria when the government placed him at the bottom of its seniority list. Despite many months of faithful service to France, Barney, with a bruised ego, "resigned his commission" (page 137). In 1813, his ego also seemed to have forced him into a duel with a Maryland merchant who had written a disparaging letter to the secretary of the navy about Barney's character.

Barney's hatred of the British, however, is the dominant cornerstone of Norton's biography. A native-born American, he served as an officer in the Continental navy on board several warships. He also was a privateer, where he fought in many naval engagements. Throughout the War of American Independence, he suffered imprisonment a number of times, which enhanced his dislike of the British. He later accepted the French commission to continue his fight against the British. Upon his return to the U.S. following the *Chesapeake v.*

Leopard affair and the outbreak of the war of 1812, he assisted in the defense of tidewater Maryland. He was wounded at the Battle of Bladensburg in 1814. Barney died four years later from his wound; therefore, "a British musket ball—and thus, symbolically, the hated British—caused Barney's death" (page 198).

With colorfully written prose, Norton is to be commended for producing a highly readable manuscript describing Barney's tumultuous career. This in-depth research, using manuscript collections, contemporary newspapers, and secondary sources will make *Joshua Barney* appealing to general readers and historians. For sixty years, Barney's exploits have not been extensively examined, and Norton succeeds in illuminating the career of an often forgotten American sailor and patriot.

R. BLAKE DUNNAVENT
Idaho State University
Pocatello, Idaho

STEPHEN W. H. DUFFY, *Captain Blakeley and the Wasp: The Cruise of 1814*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001. 348 pages, illustrations, maps, endnotes, bibliography, index. ISBN 1-55750-176-9. \$34.95.

The career of Captain Johnston Blakeley (1781–1814) is relatively unknown to all but the most dedicated buffs of the naval War of 1812, yet his record as a commander of the United States sloop-of-war *Wasp* constitutes one of the most dramatic cruises of that conflict, even though he may not quite merit Stephen Duffy's accolade that "Blakeley must rightfully be considered America's most accomplished naval commander during the age of sail" (page 253).

Born in Ireland and raised in North Carolina, Blakeley was one of those young midshipmen that joined the fledgling U.S. Navy at the turn of the century and assumed command of ships and squadrons during the second war with Great

Britain. His pre-war career was one of competent execution of various duties, but he was not one of "Preble's Boys," who experienced extensive combat during the Barbary War. Like many of the more successful commanders of the War of 1812, he had some mercantile service during the lean times between the Mediterranean years and the outbreak of war. He also served briefly as a gunboat flotilla commander. After billets as first officer of the *Argus* and *John Adams*, he received a coveted command of the schooner *Enterprise* in 1811. During the first six months of the war, he reported capturing only the Nova Scotian privateer *Fly* off the Maine coast, yet this was enough for him to be promoted to master commandant, ahead of his soon-to-be more famous contemporaries Oliver Hazard Perry and Thomas Macdonough. With this promotion, he received command of the *Wasp*, an 18-gun ship-rigged corvette then under construction at Newburyport, Massachusetts. Designed by William Doughty, she was one of six such vessels authorized by Congress in 1813. Duffy provides an excellent description of the ship's construction, armament, and crew.

Finally, on 2 May 1814, the *Wasp* set sail on her maiden and final voyage. Soon she established an enviable reputation capturing and burning merchantmen off the British Isles. In the course of his cruise, Blakeley brilliantly fought two British sloops-of-war, HMS *Reindeer* (14 June) and HMS *Avon* (2 September). Shortly after these victories, the *Wasp* disappeared, and her fate remains unknown. In recounting these engagements, Duffy takes on those authors who write "merely watered-down copies of their predecessors" and are "unwilling to dig into the archives and come up with new insights or original conclusions" (page 250). His observations are thoroughly researched, engagingly written, and originally analyzed.

While Duffy exaggerates in calling Blakeley "America's Nelson" (page 253) and "America's most accomplished martial mariner" (page 4), there can be no doubt that his book will secure him some of the increased reputation he clearly deserves.

DAVID CURTIS SKAGGS
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, Ohio

AUGUSTE DUHAUT-CILLY, *A Voyage to California and the Sandwich Islands, and around the World in the Years 1826–1829*. Translated and edited by August Frugé and Neal Harlow. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1997. xxx + 254 pages, 11 black-and-white illustrations, bibliography, notes. 6½" x 9½". ISBN 0-52021-752-7. \$29.95.

More than 160 years since its original publication in France, this vivid eyewitness account of Alta California in 1827 and 1828 is an important source of information on the lifestyles of the inhabitants and of the activities of the foreign traders to this remote province of the Mexican Republic. This new translation captures the literary flair of its author, Auguste Duhaut-Cilly, a knight of the Legion of Honor and naval veteran of the Napoleonic Wars. It is so well written and translated that the reader can almost feel the heaving of his ship *Héros* and hear the sound of the sailors' feet dancing in time to a hurdy-gurdy in the forecabin.

Other literary accounts of visits to Mexican California, including Richard Henry Dana's famous *Two Years before the Mast*, provide insights into the Franciscan mission system. Yet, it should be remembered that Dana voyaged on the brig *Pilgrim* as a sailor charged with collecting hides, not as an honored visitor. Duhaut-Cilly's view is that of a seasoned captain, fluent in French, Spanish, and English, and interested in opening a new branch of trade and a new outlet for French commerce in California and Hawaii. In fact, no doubt because he had sailed from Europe, Duhaut-Cilly was asked for news of Spain by the priest at Mission San Francisco de Asís. There and elsewhere, he hears the laments of the priests regarding Spain's loss of her New World colonies. His rank gave him the ability to travel freely to the missions at Santa Clara,

San Luis Rey, San Antonio, San Diego, and San Gabriel, and to the pueblos of Los Angeles and San José in Alta California, as well as Valparaiso, Chile, and Cabo San Lucas in Baja, California.

The pueblos of Los Angeles and San José are described as each having less than a thousand inhabitants. He noted that there was an "air of liveliness, ease and neatness" that did not exist in the surrounding presidios. Each was rich in agricultural fields, vineyards, and cattle. He describes in some detail a visit to Mission San Clara near San Francisco Bay. We learn that the mission has some twelve hundred inhabitants, and some twelve thousand head of cattle and fifteen thousand sheep. Every week, one hundred fifty head of cattle were slaughtered for hides, tallow, and beef. In addition, Duhaut-Cilly notes that the mission grew wheat, barley, peas, beans, and green beans for the sustenance of the Indian residents.

One of the most important aspects of Duhaut-Cilly's narrative are his observations of the indigenous peoples of California. An entire chapter is devoted to a description of aspects of aboriginal ethnography and linguistics, and how the missions were changing traditional lifestyles. As a product of revolutionary France, he sees the Indians in the missions as little more than slaves. He notes that although the neophytes enjoyed "plentiful nourishment, good clothing, and the benefits of civilization. . . . The desire for freedom may be stifled in a people but cannot be extinguished." At one point, he is asked to carry some Indian "convicts" to another Mexican settlement. The men are given their liberty on the *Héros* because "on board a French ship and thus on the soil of France . . . there is no slavery;" as a result, they "escape." Duhaut-Cilly also provides the reader with accounts of the resistance of Pomponio of San Rafael, and Valerio and the Chumash revolt in Santa Barbara.

For all of his praise of the indigenous people of Alta California, his description of most other groups is generally far less positive. In Mazatlán, the people are "sad and miserable." American ships are

described as being dirty and in disrepair due to "a lack of discipline and care." A visit to Oahu's Methodist missionaries resulted in the observation that "the evils they have brought about are far greater than any good they have done." His greatest praise was reserved for the Russians at Fort Ross north of San Francisco. He not only notes that "All the buildings . . . are . . . well built and well maintained," but that he was treated "with the most refined hospitality." Finally, he observed that Ross's "six hundred cows . . . produc[e] more butter and cheese than all of Alta California with its countless herds."

As a sailor, Duhaut-Cilly comments critically on differences between American, English, Hawaiian, and Russian ships, and navigation in Macao and China. He notes the famous contrary winds in the region of Baja, California, and observes the tule reed boats of the Indians of the San Francisco Bay region "are surely the worst [boats] in the world." On the other hand, the riders of Hawaiian surfboards and outrigger canoes are praised for their skill and agility.

In conclusion, *A Voyage to California, the Sandwich Islands, and around the World in the Years 1826-1829* is an essential publication for anyone interested in international trade and life in Alta California in the 1820s. It lends valuable insights into the late mission period and the lives of the priests, soldiers, neophytes, and civilians in this remote corner of Mexico.

RUSSELL K. SKOWRONEK
Santa Clara University
Santa Clara, California

CHARLES R. SCHULTZ, *Forty-Niners 'Round the Horn*. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1999. xiv + 352 pages, maps, illustrations, references, acknowledgements. Hardcover. ISBN 1-57003-329-3.

The discovery of gold at Sutter's Mill in January 1848 sparked a nearly immediate seaborne and overland migration to California. So great was this rush that contemporary reporters were overwhelmed by the magnitude of departures for the Golden Gate, and the participants themselves were well aware that they had been swept up in one of the great movements in human history. The result was a literary and artistic outpouring documenting the events of the Gold Rush, a major economic boom, the almost overnight creation of San Francisco as a major metropolis, and the near-instant acceptance into the Union of California as a state.

None of this would have been possible without ships. The success of the Gold Rush was dependant on shipping, less so than the oft-romanticized wagon trains west. More gold seekers—nearly forty thousand—came to California by sea in 1848, as opposed to the twenty-three thousand who traveled overland that same year. Some 762 ships cleared North American ports for San Francisco between December 1848 and December 1849. They were followed by hundreds more in 1850 and the year that followed. The continuous flow of shipping brought not just passengers but the freight and commodities to build California's cities and industries, while carrying California gold, produce, and merchandise to the rest of the world. Gold fever was directly responsible for San Francisco's rapid rise as the principal port on the Pacific Coast of North America, a status the city enjoyed well into the twentieth century.

Charles R. Schultz comprehensively and with consummate skill chronicles and defines the seagoing rush to California in *Forty-Niners 'Round the Horn*. Well known in maritime academic circles for his decades of research, with gems presented at annual conferences or in journal articles, Schultz has now published the definitive account of the forty-niner experience at sea, journeying by way of Cape Horn to San Francisco. Previous works by other authors have touched on the aspect of the Cape Horn rush, notably Oscar Lewis's 1949 classic *Sea Routes to the Gold Fields*, or my own *To*

California by Sea. Forty-Niners 'Round the Horn supplants both works, as well as all the others, in its detailed assessment of the Cape Horn route and the forty-niners' experiences on it.

Schultz analyzes the voyages in ten chapters, drawing from an incredible life's research drawn from 224 firsthand accounts (diaries, journals, ledgers, correspondence), ships' logs, consular records, contemporary news reports, twenty-four published voyage accounts and reminiscences, and a wealth of secondary sources. The strength of the book is its detailed look at the various aspects of the voyages, from preparations, expectations (often not achieved) of life at sea, food and drink, amusements, entertainment, holidays, weather problems, duties and responsibilities, and the forty-niners' first impressions of California. This book is a model for maritime historical studies, emphasizing as it does the people and the human experience and not the technology of the ships or merely reporting statistics. The statistics are there, but they are exceptionally placed and are used to illustrate the broader points, such as analyzing the characteristics of passenger age.

The illustrations are well chosen and complement the book, with maps of routes, passenger accommodations, and bills of fare included. A key component, and a welcome one, is a well-thought-out index that includes separate vessel lists. Librarians and archivists have much to teach historians about indexing and access to information, and the merging of Charles Schultz's professional skills in all these areas shows in the index as well as in the heart of this long overdue book. It is a measure of the value of *Forty-Niners 'Round the Horn* that it won the John Lyman Book Award for the North American Society for Oceanic History as the best work published in 1999 on U.S. naval and maritime history. That value extends well beyond 1999, as *Forty-Niners 'Round the Horn* will stand as the definitive scholarship on the Cape Horn voyages of the forty-niners for many years to come, just as much as John Haskell Kemble's *The Panama Route* remains so in this new century.

JAMES P. DELGADO
Vancouver Maritime Museum
Vancouver, British Columbia

JOHN J. POLUHOWICH, *Argonaut: The Submarine Legacy of Simon Lake*. College Station, Tex.: Texas A & M University Press, 1999. viii + 154 pages, 29 illustrations, 2 appendices, bibliography, index. Hardcover. 6³/₈" x 9¹/₂". ISBN 0-89096-894-2. \$24.95.

The life of an American inventor of submarines at the turn of the twentieth century did not go easily. The navy, concentrating on battleships, did not want to spend valuable shipbuilding dollars on the primitive submersibles that inventors such as John Holland and Simon Lake brought its way. The tortuous and frustrating process of inventing a workable vessel and then convincing the navy of its value was a Sisyphean task requiring the foresight of a visionary and the zeal of a fanatic.

Simon Lake, a brilliant and imaginative inventor, acquired 211 patents during his lifetime (1866–1945). His inventive powers touched many aspects of engineering, but he is remembered today for his work in the development of the submarine. Inspired by Jules Verne's *Twenty Thousand Leagues under the Sea*, Lake turned to submarine invention. Alone among submarine developers and naval officers, he saw the submarine primarily as a vessel of peaceful purposes and undersea commerce, a craft ideally suited for underwater salvage, transportation, and exploration. His early submarines, such as the wooden *Argonaut Junior* of 1894 and the later iron *Argonaut*, incorporated engineering fundamentals used in submarines today, as well as decidedly unmilitary characteristics such as wheels for crawling along the bottom and a diver lockout chamber for underwater exploring and harvesting.

It took Lake over ten years to win a navy submarine contract. In the interim, he engaged in other entrepreneurial activities. He sold submarines to Tsarist Russia; indeed, he is today still known as

the father of the Russian submarine navy. He promoted his submarines elsewhere in Europe. He also built and successfully operated underwater salvage equipment.

Every account of Simon Lake's life discusses his complaints and allegations about John Holland, widely acknowledged as the father of the American submarine, and the Electric Boat Company, with which he competed. Readers will find that Poluhowich covers Lake's side of the story well. He also includes a lengthy description of John Holland's early submarines and the operations of the Electric Boat Company, material already well covered in *John P. Holland*, Richard K. Morris's biography. Lake's allegations, although often repeated, have never been substantiated. *Argonaut* would have been strengthened by more text on Lake and Holland in what, at 154 pages, is a rather short biography.

Lake finally received a submarine contract from the U.S. Navy and, between 1911 and 1922, the Lake Torpedo Boat Company in Bridgeport, Connecticut, built thirty-three submarines. It is a disappointment that this enterprise, which should certainly be considered as a major part of Lake's submarine legacy, receives less than a page of text in *Argonaut*.

After the company closed in 1922, Lake spread his inventive genius among a number of projects. These included prefabricated concrete homes, gold mining ventures, treasure salvage, and a submarine for Hubert Wilkins's 1931 attempt to reach the North Pole. Lake continued to offer innovative, if unsolicited and impractical, projects for submarine utilization to the federal government. He died of a heart attack in 1945 at the age of seventy-nine.

Poluhowich, a professor of biology at West Texas A & M University, has taken the trouble to visit locations in Connecticut associated with Lake's work, including his home in Milford and the site of the Lake Torpedo Boat Company. He interviewed Lake's son in the 1970s and used the extensive Lake archives at the Submarine Force Library and Museum in Groton, apparently in the 1980s.

Poluhowich uses Lake's autobiography extensively, but he qualifies this source when he states that the "ghostwritten autobiography . . . was written with little input by Lake and was a book he was extremely unhappy with when it appeared in 1938." Readers would like to know what bothered Lake, but they will not find the answers in *Argonaut*. Given Lake's unhappiness with the book, one would expect a thorough testing of its statements and assertions; Poluhowich seems to have taken the text at face value as he proceeded in describing Lake's life.

In a life dominated by "if onlys," Poluhowich leaves many tantalizing questions unanswered. Why did so many seemingly breakthrough inventions never come to fruition? What about his near nervous breakdown and his bankruptcy? In a book that the dust jacket declares is "the most complete biography of Simon Lake," there is surprisingly little about his family or personal life. His wife of over fifty years appears rarely in the text and in the index only once, under her maiden name.

There is little material currently in print about Lake, and readers in a hurry to find out something about the man and his submarines can skim the surface of his life in *Argonaut*. Lake's autobiography, however, with whatever flaws it may possess, remains the best account of this remarkable inventor and submarine pioneer.

WILLIAM GALVANI
Naval Undersea Museum
Keyport, Washington

MARK LLEWELLYN EVANS, *Great World War II Battles in the Arctic*. Contributions in Military Studies No. 172. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1999. 165 pages, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 0-31330-892-6. \$55.00.

From Germany's occupation of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 until the closing days of World War II, the fighting in northern Scandinavia

and the Arctic waters beyond showed a determination and brutality rarely encountered in other theaters of the conflict. While the extremes of the climate and the remoteness of the locations lent a special fierceness to the combat at sea, in the air, and on the ground, the Allied mandate to supply the Soviet Union by the northern route and the corresponding German need to render such endeavors difficult and costly set the strategic framework for the war in the Arctic, especially after 1941.

Mark Llewellyn Evans, an aviation history specialist at the Naval Historical Center in Washington, revisits the struggle in the Arctic in a chronologically arranged narrative that offers not only an overview of the action and assigns a place to it in the broader context of the war, but also provides sufficient details to acquaint the reader with the most important combat engagements and their participants. Predictably, the struggle for Narvik, the PQ-17 debacle, Allied efforts to render the *Tirpitz* harmless, the Battle of Barents Sea, and the tragic end of the *Scharnhorst*, along with discussions of U-boat activities and aerial warfare, figure prominently in Evans's account. Illustrations reinforce the impression that the war in the Arctic made almost unbelievable demands on men and matériel in its grim and forbidding setting.

Was it worth the effort? Evans argues that the Arctic theater was peripheral and never crucial to the outcome of the war. Both sides committed remarkable tactical and strategic blunders and wasted precious resources that could have been employed with superior effect elsewhere. The Allied decision to run convoys to Russia was essentially a political and symbolic one designed to appease the Soviets. It made little sense economically or militarily. In fact, the Allies could have supplied Stalin just as easily and much more safely by the Iranian land route. By a similarly flawed logic, Hitler never ceased to devote naval and *Luftwaffe* resources to the Arctic theaters of operations in spite of the fact that the military threats and strategic opportunities in the region did not warrant them.

While Evans should be commended for not confusing high drama with military significance, his book nevertheless suffers from flaws and limitations. Obviously intended for a general rather than specialized readership, over long stretches, his work does little but summarize and synthesize a small selection of the existing English language literature on the subject. The few primary documents in American and British archives Evans mentions add little strength to his argument and not much color to his narrative. Not a single German source appears in the brief and dated bibliography. The same holds true for Russian, Finnish, or Norwegian works or documents. Judging by the innumerable misspelled German words throughout the text and the index, one is led to assume that Evans's linguistic skills may indeed have rendered research in continental archives and libraries problematic.

Limited research and poor proofreading are but two weaknesses of this book. Evans's account also suffers from factual inaccuracies. For instance, it claims that, during the Weimar Republic, German naval officers had to serve at least twelve years and enlisted men at least twenty-five (page 4). These numbers should be transposed. Moreover, lengthy and confusing enumerations of ships and aircraft in the text could have been avoided or streamlined by employing tables instead. One also wonders why Evans and his publisher included numerous pictures but not a single map or chart in a work whose subject matter and major argument demand a clear understanding of Arctic geography.

In short, Evans has written a reasonably solid but by no means flawless book. Readers may not find much that is new in this presentation from a research point of view. Still, if they lack a basic knowledge of operations in the Arctic theater in World War II, reading Evans's account may not be a bad way to start addressing that deficiency.

ERIC C. RUST
Baylor University
Waco, Texas

JOHN SWEETMAN, *Tirpitz: Hunting the Beast: Air Attacks on the German Battleship, 1940-44*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000. xxi + 180 pages, photographs, maps, glossary, appendix, bibliography, index. ISBN 1-55750-822-4. \$29.95.

An honorary research fellow at Keele University and head of Defense of International Affairs at Sandhurst, John Sweetman is the author of several books, including *The Dambusters Raid*, *Schweinfurt: Disaster in the Skies*, and *Ploesti-Oil Strike*. His *Tirpitz: Hunting the Beast* is the most comprehensive account of British air attacks on the massive German battleship *Tirpitz*. Sweetman's case is that *Tirpitz*, although she never engaged in naval battle, had a much greater long-term impact on British political and military policy making than her more famous sister ship, *Bismarck*. With eight 15-inch guns protected by armor up to fourteen inches thick, the fully laden *Tirpitz* displaced over 52,000 tons. Based in Norway for nearly three years, her mere presence threatened the critical convoys to Russia. She was dubbed "The Beast" by Winston Churchill. Over seven hundred British aircraft attempted to bomb, mine, or torpedo *Tirpitz* on thirty-three separate occasions between 1940 and 1944, the year that Bomber Command sank her.

After the havoc caused by *Bismarck* until her destruction in May 1941, the British were forced to keep a powerful combination of carriers, battleships, and lesser vessels ready in case Hitler decided to risk *Tirpitz* on a convoy attack. Besides pinning down British warships that were needed elsewhere (much to Winston Churchill's annoyance), Sweetman declares that *Tirpitz* had a "hidden bonus for the Germans" in that she caused naval chaos and inter-Allied friction, demonstrated by the Russian-bound PQ-17 debacle in July 1942; the fear that *Tirpitz* was about to steam over the horizon led Admiral Dudley Pound at the Admiralty to order the convoy to scatter. U-boats and the Luftwaffe sank most of the dispersed and unprotected merchant ships—only eleven of thirty-six

reached the Soviet Union. Sweetman writes that "*Tirpitz* had never been in a position to attack PQ 17" (page 38). When convoys were suspended, Stalin subjected Churchill to a torrent of abuse and insult.

As Sweetman notes, *Tirpitz* was almost invulnerable in its "Norwegian Lair." Protected by torpedo nets and the cliff-like sides of the fjords, *Tirpitz's* own antiaircraft defenses were formidable: sixty-eight close-range flak guns, later reputedly increased to ninety. In addition, air attacks were frustrated by bad weather conditions, flimsy bombs unable to scratch their target, obsolete torpedo bombers, effective smoke screen defenses, and the extremely long bomber flights involved in reaching *Tirpitz*. "Like the 1940-41 attack on *Tirpitz* in German ports, the limited effects of existing bombs undermined the bravery and skill of crews, who flew into an aerial Valley of Death time and time again" (page xii). When *Tirpitz* made a rare appearance in the open sea in March 1942, twelve biplane albacore torpedo bombers from the carrier *Victorious* attacked the armored giant. Already obsolete (like the Swordfish predecessor), two Albacores were shot down, and no more hits were scored on *Tirpitz*. Fleet Air Arm's attack did have a profound impact on Hitler, who ruled that on no account should another sortie by *Tirpitz* be risked until British aircraft carriers had been located and neutralized. Sweetman mentions the September 1943 attack by Royal Navy midget submarines, X-craft, which put the battleship out of action for months. His chapter entitled "Russian Venture, September 1944" describes Yagodnik, near Archangel. Lancaster bombers seriously damaged the starboard side of *Tirpitz*, and what was unknown to the Allies was that the Germans relegated her to a floating battery.

At length, on 12 November 1944, in a "gin-clear sky," twenty-nine Lancasters of 617 and 9 Squadrons sank *Tirpitz* with twelve-thousand-pound Tallboy bombs in just eleven minutes. If at times Sweetman is more detailed than dramatic, *Tirpitz* is a book that even the non specialist will

find well worthwhile. Although the carrier plane attacks at Taranto, Pearl Harbor, and Midway clearly indicated that the heyday of the battleship was over, Sweetman's narrative reminds the reader of the enormous effort and personal courage that were required to sink one solitary dinosaur.

COLIN F. BAXTER
East Tennessee State University
Johnson City, Tennessee

WILLIAM J. VEIGELE, *PC Patrol Craft of World War II: A History of the Ships and Their Crews*. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Astral Publishing Company, 1998. 400 pages, charts, tables, illustrations, notes, appendices, index. ISBN 0-96458-671-1. \$39.95. Order from Box 3955, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93130-3955.

While most "untold" stories deserve to remain so until gently consigned to obscurity, there are exceptions. William Veigle's history of PC patrol craft in World War II, the first account of its kind, warrants attention. Although the work often reads more like a labor of love than an exacting historical study, it succeeds in recreating a wartime experience that may have lacked glamour and prominence but contributed significantly to the Allied war effort. Part scrapbook, part anecdote collection, part documented narrative, and part reference manual, this work tries to close a void in the existing literature inasmuch as most of the PC story has until now slumbered under a blanket of benign oblivion.

Using official documents, veterans' reminiscences, English-language secondary sources, and a host of drawings, tables, and photographs, Veigle, a former patrol craft noncom turned physicist after the war, tells his story with personal engagement and obvious firsthand knowledge. Produced in several different classes mainly on inland yards and originally rushed to the front as improvised submarine chasers, some 361 patrol craft saw service before the war ended. Approximately 175 feet in

length, displacing 450 tons, carrying an average crew of sixty-five, most of them reservists, and armed with a limited assortment of surface, anti-aircraft, and antisubmarine weaponry, PCs became the true and unheralded workhorses of the navy. Their individual assignments and exploits were too numerous and varied to be easily summarized, but Veigle manages to relate a few details about the history and record of each ship besides providing overall insights into the background, construction, everyday routine, collective combat experience, and post-war fate of the PC forces.

All together, some fifty thousand men sailed in PCs as they hunted U-boats, escorted merchantmen, guided landing craft to invasion beaches, and engaged in uncounted other duties around the globe, most of them unspectacular but highly necessary. Just as the vessels themselves functioned as jacks-of-all-trades, so individual crew members came to perform a greater variety of shipboard assignments than would be the case on larger and more specialized ships. If the spit-and-polish "regular" navy may have looked down on patrol craft and their crews as falling somewhat short of ordinary standards in discipline and appearance, it also must have done so with a measure of admiration for the dedication and, not least, their sacrifice. For while PCs displayed remarkable endurance, helped sink submarines, and downed enemy planes, they were also highly vulnerable. Fifteen craft were sunk or destroyed during the war, and another twenty sustained heavy damage, mainly from collisions or grounding. On the other hand, according to Veigle's slightly optimistic estimate, PCs dispatched fifteen enemy vessels and shot down twenty aircraft in the course of their operations. After the war, virtually all of the craft were either scrapped or transferred to foreign flags.

Conceived as a monument to the patrol crafts' "forgotten" wartime service, Veigle's work, despite its limitations, should appeal to a broader readership beyond its targeted audience of PC veterans and their families. While this book clearly falls short of being the "definitive history" of the patrol

craft branch, as Veigele claims, the book does what every good literary effort should attempt to accomplish: it teaches, it entertains, and it ultimately moves its readers.

ERIC C. RUST
Baylor University
Waco, Texas

JOHN T. HAYWARD AND C. W. BORKLUND,
Bluejacket Admiral: The Naval Career of Chick Hayward. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press and Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Foundation, 2000. ix + 330 pages, illustrations, bibliography, notes, index. ISBN 1-55750-189-0. \$37.50.

"Chick" Hayward, one of the most colorful leaders of the modern U.S. Navy, allegedly lied about his age when enlisting in the service. Later, he entered the Naval Academy with the class of 1930 and eventually became a vice admiral. His career is recounted by C. W. Borklund, a well-known Washington journalist, who makes good use of Hayward's personal diaries and oral histories.

This volume presents many entertaining stories about Hayward's experiences as a naval aviator in the 1930s. In that decade, he also became involved in the technical side of aviation when, during a tour at the Naval Aircraft Factory in Philadelphia, Hayward completed all of the requirements for a Ph.D. except for his dissertation.

His World War II experience featured service in the navy's little-known, land-based bomber program. Commanding a squadron of B-24s in the South Pacific, Hayward demonstrated notable combat leadership. It is typical of his touchy, often antiestablishment outlook that he faulted his naval senior for failing to provide the support and recognition that he felt his men deserved.

Later, during World War II and immediate post-war years, Hayward worked on the atomic bomb project and served in the rocket research and development station at China Lake, California.

He developed great admiration for the scientists and engineers assigned to those programs. He insisted that the military needed to free these gifted civilians from strangling regulations and to treat them with respect.

One of the most revealing sections of Hayward's memoir recounts his command between 1948 and 1951 of Composite Squadron 5, one of the navy's first atomic bomb units. VC-5 had special importance for the navy since the service's future seemed to depend on demonstrating a nuclear capability. Nevertheless, Hayward is scathing in denouncing the risks taken in developing this force, which featured the troublesome AJ-1 aircraft. A number of his men were killed in AJ-1 accidents. He believes that the navy should have delayed activating his squadron until more reliable systems became available.

In the early 1950s, he commanded two aircraft carriers. Other duty stations included the Atomic Energy Commission and the Naval Ordnance Laboratory at White Oak, Maryland. During these tours, Hayward once again worked on the development of nuclear weapons.

After becoming an admiral, Hayward held senior positions on the navy's Washington staff during the period that Arleigh A. Burke was the chief of naval operations. Yet, he was delighted to escape from the Pentagon in the early 1960s when he returned to sea as the commander of a division of carriers. In that capacity, he participated in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The admiral's final tour was as president of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.

Following his retirement in 1968, the admiral worked in the defense industry and maintained a watchful eye on the navy. The outspoken Hayward became highly critical of the navy's leadership in the 1990s for agreeing to introduce a number of social reforms, including the integration of women, into the service. He died in 1999.

As is true of any autobiography, readers should be cautious in accepting as gospel truth all of the sea stories presented in *Bluejacket Admiral*, but

memoirs by senior naval officers are relatively rare, and few of those by twentieth-century figures are as revealing as this book. One is struck, for example, by the level of detail that Hayward and Borklund present on the technology of nuclear weapons, guided missiles, antisubmarine measures, and other systems that once were very secret. At the same time, the volume reveals the personal and financial challenges faced by the admiral's family members as they attempted to adjust to this itinerant and not very well paid naval career. The ultimate historical contribution of *Bluejacket Admiral*

may be its insights into the inner workings of the navy, including the tensions that can exist between the service's various factions. Historians, who often are puzzled by the service's culture, should be specifically thankful to Hayward and Borklund for throwing such light on the institutional aspects of the navy.

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
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


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
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
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
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
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~ SHORTER NOTICES ~

by Briton C. Busch

DAVID W. ZIMMERLY, *Qayaq: Kayaks of Alaska and Siberia*. Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press, 2000. x + 103 pages, plans, photographs, glossary, bibliography, index. Softcover. ISBN 1-88996-310-0. \$16.95.

The first edition of this book, with the slightly different title of *Qajaq* instead of *Qayaq*, appeared in 1986 to accompany an exhibit at the Alaska State Museum. The text, however, is basically the same, and offers an authoritative look at the traditional kayak design, construction, and usage in Pacific and Arctic waters. This is not a "how-to" book; indeed, some of the plans and drawings of museum-held specimens are so reduced that they are very difficult to read. On the other hand, considerable information is included on such topics as associated equipment, special kayaking techniques, and adaptations of design to such factors as the impact of climate or colonists and whalers. It would certainly be of value to any collection on small boat varieties or on the Inuit, Aleut, Chukchi, and Koryak peoples.

JOHN R. BOCKSTOCE, *Arctic Discoveries: Images from Voyages of Four Decades in the North*. Seattle: History Bank in association with the University of Washington Press, 2000. 122 pages, illustrations. Softcover. ISBN 0-29598-015-x. \$29.95.

John Bockstoce, the noted sailor, archaeologist, historian, and author or editor of eight other books on the Arctic, offers in this volume his favorite color photographs from his many expeditions, culled from many thousands taken over the years. The photographs, many quite striking, range across the Arctic from Alaska to Spitsbergen and Norway, depicting landscapes, peoples, historical sites, and so on—an interesting cross section from his remarkable career. Each picture is accompanied by a brief description or comment. This is a very handsome volume; some may find it worthwhile just for the photographs of the famous "arctic mirage," a wall of ice dead ahead when none exists—often described but seldom photographed with such clarity.

PAUL H. SILVERSTONE, *The Sailing Navy, 1775–1854*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001. xv + 101 pages, illustrations, bibliography, index. ISBN 1-55750-893-3. \$38.95.

PAUL H. SILVERSTONE, *Civil War Navies, 1855–1883*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001. xiii + 218 pages, illustrations, bibliography, index. ISBN 1-55750-894-1. \$49.95.

These two large-format (8½" x 11") reference works by Paul Silverstone are the first of a projected five-volume U.S. Navy Warship Series. Each sets

out in tabular format information on dimensions, tonnage, complement, battery, date and location of construction and commissioning, and detailed service records, including campaigns, actions fought, prizes taken, and the like. In volume one, vessels are divided into sections on the Continental navy, state navies, the United States Navy (1797–1854), the United States Revenue Cutter Service, and the Texas navy. In volume two, entries are sorted by category (armored vessels, unarmored steam vessels, etc.) separately for United States and Confederate Navy warships. Smaller vessels such as tenders and tugs are included. Volume one offers a sampling of illustrations from paintings and sketches, while volume two includes 140 historic photographs. Volume one is supplied with an appendix on “Royal Navy Losses in North American Waters,” while volume two includes a “List of Shipbuilders.” It is probably too much to ask of this series that its volumes note the source material for any given entry aside from a one-page bibliography for each entire book, but it should be noted that readers curious as to original citations are on their own. Nevertheless, these volumes, and indeed the entire series when completed, should prove most valuable for any naval research collection.

GEORG PAWLIK, *Tegetthoff und das Seegefecht vor Helgoland, 9 Mai 1864*. Vienna: Verlag Oesterreich, 2000. 176 pages, illustrations. ISBN 3-70461-627-3. ATS 498 (Euro 36,19).

CLAUDIA HAM AND M. CHRISTIAN ORTNER, EDS., *Mit S.M.S. Zenta in China . . . Aus dem Tagebuch eines k.u.k. Matrosen während des Boxeraufstands*. Vienna: Verlag Oesterreich, 2000. 160 pages, illustrations. ISBN 3-70461-586-2. ATS 478 (Euro 34,74).

Verlag Oesterreich continues its valuable series on Austro-Hungarian naval history with two new volumes, both in the same oversize (8½" x 11") and well-illustrated format, with text in German

throughout. The first is a comprehensive look by Georg Pawlik at the little-known naval combat fought between Austro-Prussian and Danish squadrons off the North Sea island of Helgoland during the brief war of 1864 over the status of Schleswig and Holstein. The Austrian victory was generally credited to Admiral Wilhelm von Tegetthoff, better known for his 1866 Adriatic victory of Lissa in which he destroyed Italy's fleet. The collection of drawings and photographs is unusual, and includes a dozen of the Danish frigate *Jylland*, restored in 1994 and now lying at Ebeltoft on the east coast of Jutland.

A generation later, the Austro-Hungarian “Torpedo-Kreuzer” *Zenta* was lying in Chinese waters as Austria-Hungary, like Germany, worked to show its flag around the world. As it happened, the visit coincided with the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. Thus the *Zenta's* crew shared in the multi-power expedition to relieve the besieged embassies in Peking. One of her crewman, seaman Anton Vierheilg, kept interesting diaries that are the main source for the volume edited by Ham and Ortner. The accompanying collection of photographs is fascinating, although it has more to do with land operations against the Boxers than naval affairs in general. An epilogue recounts *Zenta's* history from 1900 until her sinking in the Adriatic by Entente forces in August 1914.

ED RIES, *Fishing Barges of California, 1921–1998*. Laguna Hills, Calif.: Monterey Publications, 2000. 102 pages, illustrations, index.

Captain Ed Ries is a dedicated collector of California fishing lore, as he demonstrated in his *Tales of the Golden Years of California Ocean Fishing, 1900–1950*. *Fishing Barges* offers a solid history and numerous interesting photographs of the many old and unwanted sailing ships that were sailed or towed to Southern California waters from the “bone-yards” of San Francisco Bay in the 1920s and 1930s to be used in movies or as gambling or

sport fishing vessels. A combination of deliberate destruction for the films, hostile laws for the gamblers, and World War II for everybody put them all out of business, leaving only some surplus wartime barges for fishing use. The story is an important one in West Coast maritime history, and very much deserved to be told; Captain Ed's devoted research and personal recollections make this book a necessity for any collection dealing with the area. It may be difficult to find: order it directly from Monterey Publications, 25572 Sarita Drive, Laguna Hills, California 92653.

RICHARD W. BRICKER, *Mississippi's Five-Masted Barkentines: The Remarkable Story of Pascagoula's Large Wooden Sailing Ship Construction in the 1918-1920 Era*. Shortacres, Tenn.: printed by the author (1020 Shortacres Boulevard, La Porte, Texas 77571), 2000. iii + 45 pages, spiral bound. \$15.00, postage included.

This slim volume is a labor of love by Richard W. Bricker, whose first book, *Wooden Ships from Texas* (1998) went a long way toward recovering the history of the Gulf Coast ship construction in World War I. The story is continued in this booklet by turning to five, five-masted barkentines built at Pascagoula, Mississippi, by the International Shipbuilding Company (another eleven similar vessels built in Texas are discussed in the earlier volume). Bricker not only provides all details available regarding the vessels, but also furnishes an account along the way of the obstacles confronting such research. Students of American maritime history can only be indebted to independent scholars such as Mr. Bricker who are actively filling in bits of the historical puzzle and making the results available at their own expense. Any Gulf Coast maritime collection should include this inexpensive booklet.

ALAN VILLIERS, *The Last of the Wind Ships*. Introduction by Basil Greenhill. New York: W. W.

Norton, 2002. 32 pages, 55 full or double-paged black- and-white photographs. ISBN 0-39305-033-5. \$60.00.

Devotees of the many excellent books by Alan Villiers will find the title of this book confusing; it is not a reprint of his *Last of the Windships* (1934), but is instead an anthology of his photographs and writings chosen from his classic studies of the great steel square-rigged merchant sailing vessels of the 1920s and 1930s, *Falmouth for Orders*, *The Set of the Sails*, *By Way of Cape Horn*, and *Last of the Wind Ships*, recounting the several voyages of the *Herzogin Cecile*, *Grace Harwar*, and *Parma*. The photographs are better done than in the original volumes, which are in any case out of print and hard to find even in used bookshops. Villiers, in those delightful volumes published between 1929 and 1949, made a unique contribution to the literature of the sea. For a new generation, increasingly less likely to encounter the originals, this collection will serve very nicely as an introduction. A "coffee-table book" it is, but one with a rare heritage indeed.

NORMAN J. BROUWER, *The International Register of Historic Ships*. Peekskill, N.Y.: Sea History Press for the National Maritime Historical Society, and London: Chatham Publishing, third edition, 1999. 383 pages, illustrations. Hardcover. ISBN 0-93024-810-4. \$75.00. Softcover. ISBN 0-93024-811-2. \$46.00.

The third edition of this reference to historic ships afloat, restoration projects, and remains of historic ships preserved includes nearly two thousand ships from over fifty countries, one-third more entries than the second edition of 1993. New are entries on accurate full-scale replicas, as well as brief summary entries on the state of ship preservation in each country. Each earlier entry had been updated where necessary, but it should not be concluded that earlier editions are completely outdated, particularly as far as photographs are

concerned. To give only some well-known American examples, the same photograph is used of New Bedford's *Ernestina*, a different and more attractive picture of Galveston's *Elissa*, a lovely new view of Mystic Seaport's *Emma C. Berry*, but no photograph at all of San Francisco's tug *Eppeton*

Hall, although one appeared in the second edition. While not enough occurs in the world of historic ships to warrant an annual edition, certainly Brouwer is correct in believing that a revision is needed every half decade or so.

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NORTH AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR OCEANIC HISTORY Call for Papers, 2003

The 2003 NASOH conference and annual meeting will be held at the Maine Maritime Museum at Bath, Maine. The dates are Thursday, 29 May through Saturday, 31 May 2003. Accommodations will be offered at the Sebasco Harbor Resort and the Holiday Inn. A block of rooms has been reserved at each location.

NASOH members and their friends and colleagues are urged to submit proposals for papers to be presented during two and one-half days of sessions. The theme of the conference is *Seafaring in Northern Waters* and is intended to stimulate interest among students, veteran seafarers, and practitioners of maritime and naval history from the United States and Canada. The emphasis on "northern waters" should be taken to apply to both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, as well as the bays, sounds, rivers, and lakes that circumscribe and form the borders of our nations. Topics that might be included under this rubric cover everything from the history of the European voyages of discovery and conquest to warfare, fisheries, smuggling, castaways, and underwater archaeology. We particularly encourage submission of proposals covering the maritime heritage of the northeastern coast of the United States and the Maritime Provinces of Canada. Non-members are welcome to participate but will be required to pay the registration fee like anyone else.


Proposals should take the form of a one-page summary of the topic and should anticipate that presenters will be allowed only twenty minutes for their presentations. The deadline for submission of

proposals will be 1 January 2003. Presentations will be made before a plenary session audience. There will be no concurrent sessions. Those who wish to propose entire sessions should prepare a summary of each presentation and a one-page resume of each presenter for submission and submit as a group. Individuals proposing a single presentation should also include a brief resume with their proposal. The program committee will inform presenters of their selection by 1 February. Presenters should complete and submit their final drafts by 1 April. Participants are encouraged to present with visuals such as overhead slides, 35 mm slides, or Power Point and should inform the program committee as to which of these methods they will use.

Every three years, NASOH publishes a volume of selected essays based on the papers presented at the annual conferences. The most recent volume was *The Early Republic and the Sea* published in 2001 and covering conferences during the years between 1996 and 1999. The next volume will cover 2000 through 2003. Presenters should keep this in mind when composing their papers and ensure that the scholarly apparatus is in accord with *The Chicago Manual of Style*.

Please send proposals and requests for further information to Dr. Warren C. Riess, NASOH Program Chair 2003, Darling Marine Center, University of Maine, Walpole, Maine 04573. You may also e-mail <riess@maine.edu>; telephone 207-563-3146, ext. 244; or send a facsimile message to 207-563-3119.

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Author Information: Dr. Barry Gough is the author of numerous books on naval and military history. He has been awarded several distinctions for his contributions to historical literature and is past president of The Canadian Nautical Research Society. Dr. Gough is a professor of history at Wilfrid Laurier University in Waterloo. He has generously donated all of his earnings from this book to *Friends of the Haida*, to support preservation of the ship.

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
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